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This thesis consists of four articles that use administrative data to explore the Norwegian 
education system, from childcare to high school. The goal of the dissertation as a whole is to 
uncover and quantify the impact of mechanisms that explain why some students prosper, 
while others do not. The first article seeks to determine whether teachers discriminate against 
students based on observable characteristics of the students that are available to us. Previous 
literature has provided inconclusive results on whether, for example, males and immigrants 
are discriminated against in Norway and Sweden. The standard procedure has been to 
compare grades awarded by the student’s teacher (non-blind) with grades awarded by 
examiners who do not know the identity of the student (blind). This article makes three main 
contributions to the literature. First, it provides a coherent econometric framework in which to 
study grade discrimination in schools. Secondly, results are presented from several different 
types of data sets, which helps determine the underlying structure that determine teacher 
grading. Lastly, evidence is presented implying that an adjustment should be made when 
comparing non-blind and blind grading, since the scores are not directly comparable. This 
correction would partly reconcile some of the previous contradictory findings in the literature. 
Generally, this correction takes into account the fact that discrimination against students 
belonging to lower scoring groups is often more significant when holding ability fixed. 
 The second article explores the nature of peer effects in high school. Peer effects can 
be defined as a composite of factors that explain why interacting with peers with certain 
behaviors or characteristics affects a student’s own behavior. In 2005, the city of Bergen was 
exposed to a reform that changed the high school intake system from a geographical, 
neighborhood-based intake system to a GPA-based intake system. The reform greatly altered 
the composition of peer characteristics for comparable students before and after the reform. 
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The reform led to a greater degree of student tracking; low-achieving students received lower 
variation in peer characteristics and low achieving peers, while high-achieving students 
reviewed lower variation in peer characteristics and higher achieving peers. In line with recent 
findings from field experiments, we find that students from all ability levels gained from this 
reform, with low-ability students appearing to gain the most. This article makes three main 
contributions to the literature. First, we use a new type of natural experiment to explore peer 
effects. Earlier natural experiments included voucher lotteries, desegregation programs, and 
high school acceptance limits. Secondly, this article contains an analysis of tracking using a 
natural experiment. Our results are directly relevant for policymakers trying to determine 
what type of intake system to use. Third, we present evidence on several interesting high 
school outcomes such as grades, exam scores, and absence rates. 
The third article explores the effect of attending childcare on children. In recent years, 
formal childcare has become the dominant mode of care for children aged 1–5 in Norway. 
Yet, the effect of attending public childcare on different groups of children is still not well 
understood. This article employs the significant capacity buildup of the Norwegian childcare 
sector in the 2000s to explore the effect of formal childcare. The findings suggest that the 
effects of formal childcare are heterogeneous. We find no average effect of the expansion, 
while we do find positive effects in municipalities with high childcare quality, and negative 
effects in municipalities with low childcare quality. The analysis reveals that the reform 
mostly affects children aged 3–5 in municipalities with high childcare quality, while it affects 
children aged 1–2 in municipalities with low childcare quality. In addition, positive effects 
seem to be driven by children of high socioeconomic status, while negative effects are 
stronger for children of low socioeconomic status. This article contributes with an analysis of 
a recent expansion in universal childcare in Norway. The results confirm previous findings of 
positive effects for 3–5 year old children in formal childcare using a new natural experiment 
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and data set, and different outcomes. Furthermore, we employ a novel identification strategy 
in our analysis, leveraging the fact that the expansion was more comprehensive in 
municipalities with lower childcare coverage to begin with. Moreover, the results reveal 
heterogeneity that seem to be important to understand how different groups of children are 
affected by public childcare. Younger children seem less likely to gain from childcare. The 
findings show negative effects for children of low socioeconomic status in low-quality 
municipalities, and no effects for these children in high-quality municipalities. This adds to 
the discussion on how public institutions affect intergenerational transmission of inequality in 
outcomes.  
The fourth article explores how the care of children is affected by a reform that 
increased the price of formal childcare. To gain a deeper understanding of why some children 
benefit from formal childcare while others do not, it is important to have detailed information 
on what the alternative mode of care is for different types of children. The Cash-for-Care 
benefit was introduced in 1998 and provides funds to parents who do not send their 1–2 year 
old children to formal childcare. We find that for the households that are affected by this 
reform, the main alternative mode of care is parental care. The main alternative for 
households of low socioeconomic status is parental/relative care, whereas the main 
alternatives for families of high socioeconomic status include day parks and nannies as well 
as parental care. The analysis also reveals that care decisions for young children change due 
to price changes in formal childcare, with point estimates of price elasticities of -0.33 and -
0.25. This article focuses more closely on the effects of the CFC reform on children than does 
previous literature. The analysis uses survey data that allow for a detailed inspection of 
responses to the reform. Moreover, the survey data are compared to administrative data to 
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1 Introduction 
This dissertation contains four empirical articles exploring the determinants of human capital 
accumulation in Norway. The first article compares teacher-given (non-blind) grades and 
externally and anonymously graded (blind) grades to examine the extent of discrimination in 
schools in Norway. Its primary contribution is to provide evidence on the relationship 
between non-blind and blind grades with subject ability, and evaluate the consequences of 
deviations in this relationship between the two grades. The second article examines the high 
school intake system in a particular municipality in Norway, Bergen, to explore how a change 
in peer characteristics influences student outcomes. We add to the literature with an 
examination of a natural experiment that allows us to explore the effects of dividing students 
into groups based on prior ability across high schools. The third article uses a capacity 
expansion of childcare in Norway to study the effect of attending childcare facilities on later 
test scores. We employ a novel identification strategy for this question, using pre-reform 
coverage rates and studying in particular childcare quality and heterogeneity by child age. The 
fourth article explores household responses to a reform that changed the price of formal 
childcare. In contrast to the current literature, we focus on the effects of this price change on 
the care arrangements for children rather than on parents’ labor market outcomes. 
The articles share certain common elements. Firstly, they all take advantage of high-
quality administrative registry data: Norwegian registry data received the highest ratings in a 
study carried out by Atkinson, Rainwater, & Smeeding (1995). Secondly, all the articles seek 
to identify causal effects and exploit natural experiments for identification. Natural 
experiments are different from laboratory or field experiments in that they involve contexts 
that are generated by a reform, policy change, rule, or natural disaster rather than by the 
researcher(s). 
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While each analysis is set in a specific circumstance, time, and place, they all aim to 
contribute to the general knowledge of the nature of human capital accumulation. Quantifying 
the contribution of different factors is a task that is developing rapidly as empirical methods, 
economic theory, data quality, and concepts evolve. 
The next sections contain summaries of each article in the dissertation, followed by a 
































1.1 The Extent of Biased Grading at School 
The first article is part of a growing literature that explores discrimination in the education 
system. The analysis of discrimination in schools is seen as an important area alongside 
discrimination in the labor market (hiring, wages), housing, and law enforcement (policing, 
judges, lawyers). Becker (1957) developed a theory of discrimination based on the concept of 
“taste for discrimination.” This occurs when an agent discriminates a group because he has a 
disutility associated with that group. In the labor market context, the standard example often 
referred to is the case when employers dislike working with people from a particular group, 
and is willing to pay a higher wage to employ a person outside that group with equal 
productive attributes. The model provides predictions for firm performance and wage 
differentials under various conditions. 
The concept of taste for discrimination can readily be applied to the school-grading 
context. Examples where teachers base grading on group membership or student 
characteristics other than objective attributes that are supposed to be included in the student’s 
grade can occur because of teachers’ preferences. Teachers then grade because they like a 
group of students better than another group, or that they do not agree on the common set of 
course objectives, and grade based on other attributes of the student. 
An alternative theory explaining why discrimination occurs is often referred to as 
“statistical discrimination” (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973). In this model, the discriminating 
agent gets a noisy signal about another agent’s ability, while at the same time having prior 
information on the average ability of different groups (Aigner & Cain, 1977). The 
discriminating agent then bases his or her decision on both the noisy signal and the prior 
information on group averages to make a decision. If females are more productive on average, 
and an employer is supposed to hire a job applicant based on one interview, the employer is 
using information both from the interview of both the male and female, and prior information 
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about the higher female group averages to decide whom to hire. If the male and female 
perform equally well in the interview, the female is hired because of the higher average 
productivity of females. A similarity can be drawn to the school-grading context, when the 
teacher is supposed to give a grade based on a course or exam performance. This framework 
implies that teachers use both observed performance of the student and other characteristics 
observable to the teachers (group means, for example) to set the grade. 
The theories of taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination can explain 
why teachers discriminate in grading. If teachers engage in taste-based discrimination, 
measures to reduce teachers’ ability to perform discretionary grading would lead to a 
reduction in this type of bias. For example, being more specific about what should be 
included in the grade. Implementing this measure would not necessarily improve the situation 
if the discrimination were explained by statistical discrimination. In this case, implementing 
measures to reduce the noise in grading would help reduce discrimination of all individuals. 
In some contexts, to measure the extent of discrimination is to identify specific 
characteristics and determine if that is used to discriminate. For example, in hiring decisions, 
holding all other characteristics fixed, how much more/less likely is an immigrant to be hired? 
The reason for this is that the law states that employers are not allowed to discriminate based 
on certain characteristics. Employers are of course still allowed to discriminate based on other 
traits that also are not necessarily directly job-related. It is possible to argue that, in the school 
setting, this analytical approach to measuring discrimination is less appealing. There are two 
reasons for this. First, being a member of a specific group holding all other characteristics 
fixed is an abstract exercise and may have little relevance to how discrimination works 
outside randomized controlled experiments. This is an argument that can also be made against 
measuring this type of discrimination in labor market contexts. Second, discrimination in 
school will manifest in the grades that students receive. All types of discrimination may 
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therefore explain outcome differences between groups. For example, if employers and 
teachers do not discriminate based on gender, but boys behave worse than girls, then taking 
the bad behavior into account would not be considered discrimination in hiring settings since 
employers can take this into account even if it does not affect the ability to do tasks. However, 
if teachers based grading on behavior when behavior is not supposed to be included, we argue 
that this bias is worth measuring. 
 
1.1.1 Measuring School Discrimination Using Administrative Data 
The goal of this paper is to assess whether differences between assessments by the student’s 
own teacher (non-blind scores), and tests graded anonymously (blind scores), can be 
interpreted as discrimination by teachers. We focus on two types of data generating processes 
of the blind and non-blind scores. The first type occurs when the student’s own teacher and 
another examiner are marking the same exam. As in most previous studies, the second is a 
data-generating process in which the student’s own teacher and an external teacher are 
marking different tests that are meant to measure the student's knowledge of the same 
material. We present a parsimonious econometric framework that shows, for each data-
generating process, the assumptions under which one can identify bias in teachers’ assessment 
from a comparison of blind and non-blind test scores. This framework lays the groundwork 
for our empirical analysis, where we use data from the Norwegian school system to estimate 
and interpret differences between non-blind and blind assessment of students. 
The literature that compares non-blind and blind evaluations of students’ performance 
begins with Lavy (2008). The study tests for gender stereotyping in Israeli high schools by 
comparing grades given by teachers that know the students (non-blind) to grades of teachers 
that do not know the students (blind) of two exams that test the same skills. Using a 
difference-in-difference (DD) design, the study found evidence of a bias against male 
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students. This finding has been confirmed in studies from other countries. Lindahl (2007) 
compared the non-blind assessments and blind test score evaluations of Swedish students, and 
found the same gender difference as well as a difference favoring non-native students. Falch 
and Naper (2013) found the same pattern at the end of lower secondary school in Norway. 
In these studies, non-blind and blind evaluations were not of the same test. The 
findings suggesting positive discrimination of females may actually suggest that there is 
something else that is the reason for this difference. Hinnerich et al. (2011, 2015) collected 
data that allow comparisons of non-blind and blind evaluations of the same exam in Swedish 
schools. In these studies, an external teacher that does not know the student grades the same 
exam as a teacher that knows the student. The main findings from the two studies is that, even 
though local teachers raised grades on average, the results do not suggest the existence of any 
gender bias, while they find evidence of discrimination against students with foreign 
backgrounds. 
We call datasets that include a non-blind and blind score of two tests that are meant to 
test the same skill of the student administrative datasets. Datasets with non-blind and blind 
evaluations of the same test we call non-administrative. Writing out a model for grades in 
administrative data lets us clearly discuss the content of grade differences. Let us assume that 
!!"!, the grade given by the teacher in the administrative data, can be written as 
 
!!"! = ! !!" + ! !!" + !!!" + 1− ! !!" + !!"! 	
	
! !!" = ! !!", !!" = ! + !!!" + !!!"	
	
! !!"  is the biased grading function, or simply the bias. The function ! !!"  explains why 
some students perform relatively better under in-class tests graded by the teacher. The 
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variable !!" is a vector that contains !!", which are some observable characteristics to the 
researcher and the teacher. !!" represents student behavior in class, and !!" is a compound of 
other information about the students that the teacher use to grade. In particular, !!" is, for 
example, other student abilities/behavior, grades in other subjects, or previous grades. 
Importantly, in administrative data, !!" could also include other subject skills not tested in the 
blind test. !!" and !!" are not necessarily observable to the researcher. The variable !!" is the 
ability being measured in the external test. The parameter ! is the fraction of that ability that 
is measured by the teacher, or reflects the difference in learning goals weighting between 
internal and external examiners. !!"!  is an idiosyncratic error. The parameter ! captures grade 
inflation, and ! captures discrimination in favor of a group of students with observable 
characteristics !!" , while !  and 1− !  capture the effects of components that are 
unobservable to us but that are used by the teacher when grading exams. 
The grade given on the exam by the external grader is !!"! 
 
!!"! = !!" + !!"! . 
 
The grade difference can then be written as: 
 
∆!"! = !!"! − !!"! = ! !!" + ! !!" + ! − 1 !!" + 1− ! !!" + !!"! − !!"! . 
 
The parameter ! represents the difference in the relationship between subject ability 
and non-blind and subject ability and blind. The literature that discusses structural parameters 
in the estimation of bias is concerned with the size of !. This is because it is seen as an 
indicator for whether two tests used to measure discrimination measure the same skills. For 
example, Terrier (2016) uses an instrumental variable strategy for French data and cannot 
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reject that ! is 1. Estimating the size of ! is important in determining the size of bias 
conditioning on subject ability. According to our model, the grade difference will then be a 
function of subject ability if rho is different from 1. To estimate the size of !, we use a 
grouping strategy (Deaton, 1985) by regressing the grade difference on grouped blind score 
averages. Our results using this strategy suggest that ! tends to be below 1. We find evidence 
of this both when two teachers grade different exams and when teachers that know the 
student, and teachers that do not, grade the same exam. Finding a !  below 1 in the 
administrative data may indicate that the two tests actually measure different skills. However, 
finding such a relationship in the non-administrative data suggests that there also is another 
explanation. For example, the students’ teacher has additional information or face different 
incentives. 
Our model emphasizes the importance of !!". If the other information used by teachers 
in grading is subject skills not tested in exams, grade differences could reflect this. When one 
uses administrative data where the non-blind to blind grade differences come from different 
tests, it is important that one use tests that are meant to test the same skills. For example, 
teacher assessments normally cover more material, and one group could be better at one part 
of the material one year. By using recordings from several years, this should not matter if the 
material in exams changes year to year to cover all learning goals in a subject. In our project, 
we have been careful to use teacher assessments in subjects where oral performance does not 
count. For instance, we did not use recordings of grade differences in English since, in this 
subject, there is an oral component in the learning goals, and there is not a separate oral 
teacher assessment grade in English. The model also emphasizes the possible content of 
! !!" . If groups of students perform differently under different types of exams, grade 
differences between groups could be due to this phenomenon, and not bias. 
To evaluate the importance of these issues in our administrative data, we use data 
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from trials where local and external teachers grade the same exam. In this case, the fact that 
one group of students performs better under one test type cannot explain group differences. In 
addition, the problem of two tests testing different subject skills disappears. For the 
administrative sample we study, our results do not suggest that these factors explain the group 
differences. However, further analysis should work to obtain additional data to increase the 
precision of the estimates. 
Lastly, our model makes it possible to discuss how to interpret discrimination 
estimates. Discrimination, or stereotyping, can be seen as the bias one group receives 
compared to another, holding all other factors constant. How do teachers’ gender stereotypes 
affect grading? Our model makes it clear that this is not possible to measure using the audit 
data we have available. This is because other student characteristics that teachers use in 
grading, !!" and !!", can be correlated with groups. For example, male students could behave 
worse than female students. To measure discrimination based on student characteristics, 
holding all other factors fixed, one needs to randomize student characteristics, as done by 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) and Hanna and Linden (2009). 
The consequence of taking into account that rho is less than 1 is that it reveals that the 
gender bias holding ability level constant is somewhat larger than not holding the ability level 
constant. Furthermore, when estimating bias between groups that have larger ability 




1.2 Peer Effects from a School Choice Reform 
The question of how peer effects operate remains unsettled. When referring to peer effects in 
school, one is typically interested in how the ability of an individual’s peers influence that 
individual’s outcomes. There are multiple motivations behind this interest. For example, 
school administrators or policymakers may have an incentive to organize students within or 
across schools to achieve the best learning outcomes for all, such as increasing the mean 
outcome. The existence of peer effects then becomes an important part of the decision on how 
to group students within or across schools. Furthermore, parents of school-age children have 
an interest in knowing what environment most enriches their child’s learning experience. It is 
difficult for parents to choose specific study partners for their children, but they can influence 
it by deciding the type of school to which they will send their children. The existence of peer 
effects will have greatest consequences for the individual student. For example, the influence 
of a high- versus low- ability study partner can significantly affect an individual’s future 
outcome. Lastly, researchers want to learn about peer effects as one of many components that 
can explain why some students prosper, while others do not. 
This article contributes to the literature that uses natural experiments to examine peer 
effects. The types of natural experiments that have been used earlier include housing vouchers 
(Kling, Ludwig, & Katz, 2005; Kling, Liebman, & Katz, 2007; Ludwig et al., 2013; Chetty, 
Hendren, & Katz, 2015), busing students (Angrist & Lang, 2004), and school assignment 
lotteries (Clark, 2010; Jackson, 2013; Abdulkadiroğlu, Angrist, & Pathak 2014). This article 
contributes by using a school choice reform to study peer effects. In 2005, the norwegian city 
of Bergen experienced a reform that changed the composition of students at different high 
schools. The reform changed the intake system from a catchment area approach to a 
performance-based intake system. One consequence of implementing the new system was the 
concentration of high-ability students at certain high schools in the central area of Bergen. 
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Since we aim to keep school type and travel distance fixed, the identification of peer effects is 
based on comparing the outcomes of the same type of students that attended these downtown 
schools before and after school choice reform to comparable students in other cities. The 
group of students that attend these attractive schools are high-ability students who reside in 
the downtown area, where high ability is defined as those scoring in the top 25% of their 
cohort in a city. They attended the downtown schools before reform because they lived in 
those schools’ catchment areas and they attend downtown schools afterward because they still 
have that option, and there are few reasons for them to increase travel time to attend a school 
in the suburbs. The study shows that high-ability students in downtown Bergen attend schools 
with students that had on average 0.65 standard deviation (SD) higher middle school GPAs 
after reform. This is equivalent to moving from the median school to a school among the top 
10% of pre-reform schools in Bergen and comparison cities. The evidence suggests that some 
exam scores increase as a consequence of the reform for this group of students.  
For lower-ability students, the reform implied attending high school with less variation 
in peer achievement. Consistent with recent findings (Boiji et al. 2017, Carrell et al. 2013, 
Duflo et al. 2011), our results suggest that high school performance for these students 
increased as a consequence of the reform. The intake reform led to a natural experiment that 
generated a type of tracking similar to that achieved in experiments. The reform makes it 
possible to identify effects on high ability students of changing peers from mixed to high 
ability (high-high). For low ability students it is possible to find effects of changing peers 
from mixed to low (low-low). The effects of this type of tracking are relevant in cases where 




1.2.1 School and peer effects 
There is an extensive literature from the US on the effect of attending Catholic high schools 
(Coleman, Hoffer, & Kilgore, 1982; Bryk, Lee, & Holland, 1993; Evans & Schwab, 1995; 
Figlio & Stone, 1999; Grogger et al., 2000; Altonji, Elder, & Taber, 2005), and more recently 
the effect of attending charter schools (Hoxby & Rockoff, 2005; Hoxby, Murarka, & Kang, 
2009; Gleason et al., 2010; Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2011; Dobbie & Fryer, 2011, 2015; Angrist 
et al., 2016). The results from studies of Catholic schools show positive effects, while there 
are emerging results of clear positive short and long run effects of attending some types of 
charter schools.  
Even though disentangling school effects from peer effects is not the main focus of 
these studies, it remains an important issue. It is likely that good schools attract ambitious and 
high-achieving students. At the same time, it is important for policy reasons to know whether 
it is the schools or the peers that drive the positive effects of attending attractive schools. If it 
is the schools, then one policy implication is that one should study the successful schools so 
as to learn from and adapt their approaches in other schools. School effects also point to the 
importance of recruiting and retaining good teachers and indicate that increasing the resources 
available to schools for enhancing quality will improve student outcomes. On the other hand, 
if it is the peers at good schools who are responsible for the observed positive effects, 
increasing school resources could be a needless use of public resources.  
One aim of this paper is to disentangle school effects from peer effects. Using a school 
choice reform, we argue that we were able to identify peer effects on a group of students who 
did not change school type. The treatment effect of the school choice reform can be written 
as:  
!!! − !!! = !! 
The effect of the intake reform is not constant across students: 
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!!"  =  !!" +  !!" + !!"  + !!", 
where ! indicates high ability students, ! indicates downtown students, !!"  is the peer effect, 
 !!! is the school effect, !!" represents the effect of a change in travel distance, and !!" is 
the incentivizing effect of the school choice reform. Since we restrict the sample to high-
ability downtown students, we assume initially that the intake reform does not affect travel 
distance or type of school, since these students still attend nearby schools of the same quality. 
However, we find that high-ability downtown students move systematically between 
downtown high schools as a consequence of reform. This may be an indication that 
downtown schools are not all of the same type, and that high-ability downtown students 
actually do experience school effects. Nevertheless, since movement of high-ability 
downtown students between downtown schools is limited, only a fraction of the identified 





1.3 Universal Childcare, Childcare Quality, Starting Age, and School 
Performance 
The effects of early childhood education have gained increasing interest among social 
scientists, politicians and especially economists. There is now an emerging consensus that the 
positive effects of high-quality childcare can be significant for children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds (Anderson, 2008; Heckman et. al, 2010). A next step for research is to examine 
whether it is possible to scale up those interventions, which have previously been effective in 
high-cost programs of limited reach, and achieve the same effects. The literature on targeted 
programs can also be extended by examining the effects for different groups of children, such 
as those not from disadvantaged backgrounds or very young children. The main way to 
answer these questions comes from studying large-scale public childcare programs, regarding 
which the literature has thus far provided mixed conclusions.1  Performing randomized 
experiments on such a large scale in this setting is generally considered unfeasible, so natural 
experiments are used to identify treatment effects. Baker, Gruber, & Milligan (2008) is an 
early example of a study on universal childcare programs in the 1990s in Canada. The 
Province of Quebec introduced a program that greatly increased the level of subsidies for 
childcare places. As a consequence, childcare attendance increased in Quebec compared to 
other Canadian provinces. Comparing the measures of health and behavioral outcomes in 
Quebec with the rest of Canada they find evidence that children in Quebec are worse off on 
several dimensions. 
Havnes & Mogstad (2011) looked at a natural experiment from the Norwegian 
childcare system. Their study used a 1970s reform that led to a large-scale capacity increase 
in childcare in only a few years. Since the reform was implemented several decades ago, the 
authors were able to look at the adult economic outcomes of the children affected by the 
																																																								
1	“Childcare” is the common UK term employed in this thesis; “day care” is common in other 
countries.	
2	In both Norway and Denmark, family daycare is mostly a home-based care alternative that normally 
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reform. Comparing children living in municipalities that had high childcare coverage 
expansion to those from municipalities with low coverage expansion, the study finds positive 
effects of universal childcare on adult labor market outcomes.  
This article contributes to the literature by studying the effect of a universal childcare 
expansion on child outcomes. While Havnes & Mogstad (2011) looked at a capacity 
expansion that occurred in the 1970s, this article uses a more recent large-scale expansion as a 
source of plausible exogenous variation in childcare attendance. The 2000s have seen a rapid 
increase in Norway’s number of young children in childcare. From 2000 to 2010, the 
proportion of children aged one and two in childcare increased from 38% to 79%. The 
increase in capacity can be attributed in part to “The Childcare Agreement” reform of 2003, 
when several measures were implemented to increase childcare coverage across the country. 
There had been large variations in the existing coverage for one- and two-year-olds across 
municipalities. The reform included several measures that led municipalities with low 
coverage to increase their coverage rates to a greater extent than municipalities that already 
had higher coverage rates. Pre-reform childcare coverage rates are thus a strong predictor of 
the level of childcare expansion in the 2000s. The empirical strategy employed in this article 
relies on comparing the outcomes of children that live in municipalities with low-pre reform 
coverage (high expansion) to children that live in municipalities with high pre-reform 
coverage (low expansion) before and after the reform. Differences in changes in test scores 
could then be attributed to the childcare expansion.  
 
1.3.1 Empirical specification and findings 
The empirical specification, using pre-coverage rates, follows Duflo (2000, 2004) in a school 
setting and Løken et. al (2017) in an eldercare setting. The specification is based on a 
difference-in-difference strategy (DD). The main difference from a standard DD strategy is 
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that we rely on a pre-reform indicator to measure the intensity of the childcare expansion over 
time, instead of having a treatment and comparison group of municipalities measured both 
before and after an expansion. The contrast with a standard DD specification can be 
illuminated trough a simple two-period formal example. Individual test scores can be written 
as: 
!!"!"#$ = !! + ! + ! !! + ! + !!" 
 
!!"!"# = !! + !!! + !!", 
where !!"!"#$ is the 5th grade test score for individual child ! in municipality ! for cohorts born 
after (!"#$) the childcare expansion, !!"!"# is the test score for cohorts of children born before 
the expansion, !! is a time-invariant municipality fixed effect reflecting the fact that children 
in different municipalities score differently, ! is a municipality-invariant time effect that 
indicates the common change in test scores from before to after the expansion, !!" and !!" are 
error terms reflecting all other factors that can influence test scores, !! is the coverage rate 
measured before the expansion, ! indicates the relationship between test scores and childcare 
coverage rates before the expansion, and ! shows how this relationship changes after the 
expansion. For simplicity, we keep to the two-period case here, as it is easily extended to the 
standard regression DD model. Following the notation used by Duflo (2004), the pre-post 
difference can be written as: 
 
!!"!"#$ − !!"!"# = !!! + ! + !!"        (1) 
 
Our main interest in this article is to estimate !. Writing the model as in Eq. (1) makes 
especially clear the assumption upon which the identification relies. !!"!"#$ ,!!"!"#  are the 
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average municipality test scores. An estimate of ! can be obtained by regressing the change 
in municipal-level average test scores from before and after the reform on pre-reform 
coverage rates. The fact that different types of municipalities have high or low coverage rates 
should not influence estimation, since municipal fixed effects are differenced out. That is, we 
are comparing changes in test scores within municipalities. Our identification relies on !!’s 
not being correlated with any factors that remain in the error term !!". This term reflects all 
other factors that can influence changes in test scores from before to after the reform. Without 
a pre-reform indicator of expansion, a common procedure in the literature is to replace !! with 
a dummy !! that indicates whether the actual expansion in a given municipality was large or 
small. The advantage of our method compared to that approach is the fact that it is easier to 
accept that !!", which can be seen as a change in unobserved factors that affect test scores 
before and after reform, is independent of the pre reform coverage rate, than to accept that the 
actual change in childcare coverage is independent.  
An estimate of the parameter β can be obtained by estimating the following regression: 
 
!!"# = !! + !!! + !(!! ∙ !!)+ !!"#, 
 
where !! is the indicator for post-reform cohorts. It is this last specification that is used to 
produce our findings. The results do not indicate that the childcare expansion had any average 
impact for the children exposed to it.  
Municipalities are then split into groups according to where they ranked in the 
distribution of municipality-level proportions of preschool teachers among pedagogical 
leaders (pedagogical leader are a childcare position type that requires certified education). 
The group of municipalities with the highest proportion of preschool teachers among 
pedagogical leaders is called “high-quality” municipalities, while the group with the lowest is 
	30	
called “low-quality” municipalities. Estimating the effect of childcare expansion on high-
quality municipalities, we find positive effects on child test scores, while we find negative 
effects on child test scores in low-quality municipalities. It is important to note that 
observable inputs to childcare are not randomly distributed across municipalities. Even 
though we find positive effects of the expansion in municipalities with better-educated staff 
and negative effects in municipalities with less well-educated staff, other explanations are 
possible. In particular, we observed that the two groups of municipalities increased coverage 
for different age groups differently. Positive effects are found in the group of municipalities 
that expanded access mostly to older children, while negative effects are found among 
municipalities that largely expanded access to children aged one or two years. Based on these 
findings, an important starting point for further investigation is therefore to disentangle the 
role of child age and childcare quality in determining the return on attending childcare. 
Furthermore, the results point to an important heterogeneity in the effects based on child 
characteristics. The heterogeneity discovered resonates with some of the previous literature on 
public childcare programs. The positive effect of Norwegian public childcare for three- to 
five-year-olds is in line with the findings in Havnes & Mogstad (2011, 2015). Negative 
effects for younger children are similar to the results in Baker, Gruber, & Milligan (2008). 
Our results are also consistent with Gupta & Simonsen (2010), who found negative effects of 
family daycare on boys whose mothers had vocational-track education.2 We find negative 
effect in low-quality municipalities on children in low-socioeconomic status families, and no 
positive effect on this group in high quality municipalities. Our findings suggest that 
examining how quality, age, and these child characteristics interact is important to be able to 
evaluate more accurately how public childcare programs affect children’s future outcomes. 
																																																								
2	In both Norway and Denmark, family daycare is mostly a home-based care alternative that normally 
cares for younger children and is often run by parents. This form of care is public subsidized in 
Norway.	
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Large expansions of childcare programs that influence different groups of children are likely 




1.4 Households’ Responses to Price Changes in Formal Childcare 
Nominal childcare prices in Norway fell from 2002 to 2010; in the same period, there was a 
significant increase in childcare attendance.3 From 2002 to 2010, childcare attendance for 
children aged one or two rose from 41% to 79%. Increased capacity, family structure, 
attitudes, childcare quality, and price are all factors in explaining this growth in childcare 
attendance. This article seeks to determine how childcare utilization responds to a change in 
the childcare price. Norway’s Cash-for-Care (CFC) reform was enacted on 1stAugust 1998. 
By 2002, it provided 3,000 NOK (1€ ~ 7.5 NOK in 2002) monthly for each one- or two-year-
old child that they did not send to childcare. The size of the benefit corresponded to about 
108% of the price of childcare. To analyze the consequences of this price change on formal 
childcare attendance, we compare differences in childcare attendance rates of eligible children 
aged one or two to non-eligible children aged three to five before and after reform. 
Using the CFC reform, we find that childcare attendance of one- and two-year-olds 
declined by 14.4 percentage points by 2002, corresponding to a price elasticity of -0.35. From 
a public policy perspective, it is important to analyze how childcare attendance responds to 
prices, especially in a regulated market in which the authorities have significant influence in 
setting prices. However, it must be emphasized that the response to a price change in 2002 
might be very different than to a similar price change in 2017, for several reasons. 
Households at the margin of enrolling a child in childcare in 2002 and 2017 may be different, 
with their decisions perhaps depending on the income level. There may also be different 
levels of excess demand. A change in attitude that places more expectations on mothers to re-
enter the labor market earlier after birth, which would make price less influential in the 
enrollment decision, could also be important. These factors counsel caution about 
																																																								
3	The household surveys used in the analysis show that the average cost of childcare for one child in 2002 where 
2707, while it was 2110 in 2010. The 2010 amount adjusted for inflation is 1804.	
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extrapolating the findings of this study to offer conclusions about how a similar benefit 
introduced in 2017 would affect childcare attendance.  
In addition to advancing the understanding of the response to a price change in 
childcare on formal childcare participation, we present evidence on alternative modes to 
public childcare. To understand in appropriate depth how increased childcare attendance 
affects children in the long run, it is essential to understand what the alternatives are. For 
example, the effect of increasing childcare attendance may differ if the counterfactual mode 
of care is informal caregivers as opposed to parental care. The results suggest that parental 
care is the most important counterfactual care arrangement, since this form of care increased 
9.4 percentage points after the 1998 reform. Nannies appear somewhat less important, with an 
increase of 3.6 percentage points.  
In 2002, about 41% of children aged one or two and 84% of children aged three to five 
attended childcare. Availability, family structure, and childcare quality are arguably constant 
across children in these two age groups at any given time. The main explanations for 
differences in attendance rates between these two groups are therefore differences in 
preferences for childcare for younger and older children and price differences between the 
two groups. The CFC benefit is the main reason why prices for childcare slots differ for the 
two groups of children. If there were no difference in parental preferences regarding childcare 
for younger and older children, it could be argued that the CFC benefit would completely 
explain the gap in attendance rates. 
The difference in price between 2002 and 2010 and the difference in price between 
children aged one or two and children aged three to five provide two potential ways of 
calculating the price elasticity of childcare. For example, the inflation adjusted decline in 
average parental payment from 2002 to 2010 was (2707 – 1804) = 903 NOK. Calculating 
elasticity with this method gives ((0.79-0.41)/0.41)/((1804-2707)/2707) = -2.78. 
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Alternatively, one can use the difference in price across age groups in 2002 to calculate the 
price elasticity for a middle-income household: ((0.82-0.40)/0.40)/(3000/2600) = 0.91. Both 
numbers could be considered upper bounds on the price elasticity and thus suggest that other 
factors prominent in the period 2002–2010 have contributed to the rise in childcare attendance 
for one- and two-year-olds. There has been a great increase in availability, especially 
following “The Childcare agreement” reform of 2003. 
Understanding how childcare attendance responds to childcare prices is important 
from a public policy perspective. Using easily available estimates to estimate the response 
may provide deeply misleading assessments of how attendance rates respond to childcare 
prices. This article uses a 1998 reform that substantially increased the price of childcare for 
one group of children, while leaving it unchanged for another. This provides us with a causal 
estimate of the effect of a price change on childcare attendance. At the same time, it allows us 
to analyze different aspects of household behavior that have not previously been studied in 
great depth.  
 
1.4.1 Model and previous literature 
Identification relies on comparing the differences in childcare attendance rates of eligible 
children (aged 1–2) to non-eligible children (aged 3–5) before and after reform. The DD 
model can be specified through the potential outcomes framework. Let !!! and !!! be the 
potential childcare use for an individual with and without a price change in formal childcare: 
!!! − !!! = ! 
! !!!"# = !! + !!, 
where ! indexes age group, ! indexes the individual child, ! indexes time, and ! is the causal 
effect of the policy. In the absence of any price changes, childcare attendance is determined 
by a time-invariant age effect (!!), and an age-invariant time effect (!!). Let !!" be a dummy 
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indicating children aged 1–2 after the implementation of the CFC reform. Observed childcare 
attendance can then be written as: 
!!"#  = !! + !! + !!!" + !!"#, 
where !!"# is an error term that includes other factors that can determine attendance rates. 
The 1998 CFC reform has previously been analyzed in studies with a primary focus on 
its effect on parents’ labor force participation. For example, Naz (2004) compared the labor 
force participation of parents of one- and two-year-olds and parents of three- to five-year-olds 
before and after reform. This is similar to the identification strategy described above. The 
main conclusion of that article is that specialization within the household increased following 
the reform: mothers decreased their labor market participation, while there was little change 
in their husbands’ labor force participation. Using administrative data, Schøne (2004) shows 
that the effect is somewhat smaller after controlling for macroeconomic factors by employing 
a difference-in-difference-in-difference strategy. 
This study adds to the previous literature studying Norway’s CFC reform by focusing 
on the effects of a price change in childcare on the children involved. Part of the motivation 
behind this approach is to help explain the results found in studies of the effects of childcare. 
For this purpose, this article contains an investigation of what the alternative mode of care is 
for one- and two-year olds. While we use the CFC reform here, these reveal something 
general about the price sensitivity of parents to childcare prices. The CFC reform constituted 
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Abstract 
Do biased perceptions and behaviors affect teachers’ assessment of students? To investigate 
this question, a number of studies use data on two different scores for the same individuals: 
one non-blind score based on classroom tests assessed by the student’s own teacher and one 
blind test score based on a national exam marked externally and anonymously. In the absence 
of bias in teachers’ assessments, it is argued, there should not be significant differences in the 
gaps in blind and non-blind scores between different groups. This article present a 
parsimonious econometric framework that distills out the assumptions necessary to identify 
group bias in teachers’ assessment from such a comparison of blind and non-blind scores. 
This framework lays the foundation for our empirical analysis, where data from the 
Norwegian school system are employed to estimate and interpret differences between non-
blind and blind assessments. The results suggest that the relationship between the subject 
ability and non-blind results tends to be different from the relationship between subject 
ability and blind results. Evidence of this is found both when grades are recorded when 
teachers grade the same test and when they grade based on different assessments that are 
meant to test the same skill. The difference between non-blind and blind will therefore be a 
function of the skill tested. This leads to different estimates of the group bias when holding 
ability fixed. 
 
Keywords: Discrimination; bias; human capital; test scores 











Economists and policymakers are keenly interested in the existence and importance of 
stereotyping and discrimination by schoolteachers. One question receiving particular 
attention is whether gender-biased perceptions and behaviors affect teachers’ evaluation of 
students. To answer this question, a number of studies compare teachers’ average marking of 
boys and girls in a classroom exam assessed by the student’s own teacher (non-blind scores) 
to the respective means in a nationally set exam marked externally and anonymously (blind 
scores). This approach was pioneered in Lavy’s (2008) study of gender bias in Israel, and 
subsequently, it has been applied to data from many other countries (see, for example, 
Lindahl, 2007; Cornwell, Mustard, & Van Parys, 2013; Burgess & Greaves, 2013).1 These 
studies report significant differences across groups in blind and non-blind test scores, and 
interpret these differences as evidence of stereotyping or discrimination by teachers. 
The goal of this paper is to assess whether and in what situations systematic 
differences between non-blind and blind assessment across groups can be interpreted as 
evidence of stereotyping or discrimination by teachers. We focus on two types of data 
generating processes of the blind and non-blind scores. The first type occurs when the 
student’s own teacher and an external examiner are marking the same test. As in most 
previous studies, the second is a data-generating process in which the student’s own teacher 
and an external teacher are marking different tests that are meant to measure the student’s 
knowledge of the same material. We present a parsimonious econometric framework that 
shows, for each data-generating process, the assumptions under which one can draw causal 
inferences about bias in teachers’ assessment from a comparison of blind and non-blind test 
																																								 																				
1 Differences between non-blind and blind assessment across groups have been used to measure discrimination 
or stereotypes in several other settings (see, for example, Blank, 1991; Goldin & Rouse, 2009). An alternative 
approach to measuring discrimination or stereotyping is to randomly assign certain characteristics (e.g., gender) 




scores. This framework lays the groundwork for our empirical analysis, where data from the 
Norwegian school system is employed to estimate and interpret differences between non-
blind and blind assessment of students. 
Importantly for our analysis, the Norwegian data offer information on two sets of 
blind and non-blind scores. One set of scores is generated by assessment of the same test by 
examiners that do not know the identity of the student and the student’s own teacher. The 
other set of scores comes from assessment on different tests (testing the student’s knowledge 
of the same material) by external examiners and the student’s own teacher. As in previous 
studies, the results show that the scores of boys and girls differ significantly in the non-blind 
classroom assessments marked by the student’s own teacher as compared to the scores in a 
nationally set exam marked remotely and anonymously by an external examiner. If data from 
two evaluations of the same test are used, a similar difference appears, though it is not 
statistically significant. A possible explanation for a potential difference between the two 
types of data is that females tend to perform better than boys in classroom tests assessed by 
their own teacher as compared to nationally set exams marked by an external examiner. 
Another is that female students are better at a potential skill only tested in teacher assessment 
compared to boys. The result shows that the relationship between subject ability and non-
blind grades is different from the relationship between subject ability and blind grades. This 
is found even when teachers grade the same exam. This leads to different estimates of the 
group bias when holding ability fixed.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides 
background on the Norwegian school system, discusses how exams are set and assessed, and 
describes our data. Section 3 presents the econometric framework, laying out the possible 
sources of differences in blind and non-blind test scores. Section 4 describes and discusses 
our findings, and the final section offers some concluding remarks. 
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2 Institutional Background and Data	
This analysis employs data comparing exams that are graded externally and anonymous with 
local teacher evaluations. These records will be referred to as the administrative data. In 
addition, we have been given access to files from experiments in two different areas 
comparing the same test graded anonymous and by the students’ teacher. These records are 
called the non-administrative data. This section gives an overview of the education system, 
focusing on the importance of the tests, how grading is undertaken, and a data and variable 
description. 
 
2.1 The Norwegian Education System	
The Norwegian pre-college education system consists of primary school (level 1-7), lower 
secondary school (level 8-10), and upper secondary school (level 11-13). Both primary and 
lower secondary schools are compulsory. The majority of students attend a public institution, 
and even private institutions are funded and regulated by the Ministry of Education and 
Research. There are generally no tuition fees. 
Norwegian municipalities operate primary and lower secondary schools. At the 
primary school level, all students are allocated to schools based on fixed school catchment 
areas within municipalities. With the exception of some religious schools and schools using 
specialized pedagogic principles, parents are not able to choose the schools to which their 
children are sent (except by moving neighborhoods). There is a direct link between 
elementary school attendance and attendance at middle or lower secondary schools (ages 13–
16/grades 8–10), in that elementary schools feed directly into lower secondary schools. In 
many cases, primary and lower secondary schools are also integrated. At the end of middle 
school, students are evaluated both non-anonymously by their teachers for most subjects 
taught in school, and in addition anonymously and externally in one to two central exit 
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exams. 
At the end of 10th grade, students apply for upper secondary school. The high schools 
have two main tracks, vocational and academic. They are administered at the county level 
(above the level of municipalities) and are not mandatory in Norway, although, since the 
early 1990s, everybody graduating from middle schools is guaranteed a slot in high school. 
Admissions procedures differ across counties for upper secondary schools. In most 
counties, students can freely choose schools, but in others, children are allocated to schools 
based on well-defined catchment areas, or high school zones. In both regions we focus on, 
students are free to choose schools within their regions. This means that middle school grades 
are important for intake to schools and tracks where there is competition. 
At the middle school level, the final Gradepoint is based on teacher evaluations of in-
school performance, as well as central exams. The Gradepoint summarizes student 
performance at school, and is used for track and school placement later. Both oral and written 
performance are assessed in some subjects, and both oral and written exams are given. Our 
data show that, in the period 2000–2010, students had on average 14.0 teacher-given grades 
and 1.37 written exam grades and 1.0 oral exam grades in middle school.2 In middle school, 
the Gradepoint consists of the average grade times 10, where all topics (exams and in-school 
assessments) have a grade between 1 and 6. A new Gradepoint is calculated at the end of high 
school, and is the average grade on all high school exams and subjects times 10. In addition 
to Gradepoints, points are given according to specific criteria to make up the final measure 
that determines school and track placement at post-secondary education. It is also common to 




2 In the same period, students had on average 22.4 teacher-given grades and 6.5 exams (oral and written) at 
academic track high schools. 
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2.2 Grading 
Grading principles are set by the Education Act (Opplæringslova). It is stated that teacher 
course evaluations shall be based on to what degree students have achieved the competence 
goals, stated by the subject-specific and nationally set learning goals. For most subjects, the 
final teacher evaluation grade is set based on achieved competence in the late spring each 
year. Notably, it is specifically stated that student behavior (orden og oppførsel) is not to be 
reflected in grading, and (of course) that student background should not count in grading. 
Effort is allowed to be included in grading in gymnastics. Teacher course assessment grades 
are set before the grading of exams. Normally, schools have a local test called Tentamen near 
the end of each semester in middle school. It is an important part of the teacher’s final 
evaluation. 
Students do not have an exam in each subject. At the end of middle school, students 
are drawn to take Norwegian, Math, or English written exams. Students drawn to Norwegian 
perform two exams, one for each official written language (Bokmål and Nynorsk). The 
written exam is nationally prepared and corrected by two sensors that are external to the 
school and who do not know the identity of the student. Students are also drawn to perform 
an oral exam in any subject, which is administered at the local level. The exams are part of 
the evaluation of the students’ achieved competences in a subject according to the centrally 
set learning goals. The learning goals have an oral component in some subjects. We focus on 
teacher assessments in two subjects, Math and written Norwegian, where the oral component 
does not matter. Thus, teacher assessments and the national exams we use are supposed to 
test the same skills. 
For two regions, Rogaland and Bergen, we have the non-administrative datasets. In 
the spring of 2015, the school authorities in the municipality of Bergen conducted an 
experiment on all students at middle schools in Bergen. For the high-stakes Tentamen at the 
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end of 10th grade, an additional teacher graded the tests anonymously, in addition to the 
students’ teacher in that topic. All students take the Tentamen in Math, English, and 
Norwegian, but it varies by class in which subject an additional teacher graded the test 
anonymously. We have information on the gender of the students, as well as whether they are 
immigrants or not for a part of this sample. The teacher that was to grade the test 
anonymously was another teacher at the same school. Therefore, it is likely that all teachers 
knew that this experiment took place. 
For Rogaland, we have a similar dataset at the high school level. Here, a student’s 
tests were graded both by teachers at the same school and by an external group of examiners 
elected by the county-level school authorities. The test is a locally administered end-of-year 
exam. In contrast to Tentamen, the grade on this exam appears as a separate grade on the 
students’ certificates and counts in calculating their Gradepoints. In addition, students’ names 
do not appear on their exams. This is different from centrally administered exams in that the 
students’ local teachers participate in both making and grading the exam.3 In addition to the 
external group of examiners that grade the tests anonymously for the blind evaluation, two 
teachers grade the locally administered exams for the non-blind evaluation, one of which is 
the student’s teacher. The other is a teacher external to the school. The procedure in the first 
year, 2010, was that 6 schools were drawn to provide 10 exams each (at random) and 
submitted to the school authorities. Then a group of external examiners were chosen to grade 
the exams. Half of the tests this year were in Mathematics and half were in Norwegian. In 
2012 and 2013, the experiment was followed up and extended to include more schools. In 
these years, the schools were also randomly drawn. We do not have any observable 
characteristics of the students for this dataset. Nevertheless, we can still examine the pattern 
in non-blind and blind scores, and compare it to the results from in the administrative data. 
																																								 																				
3	 In Math one part of the exam is made at the county level, and one part on the school level. In 
Norwegian the whole exam is made on the county level.	
	 46	
The experiment in Bergen was performed at the middle school level, while the 
Rogaland experiment was performed at the high school level. The comparable administrative 
data is at the same school level. As discussed in this section, there are some differences 
between scores within the non-blind and blind definitions. Table 1 summarizes institutional 
details about the grader, number of graders, etc. 
[Table 1] 
One thing to note from Table 1 is that in the data from Rogaland, the blind grade in 
the administrative data is the same as the non-blind in the non-administrative dataset. For the 
administrative data, the score on the local exam is defined as blind since the name does not 
appear on the test, while the teacher knows the student’s identity for course assessments. In 
the non-administrative data, the same score on the local exam is non-blind since the student’s 
teacher grades the exams, while external examiners give the blind scores. 
Since 2012, the standard has been that exams in Norwegian are written on a computer, 
while exams are written on both paper and digitally in Mathematics. For the experiment 
conducted in Bergen, the Norwegian tests are written digitally, while the Mathematics tests 
are written on paper. 
Failing a course assessment or an exam (local or external) in middle school, the 
student will still be able to attend high school, but it may have consequences for the student’s 
options regarding track and school placement. If the student fails a compulsory course 
assessment or compulsory exam in high school, he or she will not be able to complete the 
education in that track. Failing the Tentamen does not have any direct consequences other 
than being negative for the course assessment.	
 
2.2.1 Variable Definitions 
For the administrative dataset, we are able to match middle and high school grades to 
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register-based files. Students are defined as having a low socio-economic-status (SES) if 
none of their parents have completed college/university and the father has earnings below the 
50th percentile in the income distribution of fathers in the sample. Students are categorized as 
immigrants if they have one or two parents born in a non-Western country. The register-
based files also provide information on the student’s gender. The grade files provide 
information on which school the student attended for each year the grade is registered. 
We have split the administrative data into three main samples. The first is a sample of 
grades given to students at the same schools, years, subjects, and level as in the experiments. 
The second is a sample of grades from all middle schools/high schools in Bergen/Rogaland 
from the same years, subjects, and level, while the third contains grades from these areas 
given in the period 2008–2015 for the same subjects and levels. The grades in the non-
administrative data are from 2015 in the Bergen experiment, while grades are from 2010, 
2012, and 2013 in the Rogaland experiment. 
School administrators supplied data from the experiments directly to us. In the Bergen 
experiment, we were able to derive grades, school, year, gender, class, subject, and a personal 
identifier. For the Rogaland experiment, in addition to grades, we have information on the 
school, subject, and year.	
 
3 Setup 
3.1 Notation and Modeling 
3.1.1 Data-Generating Processes 
The data are from two different data-generating processes.4 The first is the non-administrative 
data, which are based on the experiments that assigned the same test in Bergen to be graded 
by different examiners. Here, we can observe student ! at school (or class) ! taking only one 
																																								 																				
4 The model is explained in terms of the institutional setup for Bergen, since it is here we compare non-
administrative and administrative group coefficients. Differences in the setup for Rogaland are presented in the 
institutional details and data section, and will be discussed in the results section. 
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test. The grade student ! receives from her teacher is !!! (non-blind grading result), whereas 
the one from the other grader is !!! (blind grading result of the same exam). Therefore, we 
define the grade difference using non-administrative data as ∆!!, where 
∆!! = !!! − !!!. 
The second set of records is the administrative data. For this data-generating process, 
we can observe student ! at school (or class) ! now taking two different tests: a blind exam 
and a teacher assessment at her own school, which is graded by her own teacher. The grade 
student ! receives from her teacher is !!!, whereas the grade from the external graders is !!!. 
Therefore, we define the grade difference using administrative data as ∆!!, where 
∆!! = !!! − !!!. 
 
3.1.2 Grades Given by Students’ Own Teacher in Non-Administrative Data 
Let us assume that !!"! , the grade given by the teacher in the non-administrative data, can be 
written as 
!!"! = ! !!" + !!!" + !!"! . 
The function !(∙) expresses how the teacher at school (class) ! affects student !’s grade. We 
assume that !(∙) has the following functional form: 
! !!" = ! !!", !!",!!" = ! + !!!" + !!!" + (1− !)!!". 
The function !(∙) is the biased grading function, or simply, bias. It describes how teachers 
bias grades according to student characteristics. The variable !!" is a vector that contains !!", 
which are some observable characteristics to the researcher and the teacher. !!" represents 
student behavior in class, and !!" is a compound of other information about the students that 
the teacher uses to grade. In particular, !!" is, for example, other student abilities/behavior, 
grades in other subjects, or previous grades. !!" and !!" are not necessarily observable to the 
researcher. The variable !!" is the true ability being measured. The parameter ! reflects the 
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relationship (mapping) of that ability to the score given by the teacher. !!"!  is an error. The 
parameter ! captures grade inflation, ! captures discrimination in favor of groups of students 
with observable characteristics !, and ! and (1− !) capture the effect of components that 
are unobservable to us but that are used by the teacher when grading exams. 
There are two components of !!"! . The first one, !!"! , is specific to the grader when 
assigning a grade to student !. The second one is a component reflecting the student's 
idiosyncrasy, !!", which is not related to the grader. For example, !!" may be any deviation 
(luck, not feeling well on the day of the internal exam, etc.) that makes the student’s grade 
not reflect exactly his or her level of ability !!". Thus, 
!!"! = !!"! + !!". 
For those reasons, we rewrite the previous equation for !!"! as 
!!"! = ! + !!!" + !!!" + 1− ! !!" + !!!"+!!"! + !!"     (1). 
 
3.1.3 Grades Given by Students’ Own Teachers in Administrative Data 
Let us assume that !!"!, the grade given by the teacher in the administrative data, can be 
written as 
!!"! = ! !!" + ! !!" + !!!" + 1− ! !!" + !!"! .	
! !!"  is the biased grading function in the administrative data. The parameter ! reflects the 
relationship of ability !!" to the score given by the teacher. !!" measures a compound of other 
abilities that are captured by the teacher grade in administrative data. Note that an important 
difference here from the non-administrative data is that we do not include this term in the 
biased grading function. This is because, in the administrative data, the two different tests can 
actually measure different subject skills. The function ! !!"  explains why some students 
perform relatively better under in-class tests graded by the teacher. Finally, !!"!  is some 
variation, containing, for example, an error that is due to the grader, !!"! , and another coming 
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from the student, !!", as he or she may have different performance at another time due to 
various causes. That is, 
!!"! = !!"! + !!". 
Let ! !!"  be 
! !!" = ! !!", !!" = ! + !!!" + !!!".	
We write ! !!"  as 
! !!" = ! + !!!" + !!!".	
!!"! is then 
!!"! = ! + !!!" + !!!" + ! + !!!" + !!!" + 1− ! !!" + !!!" + !!"! + !!"			(2). 
 
3.1.4 Grades Given by External Reviewers 
The grade given on the exam from the external grader is !!"!. 
!!"! = !!" + !!"! . 
We then write 
!!"! = !!"! + !!", 
where !!"!  is the measurement error that is specific to the external evaluator when assigning a 
grade to student ! and !!" is the same term that explains deviations between grades and skills 
that appeared as a component of !!"! . We therefore rewrite the equation for !!"! as 
!!"! = !!" + !!"! + !!"     (3). 
 
3.2 Parameters of Interest 
The biased grading function !(∙) is unknown and is the main object of interest. We want to 
learn how teachers distort grades. For example, as in Lavy (2008), do teachers favor girls? Or 
is it another reason for this difference, as suggested in Hinnerich, Hoglin, and Johanneson 
(2011). 
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Identification of the parameters !, !, and ! is not feasible without imposing some 
untestable assumptions. For example, we do not observe !!", !!", or !!", which may be 
arbitrarily correlated with !. However, the relevance for explaining outcome differences 
between groups of separating out the effect of those variables is not clear, as all can have an 
effect on future outcomes. In what follows, we show what can be identified from the non-
administrative data we have available. We also show what under different assumptions can be 
identified by administrative data. The main threat to identifying relevant bias in the 
administrative data would be the function ! !!"  and the difference between !!" and !!". If 
some students perform better at in-class exams, or if the teacher assessments and national 
exams actually tests different skills, then this should not be characterized as bias. 
 
3.3 Identification Using the Non-Administrative Data 
3.3.1 Identification Using Non-Administrative Data: ! = ! 
We have that the variable that measures differences in grades, ∆!!, in the non-administrative 
data can be written as 
∆!"! = !!"! − !!"! = ! !!" + !!"   (4), 
where 
!!"! − !!"! = !!" 
captures differences in error terms coming from the fact that grades are given by two 
different people (teacher, !!"! , and external reviewer, !!"! ) for the same exam. We assume that 
the error !!" is idiosyncratic and not related to any of the other variables on the right-hand 
side. The differences in grades are equal to !(∙) plus the unobserved component !!": 
!"
! = ! + !!!" + !!!" + !!". 
Identification of the parameters !, !, and ! is not possible without further 
assumptions because ! and !!" are arbitrarily correlated. In this case, the unobserved 
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component !!" is uncorrelated to the function ! !!"  and is not the reason the structural 
parameters of the biased grading function are not identified. Even though we cannot identify 
! and !, we can identify the parameters of the regression of ∆!"!  on !:5 
! = !"# ∆
! ,!
!"# ! = ! + !
!"! !,!
!"# !  (5) 
The parameter ! can be interpreted as the total effect of a given characteristic ! on 
the differences in grades. For example, suppose that teachers do not favor girls (! = 0), but 
that girls are typically better-behaved in class than boys and that teachers reward girls for 
their behavior. Thus, !"# !,!  and ! are both positive. In that case, ! is positive even though 
! equals zero. Nevertheless, given that ! and ! are correlated, any intervention that tries to 
minimize bias in grading will necessarily be a policy whose overall effect will be measured in 
terms of !, not !. The intercept ! can be written as 
! = !(∆!)− !! ! = ! − (! + ! !"# !,!!"# ! )! !  
 
(6). 
Again, the mean bias, !, is not identifiable, but the parameter that will be used to measure the 
effectiveness of bias on outcomes is not !, but !. 
 
3.3.2 Identification Using Non-Administrative Data: ! ≠ ! 
The difference is then equal to the function of interest, !(⋅), a function of the skills being 
measured. Moreover, the unobserved component ! is: 
!"
! = ! + !!!" + !!!" + ! − 1 !!" + (1−  !)!!" + !!"     (7). 
Even though we cannot identify ! and !, we can identify the parameters estimated by a 
regression of !! on !: 
																																								 																				
5 When ! is a vector, the usual matrix notation has to be employed. We present the simple regression algebra 
just to facilitate the exposition of the argument. 
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! = !"# ∆
! ,!
!"# ! =
!"# !+ !!!" + !!!" + !− 1 !!" + (1−  !)!!" + !!",!
!"# !  
 
! = !"# ∆
! ,!
!"# ! = ! + !
!"# !,!
!"# ! + !− 1
!"# !,!
!"! ! + (1−  !)
!"# !,!
!"# !  
(8). 
 
The parameter ! will then consist of gender bias, differences in behavior correlated with 
gender, and a function of how gender is correlated with the different skills and information 
that teachers use in setting grades. Importantly, note that, in this case, it is not obvious that ! 
is the only parameter of interest for evaluating how the total amount of bias affects student 
outcomes. In particular, it is interesting to know, for a given ability in a subject, the total 
amount of bias one group receives compared to another. The alternative parameter of interest 
would be: 
 
! = !"# ∆
! ,! !
!"# ! =
!"# !+ !!!" + !!!" + !− 1 !!" + (1−  !)!!" + !!",! !
!"# !  (9). 
One way of obtaining an estimate of this would be to insert ! into the right-hand side of 
Equation (7), using !!"!: 
!!"! = !!" + !!"! + !!" 
!!" = !!"! − !!"! − !!" 
Inserting into Equation (7):  
∆!"! = !+ !!!" + !!!" + !− 1 !!"! + 1−  ! !!" + !!"! − !!!"! − !− 1 !!"     (10). 
Because the errors in −!!!"! − ! − 1 !!" are correlated with !!"!, a regression of ∆!"!  on !!" 
and !!"! would not yield the parameter of interest: 
 
! =
!"# ∆! ,! !!
!"# ! ≠ ! =
!"# ∆! ,! !
!"# !  
 
(11). 
A solution to this problem is to obtain an unbiased estimate of ! − 1  and fix this parameter 
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in the estimation of Equation (7). 
 
3.4 Using Administrative Data 
For the administrative setting, differences in grades can now also be explained by differences 
in test-type specific performance and differences in the skills that the assessments measure. 
The grade difference can now be written as: 
∆!! = !!! − !!! 
= ! !!" + ! !!" + ! − 1 !!" + 1− ! !!" + !!"! − !!"! 	
= ! + ! + ! + ! !!" + ! + ! !!" + ! − 1 !!" + 1− ! !!" + !!"! − !!"! + !!" − !!"	
 
In this case it is important to notice that: 
• Although ! !!"  and ! !!"  are functions of observable (G) and unobservable !, they 
have different interpretations. So, a general function ! !!" = ! !!" + ! !!"  is not 
measuring biased grading, but the biased grading effect over the fact that some groups 
of students (e.g., females) perform relatively better under in-class exams than under 
external exams. Therefore, we cannot necessarily claim that ! !!"  is biased grading. 
• If ! is different from 1, the grade difference is a function of the competence level of 
the skill being evaluated. The closer to 1, the smaller the effect of subject-specific 
ability on the grade difference. Thus, for ! < 1, and as in the non-administrative 
setting, differences in grades ∆!! will depend directly on skills being measured. In 
contrast to the non-administrative setting, the reason for ! < 1 is not only different 
grading practices between external and internal teachers, but could also be due to tests 
measuring different subject skills. 
• Unlike in the non-administrative setting, !!" ≠ !!", as these two objects come from 
different exams and luck or feeling ill on an exam day may differ across days. 
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In what follows, we impose some assumptions that allow us to identify parameters 
related to the biased grading function using administrative data. 
 
3.4.1 Identification Using Administrative Data: ! = ! 
We have that 
∆!! = !!! − !!! = ! !!" + !!"    (12) 




! + !!" − !!". 
As with non-administrative data, we assume that !!" is idiosyncratic, and that !!" and ! are 
independent. Thus, one can identify the coefficients of a regression of ∆!! on !, exactly as in 
Equations (5) and (6). The key difference here is that the interpretation of these coefficients 
would be different, since ! ∙  is not null. Specifically, they will reflect both bias and 
differences coming from different test types. Note that both types may explain outcome 
differences between groups. However, this combined effect could rather be described as the 
effect of grading schemes rather than bias. 
 
3.4.2 Identification Using Administrative Data: ! = ! and ! ∙ = ! 
We have that 
∆!! = !!! − !!! = ! !!" + !!"          (13). 
In this case, the parameters of equations Equations (5) and (6) could be identified. 
 
3.4.3 Identification Using Administrative Data: ! ≠ ! and ! ∙ = ! 
We have that 
∆!! = !!! − !!! = !+ !!!" + !!!" + !− 1 !!" + (1−  !)!!" + !!"
! − !!"! + !!" − !!"    (14). 
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Even though we cannot identify ! and !, we can identify the parameters of the regression of 
∆!! on !: 
 
!′ = !"# ∆
! ,!
!"# ! = !′ + !′
!"# !,!
!"# ! + !− 1
!"# !,!
!"# ! + (1−  !)
!"# !,!
!"# !  
(15) 
The parameter !′ will then consist of gender bias, differences in behavior correlated with 
gender, and a function of how gender is correlated with the different skills and information 
that teachers use in setting grades. Again, it is not obvious that !′ is the only parameter of 
interest for evaluating how the total amount of bias affects student outcomes. In particular, it 
is interesting to know, for a given ability in a subject, the total amount of bias one group 
receives compared to another. An alternative parameter of interest would be: 
 
!′ = !"# ∆
! ,! !
!"# !  (16) 
A way to estimate total amount of bias conditional on subject-specific ability is to use the 
blind score: 
!!"! = !!" + !!"! + !!" 
!!" = !!"! − !!"! − !!" 
Inserting into Equation (14): 
∆!"! = !+ !!!" + !!!" + !− 1 !!"! + (1−  !)!!" + !!"
! + !!" − !(!!"! − !!")    (17) 
Because the errors in −!(!!"! − !!") are correlated with !!"!, a regression of ∆!"!  on !!" and !!!! 
would not yield the parameter of interest: 
 
!′ =
!"# ∆! ,! !!
!"# ! ≠ !′ =
!"# ∆! ,! !
!"# !  
 
(18). 
A solution to this problem is to obtain an unbiased estimate of ! − 1  and fix this parameter 
in the estimation of Equation (17). 
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3.5 Comparing Non-Administrative with Administrative Data 
Under certain assumptions, administrative data may not be useful for testing for the existence 
of biased grading. A potential reason for that has to do with the fact that blindly and non-
blindly graded exams may differ because these are two different tests. Thus, it is likely that 
the abilities being measured may be different (! ≠ !), or that the systematic reaction to the 
exam may be different (! ! ≠ 0). These factors are the main potential reasons resulting from 
administrative data but do not necessarily identify the same objects as results from non-
administrative data. The next section will provide evidence on the difference in estimates 
produced when using data based on the same exam and data based on different assessments 
meant to test the same skills. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of blind and non-blind grades for both non-administrative 
and administrative datasets. Grades are reported for Math and Norwegian, separately. We 
also report proportions of students by gender, immigration status, and SES. 
[Table 2] 
Each column presents the different samples used in the analysis. Column (1) shows 
summary statistics for the Bergen experiment, while Column (2) shows statistics for middle 
school grades for the same schools, year, subjects, and level in the administrative data. 
Columns (3) and (4) show administrative middle school grades for all students in Bergen the 
same year, subject, and level, and in the period 2008–2015, respectively. In Column (5), 
statistics from the Rogaland experiment are reported, while Columns (6), (7), and (8) report 
statistics from administrative samples that include the same schools, years, subjects, and 
levels as in the experiment; all schools in Rogaland the same years, subjects, and levels; and 
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these grades in Rogaland recorded in the period 2008–2015, respectively. 
The total number of observations from the experiment in Bergen is 99. Most students 
take the Tentamen in Norwegian, Math, and English, but only one test for each student was 
selected for re-grading. For the administrative sample, all students are drawn to perform a 
national exam in Norwegian, Math, or English. The number of observations is fairly similar 
to that in the experiment, 105, which is reasonable given the similar system of all students 
being exposed to anonymous grading in one subject. There are relatively more recordings in 
Norwegian in the Bergen experiment. For our estimates to be unaffected by the proportion of 
exams in a particular subject, inverse proportion subject weights are used in the empirical 
specifications. In the Rogaland experiment, the experiment was carried out by drawing a 
sample of exams from each school. There are thus more observations for the same schools 
from the administrative data than in the experiment. 
The averages of Math grades are lower than the averages of Norwegian grades, and 
average blind grades are lower than average non-blind grades. Standard deviations are lower 
in Norwegian than in Math, but there is not any pattern in the differences in standard 
deviations between blind and non-blind grades. This does not suggest a leniency bias or 
centrality bias (Landy & Farr, 1980; Prendergast, 1999). However, if non-blind includes more 
or different attributes than blind, a centrality bias based on subject-specific ability might not 
appear as lower standard deviations in non-blind. This is because the different attributes 
included in non-blind may lead to additional variation in this variable. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the grade difference between the non-blind and 
blind grades. Depending on the type of data being used, the grade difference could be a sum 
of several terms and does not necessarily reflect only the teachers’ biased grading, or bias. In 
administrative data, as discussed in the previous section, differences in grades could be 
because of teachers’ biased grading, that students perform better at one type of exam, or that 
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non-blind and blind grades relate differently to the subject-specific skill. In the non-
administrative data, in addition to noise, differences in grades are a sum of teachers’ biased 
grading and that non-blind and blind map differently onto the subject-specific skill. Table 3 
presents summary statistics of the grade difference both when aggregating subjects and by 
subject. Weighted delta (grade difference) is computed by using inverse proportion subject 
weights. A standardized measure of the difference is constructed by dividing by the standard 
deviation of the blind exam grade. 
[Table 3] 
In every subject, the average grade difference is positive. In the non-administrative 
data from Bergen, the difference is 0.17 standard deviations (SD) of blind exam, whereas in 
the corresponding administrative data, it is almost three times larger (0.42 SD). In contrast, 
the non-administrative differences in Rogaland are about twice as large as the difference in 
the corresponding administrative data. Average differences are smallest in Math, both in 
absolute terms and relative to variation in blind grades. According to our model, there are 
several possible explanations for this. The parameters of the biased grading function, !(!), 
may be different in different subjects. This could, for example, be because there are different 
types of teachers. Disparities in grade differences across subjects could be explained by the 
fact that there are differences in student performance across test types in the two subjects. For 
example, students perform relatively better at in-class exams compared to external exams in 
Norwegian, compared to Math. Lastly, the students’ teachers could weigh skills the students 
are better at more than external teachers, or in addition, for the administrative data, students 
are better at the subject skills tested in the non-blind test that are not tested in the blind test. In 
our model, this would mean that ! and ! differ across subjects, or ! and ! differ across 
subjects. A general pattern to notice is that examiners external to the school seem to lead to 
lower grading. The grade difference is higher in Bergen administrative than non-
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administrative, while the reverse is true for Rogaland. At the same time, the external graders 
to the school are grading the blind in the administrative data for Bergen, and in the non-
administrative for Rogaland. 
 
4.2 Comparing Estimates of Bias in Administrative and Non-Administrative Data 
Table 4 focuses on the non-administrative data from Bergen and compares them to the 
administrative data from Bergen. The Bergen experiment is particularly interesting because a 
variable for the observable characteristic gender is available, which is used to estimate a 
coefficient that can be compared to the coefficient obtained from the administrative data from 
the same year, schools, level, and subject. 
[Table 4] 
The table presents results from regressions with grade difference as the dependent variable. 
According to our model, the parameters shown in Equations (5) and (6) would be the correct 
expressions for the population regression coefficients on group dummies under the 
assumption that the non-blind and blind relationship to subject skill is the same (! = 1 and 
! = 1). In addition, for the administrative data, students do not perform differently under 
different types of tests (! ! = 0). 
First, Column (1) shows the results including only subject dummies on the right hand 
side. Since within transformation on the all of the binary variables used in Table 4 have been 
performed, the intercept reflects the weighted average grade difference. Adding an indicator 
variable for gender, Column (2) shows that the gender coefficient is close to 0, with a 
standard deviation of 0.098. Column (3) displays results when school-interacted fixed effects 
are included. This increases the gender coefficient to 0.12, though it stays statistically 
insignificant. Columns (4), (5), and (6) show the same specifications performed on a sample 
of students from the same schools, years, level, and subjects, using administrative data. The 
	 61	
weighted average grade difference is much larger in the administrative data, which may be 
due to the blind graders being external to the schools. Alternatively, students may perform 
better on in-class exams, or better at the skills tested by in-class exams, but this is not what 
was suggested by the data from Rogaland shown in the descriptive statistics of grade 
differences. An explanation for the higher standard errors in the results in the administrative 
data is that the variation in student performance across different tests is included as 
unexplained variation. Results in Columns (1), (2), and (3) and (4), (5), and (6) show that we 
are not able to reject the null hypothesis of no gender bias in either the administrative or non-
administrative data, respectively. The evidence does not suggest that the explanation for the 
positive gender coefficient in administrative data is that females perform better at in-class 
tests than external exams compared to males, or that females are better at the skills tested by 
the in-class tests. Three points are important to note about the non-administrative data for 
Bergen. First, the low sample size makes it difficult to make any precise statements on the 
size of gender bias. Thus, the true gender coefficient derived from the comparable sample in 
the administrative and non-administrative may actually be different. Second, the setup for the 
Bergen trial make it possible that all teachers knew about the fact that the grading where to be 
audited. This is different from normal grading of students. Lastly, only two schools were 
available, and grading in these schools can be different from a representative sample of 
schools. 
In Column (7), we include all students in Bergen. The intercept is relatively similar as 
in results from the two experiment schools, suggesting similar grading in these schools and 
the rest of Bergen. Column (8) shows a significant coefficient at the 5% significance level of 
0.086, which is close to the estimate with school-interacted fixed effects in the non-
administrative data. Including school-interacted fixed effects in Column (9) increases the 
coefficient to 0.098. 
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According to our model that describes the content of blind and non-blind grades, there 
could be several reasons for finding non-blind-blind grade differences that are different 
across groups in the administrative data. Teacher-biased grading, different performance 
across test types, and two tests measuring different skills can all be potential explanations. 
Our results do not suggest that different performance across test types, or that the two test 
measure different skills, explain the findings for the gender coefficient in the administrative 
data. However, data limitations make us carful to conclude about the existence of gender bias 
only relying on the non-administrative sample from Bergen. 
 
4.3 The Relationship between Non-Blind, Blind, and Subject Ability 
It is important to determine the relationship between non-blind and subject ability, and blind 
and subject ability. If these relationships are unequal, it has consequences for the 
interpretation of grade differences. The slope parameters estimated in Table 4 would then be 
more correctly described by Equations (8) and (15). For example, grade differences between 
groups could arise just because the two groups are at different ability levels in the subject 
(Burgess & Greaves, 2013). There could be several reasons for why the relationship to 
subject ability differs between the two grades. Tests could measure different skills, or graders 
are looking at different skills when grading. It is also possible that teachers that know the 
student avoid giving the student a failing grade, while, for an external grader, it is easier to 
fail a student. 
One approach to evaluate this relationship is to rearrange the variables in our model 
by inserting !!"! for !!", as shown in Equations (10) and (17). Blind scores are measuring 
ability with an error. Therefore, !!"! is correlated with the unexplained part in this equation. 
Because of this, a simple regression of the grade difference on blind score does not reveal ! 
or !, but with a classical measurement error in blind yields a negatively biased estimate of 
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these parameters. 
There are two main ways to investigate the importance of measurement error in blind 
score. First, one could use lagged blind scores as an instrument. The main problem with this 
procedure is that teachers and the student generally have information on previous and other 
exam grades the student receives. It is therefore possible that lagged blind grades have a 
separate impact on non-blind grades. In our model, this is reflected in the terms ! in the non-
administrative data and ! in the administrative data. The other method is to use a regression 
of the grade difference on grouped average blind score (Deaton, 1985). In our case, the 
natural way to group students is by school. Table 5 shows these estimations for data from 
Bergen. 
[Table 5] 
The table shows results from regressions of the grade difference on individual blind 
score and school blind score for administrative data in Columns (1)–(4), and for non-
administrative data in Columns (5)–(8). Recordings from more years, 2008–2015, are 
included in the administrative sample to increase precision. The difference between the 
specification used in Columns (1) and (2) is that school-interacted fixed effects are included 
in Column (2). This lowers the coefficient on blind scores from –0.25 to –0.22 and suggests 
that the negative relationship between the grade difference and blind score is partly explained 
by school factors. The difference between the specifications in Columns (3) and (4) is that 
blind score-interacted fixed effects are included in Column (4). Column (3) shows a negative 
relationship of –0.35 between the grade difference and school average blind.6 This 
relationship cannot be explained by classical measurement errors in blind score since this is a 
precise estimate of the school-level ability. There could, however, be other school-level 
																																								 																				
6 The regression is performed at the individual level, while school blind is the school average blind for the 
subject the individual recording is measured in. This specification simply allows for appropriate weighting by 
school size, while at the same time including subject weights in the regression. School averages are calculated 
without own recording. 
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factors that contribute to the negative relationship between group differences and school 
blind. For example, schools with higher average blind scores are less lenient in non-blind 
grading. Including blind score-interacted fixed effects reduces the size of the school blind 
coefficient by 0.21, suggesting that a substantial portion of the negative coefficient is not due 
to school-level factors. These results are in line with the explanation that a large part of the 
negative coefficient on blind score is due to non-blind and blind grades mapping differently 
onto subject ability in the administrative data. 
A reason for the negative relationship between the grade difference and school blind 
could be that non-blind and blind tests in the administrative data actually measure different 
subject skills. Even though Table 4 did not indicate it, this could lead to the gender 
coefficient reflecting that females perform better at the subject skills tested in non-blind, but 
not in blind. Columns (5) and (6) show that the coefficient is only –0.11 using the non-
administrative data, indicating that the non-blind and blind grade is more likely measuring the 
same ability. Still, it also suggests that teachers that know the student, and teachers that do 
not know the student, grade differently even though they grade the same test. Possible 
explanations are that the student’s teacher knows the identity of the student, the student’s 
class behavior, previous grades, and grades in other subjects. Columns (7) and (8) provide 
negative, but much less precise, estimates of the relationship between grade difference and 
school blind. Due to large standard errors, the difference between Column (7) and (8) tells us 
little, but since both non-blind and blind graders are internal to the school, school-level 
influences are less likely to be responsible for the negative relationship. 
[Table 6] 
Table 6 provides results for the separate experiment performed in Rogaland and a 
comparable administrative dataset. Individual observable characteristics are not available for 
the non-administrative data, but there are more individual recordings, and recordings from 
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more schools than from the Bergen experiment. Columns (1) and (2) show a negative 
relationship between grade differences and blind scores of –0.27 and –0.28, respectively. 
Interestingly, the coefficient increases when including school-interacted fixed effects, 
suggesting that school-level factors do not contribute to a negative relationship between the 
grade difference and blind. Column (3) reveals a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient on school blind of –0.17, which disappears when including blind-interacted fixed 
effects in Column (4). Note that the student’s teacher also grades the locally administered 
exam, which is used as a blind score for the administrative sample from Rogaland. There is, 
however, another teacher that also grades the exam, who has less prior information on the 
student and is external to the school. 
As discussed, the negative relationship between the grade difference and blind, 
indicated by the results provided in Columns (1)–(4), may indicate that non-blind and blind 
measure different skills. Columns (5) and (6) explore the relationship using the non-
administrative data. Column (5) shows a coefficient of –0.17, while the estimate in Column 
(6) is –0.18. Again, these results do not suggest that schools with higher blind scores are less 
lenient for the sample of schools from Rogaland. Regressing the grade difference on school 
blind provides a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 5% significance level 
of –0.13 in Column (7). This coefficient increases to 0.05 when including blind-interacted 
fixed effects. The difference between Columns (7) and (8) is 0.17, which is identical to the 
coefficient in Column (5). 
The results provided in Tables 5 and 6 make it possible to determine the size of 1-! 
and 1-!. Generally, we find a negative relationship when regressing the grade difference on 
blind. This negative relationship is somewhat smaller in the non-administrative datasets. We 
also find a similar negative relationship when regressing grade difference on school blind, 
something that is not explained by measurement error in blind. For the schools from 
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Rogaland, we do not see any signs that schools with better students are less lenient. Because 
school-level factors seem to be less of a concern in the Rogaland sample, we use the 
indicated impact of measurement error in the sample from Rogaland to determine the 
parameters in Bergen. Using the point estimates of coefficients, the impact of measurement 
error in blind in administrative data is –0.10 in administrative and –0.04 in non-
administrative. Based on results with school-interacted fixed effects from Bergen, this 
indicates a 1− ! of –0.12 and 1− ! of –0.05. 
Table 5 and 6 provide estimates for 1− ! from both Bergen and Rogaland. For the 
non-administrative data from Rogaland, the estimate is larger in magnitude. A possible 
explanation for this is that the blind evaluator is external to the school in this experiment, 
leading to a different mapping of grades.  In addition, exams were randomly drawn from 
schools chosen by county level administrative personnel. These features correspond more to 
the field experiment conduced in Hinnerich et al. (2011), and suggest that the gender bias 
holding ability fixed is different from the gender bias estimated in that paper. 
 
4.4 Alternative Parameter of Interest 
The previous section examined the relationship between non-blind, blind, and subject ability, 
and found convincing evidence that 1− ! < 0 and 1− ! < 0. This changes the 
interpretation of the coefficient from a regression of grade difference on the group dummy to 
now also including a term that reflects the ability difference between groups. In our model, 
the coefficient is characterized by Equation (8) for non-administrative data and Equation (15) 
for administrative data. Group bias will now arise if the groups have different subject 
abilities. 
An alternative parameter of interest reflects group bias holding ability constant. For 
example, this parameter describes the amount of bias a female can expect to get compared to 
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a male of equal ability. In the terms of the model, this parameter is defined in Equations (9) 
and (16). A way to retrieve an estimate of this parameter is to add blind score as a right-side 
variable, as shown in Equations (10) and (17). However, this is not feasible using ordinary 
least squared regression since the model is unidentified, because the blind score is correlated 
with the unexplained part. Therefore, we use the fact that the last section provided credible 
estimates of 1− ! and 1− !, and estimate parameters using constrained least squared 
estimation, fixing the coefficient of !!"! to the specific values. 
[Table 7] 
Columns (1)–(3) show results from the non-administrative sample, Columns (4)–(6) 
for the same schools using the administrative sample, and Columns (7)–(9) all recordings 
from Bergen in 2015. Column (1) shows the result from an OLS regression of the grade 
difference on a gender coefficient, shown earlier in Table 4. Column (2) shows results from a 
constrained least squared estimation, where, in addition to having the gender dummy on the 
right side, the blind score is included as described in Equation (10). The results confirm that 
fixing the coefficient on blind to be 0 with this specification gives the same results as an OLS 
regression of the grade difference on the gender dummy shown in Column (1). Column (3) 
displays results when fixing 1− ! to −0.05. The gender coefficient increases to 0.15, but is 
still not statistically significant.7 Columns (4)−(6) repeat this procedure for administrative 
data from the same schools. Column (6) uses the estimate of 1− ! obtained for the 
administrative data of −0.12. Also here, the gender coefficient increases but is still not 
significant. In Columns (7)−(9) the gender coefficient is significant for all specifications, and 




7 Note that this procedure does not account for uncertainty regarding the size of the fixed parameters. 
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4.5 Other Observable Characteristics 
This analysis has compared estimates of gender bias using two different data-generating 
processes—one where the student’s teacher and a teacher that does not know the identity of 
the student grade the same test, and where the student’s teacher performs a final course 
evaluation and two external examiners grade a final course exam. The results did not confirm 
that estimates of gender bias were different in the administrative data, not suggesting that the 
explanation for the positive gender coefficient found using administrative data is because 
females perform better at in-class exams or tests measuring different skills. This analysis 
therefore proceeds to look at other observable determinants of the grade difference using 
administrative data. Given that estimates of gender bias in the non-administrative bias were 
similar to the coefficient obtained from the administrative data, there is no reason to mistrust 
estimates from administrative data based on other student characteristics. In addition, we 
provided evidence that bias depends on ability. In Table 8, we examined how other 
observable characteristics are related to grade differences using the administrative data, fixing 
the coefficient on blind to specific values in the model described in Equation (17). Since the 
purpose no longer is to compare bias estimates for the same school, year, and course as in the 
Bergen experiment, we use a sample of recordings from all schools in Bergen for 2008–2015. 
[Table 8] 
Columns (1)–(3) show the coefficient on the gender dummy with subject- and cohort-
interacted fixed effects, and subject-, cohort-, and school-interacted fixed effects. The results 
are similar to the findings previously shown for 2015. The coefficient changes marginally 
when moving from Column (1) to Column (2) when adding the school-interacted fixed effect. 
Middle school attendance is determined by catchment area. This means that the gender 
balance should be unrelated to school characteristics, since the proportion of females is the 
same in different types of catchment areas. This may explain why including school-interacted 
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fixed effects only has a small impact on the coefficient. When moving from Column (2) to 
Column (3), the coefficient on blind score is fixed to −0.12. Holding subject ability fixed 
significantly increases the size of the coefficient. As we have discussed, this is because the 
non-blind relationship to subject ability is different than the relationship between blind and 
subject ability, and females have different ability levels than males. 
Columns (4)–(6) repeat the procedure, but jointly include additional observable 
characteristics. Column (4) suggests that immigrants are positively rewarded by teachers 
compared to non-immigrants. This is in line with findings in Lindahl (2007) and Falch and 
Naper (2013). Adding school-interacted fixed effects leaves the estimate unchanged. Column 
(6) fixes the coefficient on blind score to −0.12, and the coefficient decreases to 0.01 and 
becomes insignificant. This suggests that, when holding subject ability fixed, immigrants do 
not receive a positive amount of bias compared to non-immigrants in Bergen. 
Column (4) suggests that low-SES students receive a negative amount of bias 
compared to non-low-SES students. The coefficient becomes larger in magnitude and 
statistically significant at the 1% significant level when including school-interacted fixed 
effects. The results suggest that low-SES students are overrepresented in areas where schools 
are more lenient. Column (6) shows that holding subject ability fixed more than doubles the 
estimate of the amount of negative bias that low-SES students receive. 
Table 8 shows that the estimates of the total amount of group bias, and the total 
amount of group bias conditioning on ability, parameters described in Equations (15) and 
(18), may provide widely different estimates of the size of discrimination. According to the 
econometric model we specify, since we find that 1− ! < 0, estimates of bias that do not 
take into account subject ability indicates that the bias in favor of the group with lower 




Several studies use data where teachers that know the identity of the students, and teachers 
that do not, grade students’ tests. Systematic differences in grading between these teachers 
could then be attributed to biased grading. This paper develop an econometric framework that 
clarifies underlying reasons for differences in grading between teachers that know the 
students and teachers that do not. In our model, blind scores include subject-specific ability 
and measurement errors. Furthermore, the model describe that non-blind grades may contain 
more information than only the subject-specific ability. In addition to subject-specific ability, 
non-blind includes teacher biased grading according to observable student characteristics of 
the teacher, the information the teacher has on previous grades and grades in other subjects, 
and measurement errors. In the administrative data, non-blind may also contain information 
on subject-specific ability not tested in blind, and the relative performance of students in the 
non-blind test situations compared to the blind test situation. Our model points to two 
important issues. First, if administrative non-blind includes more subject-specific ability than 
blind, or if some students perform better at a specific test type, then using administrative data 
may not yield an appropriate measure of the total amount of bias one group receives 
compared to another. Differences across groups can therefore more correctly be ascribed to 
the effect of test type/grading scheme. Second, if non-blind and blind map differently onto 
subject-specific skills, the non-blind-blind grade difference is a function of skill. Therefore, 
differences in grading between the two groups can be a result of different skill levels. This 
could happen using both administrative and non-administrative data. In addition to 
developing the econometric framework, this paper compare estimates of bias for comparable 
administrative and non-administrative data. The results are not able to show that the estimate 
of the amount of bias females receive compared to males is different when using the two data 
types. Note that data limitations restrict our conclusion based on this specific dataset. 
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Furthermore, the analysis provides convincing evidence that the relationship between subject-
specific ability and non-blind is not equal to the relationship between subject ability and 
blind. The consequence of this is important, because it means that subject ability level should 
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Table 2: Descriptives - Grades
Bergen Rogaland
Non-adm. Adm. Non-adm. Adm.
Same schools Bergen 08-15 Same schools Rogaland 08-15
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math
Non-blind average 3.18 3.21 3.66 3.69 3.26 3.00 3.08 3.14
Non-blind sd 1.10 1.20 1.22 1.18 1.27 1.39 1.40 1.37
Blind average 3.08 2.72 3.04 3.25 2.98 2.98 3.07 3.16
Blind sd 1.13 1.24 1.29 1.22 1.32 1.25 1.29 1.27
# Math 39 67 1024 8747 135 649 782 1922
Norwegian
Non-blind average 3.60 3.95 3.97 3.97 3.16 3.50 3.56 3.52
Non-blind sd 1.01 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.01 0.99 0.98
Blind average 3.37 3.45 3.56 3.58 2.86 3.21 3.32 3.30
Blind sd 0.97 1.01 1.06 1.02 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.99
# Norwegian 60 38 662 4481 148 536 665 1309
Female 0.43 0.44 0.50 0.49 . 0.40 0.43 0.44
Ses . 0.22 0.20 0.24 . 0.29 0.29 0.28
Immigrant 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.10 . 0.06 0.05 0.05
# All 99 105 1686 13228 283 1185 1447 3231
Schools 2 2 28 28 15 15 29 29
Notes: Non-blind are grades given by the students’ teacher, while blind are grades given by other examinators.
Descriptives are on the student level. Columns (1)-(3) consist of students in Bergen exiting middle school in the
year 2015 (cohort 1999). Column (4) consists of students in Bergen exiting middle school in the period 2008-2018.
Grades are given at the end of the last year of middle school. Columns (5)-(7) consist of students in Rogaland
taking high school courses in the years 2010, 2012 and 2013. Column (8) consists of students in Rogaland taking
courses in the period 2008-2015. Grades are given at the first and second level of high school. In the
non-administrative data, non-blind and blind grades are evaluations of the same test for each student. The test in
Bergen is the Tentamen, a locally administered written test. The test in Rogaland is the locally administered
end-of-year exam. In the administrative data, the non-blind grade is a teacher evaluation of the students’
performance in the course, while the Blind grade is a grade given on a test at the end of the year. Non-blind
grades are set before the blind grades are set in the administrative data. In the administrative data from Bergen,
the blind evaluation is performed anonomously by two external examinators. In the administrative data from
Rogaland, the blind evaluation is set by an examinator together with the students’ teachers. This is the locally
administered end-of-year exam also used in the experiment. In both Bergen and Rogaland, grades are recorded in



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Delta on blind - Bergen
Administrative Non-administrative
Dependent variable: Grade difference (delta)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Blind -0.25*** -0.22*** -0.11** -0.09**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
School-blind -0.35*** -0.14*** -0.60** -0.68**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.27) (0.28)
Intercept 1.27*** 1.17*** 1.60*** 0.89*** 0.52*** 0.46*** 2.13** 2.38**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.14) (0.91) (0.92)
r2 0.16 0.29 0.04 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.07 0.17
Adj. r2 0.16 0.27 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.09
N 13228 13228 13228 13228 99 99 99 99
Fixed effects
Subject*Cohort x x x x
Subject*Cohort*School x x
Subject*Cohort*Blind x x
Notes: The dependent variable is the grade difference (delta) measured at the individual level. Blind grade
is individual blind grade. Only Math and Norwegian recordings are included. School-blind is the school
average blind score calculated without the students’ own individual blind score for each subject.
School-blind to a student drawn in Math is the school average blind grade in Math of all other students
drawn in Math at the same school. The regression is weighting each observation with the inverse of the
proportion of that subject being recorded. Three lowest rows indicate demeaned variables included. The
administrative sample consists of recordings measured in middle school 2008 - 2015, while
Non-administrative sample is only for the year 2015. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors reported. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 6: Delta on blind - Rogaland
Administrative Non-administrative
Dependent variable: Grade difference (delta)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Blind -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.17*** -0.18***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
School Blind -0.17*** 0.02 -0.13** 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07)
Intercept 0.95*** 0.98*** 0.62*** 0.00 0.79*** 0.81*** 0.67*** 0.13
(0.04) (0.05) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.11) (0.18) (0.21)
r2 0.15 0.35 0.04 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.03 0.22
Adj. r2 0.14 0.25 0.04 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.01 0.13
N 3231 3231 3231 3231 283 283 283 283
Fixed effects
Subject*Cohort x x x x
Subject*Cohort*School x x
Subject*Cohort*Blind x x
Notes: The dependent variable is delta ( i) measured at the individual level. Blind grade are individual blind
grade. Only Math and Norwegian recordings included. School-blind is school average blind grade calculated
without own individual blind grade for each subject. School-blind to a student drawn in Math is school average
blind grade in Math of all other students drawn in Math at the same school. Regressions are weighting each
observation with the inverse of the proportion of that subject being recorded. The three lowest rows indicate the
demeaned variables included. Non-administrative and administrative samples consist of recordings measured in
vocational track high schools for 2010, 2012, and 2013 in Rogaland. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In 2005 the city of Bergen, Norway, went from a geographical catchment area high school 
intake system to a grade point average-based (GPA) intake system. The reform changed the 
composition of high school peer student characteristics substantially for comparable groups of 
students before and after the reform. This article compares changes in outcomes for students 
in Bergen before and after the reform to changes in the outcomes of students in control cities. 
Positive effects are found on test scores and grades at high school. 
 
Keywords: Analysis of Education, Peer effects, Tracking, High school, Natural experiment 







                                                




A significant and ongoing debate in educational research and policy concerns how to place 
students into groups to enhance the learning environment. One important strand of the 
literature has studied the optimal mixture of a student group in field experiments (Booij et al. 
2017; Carrell et al. 2013; Duflo et al. 2011). Do high-ability students benefit from having 
high-ability peers, or is it preferable to have a mixture of high- and-low ability peers? The 
answer to this question may vary by student age, whether cognitive or non-cognitive 
outcomes are studied, type of peer ability, subject, and institutional setting. 
A main argument for having a system with similar students grouped together in 
schools is to allow the teacher to tailor content and pedagogical techniques to a homogeneous 
group. Another argument is that it can potentially improve student interaction. For example, 
high-ability students may create a culture for learning or push each other toward better 
achievement when grouped together. The main arguments for mixing students with different 
backgrounds rely on the notion that students may gain from being part of groups that include 
students that are diverse in various ways. High-ability students may gain from ranking in the 
top of their class, while low-ability students may gain from interacting with high-ability 
students. There are, however, many ways of grouping students, and it is possible to do so 
using different dimensions. In the end, the question of which system and what kind of 
mechanisms is most preferred are empirical.  
Evidence regarding peer effects on students in their natural environments relies on 
finding natural experiments; the most frequent types used in the literature include housing 
vouchers, busing students to different schools, natural disasters, and school acceptance 
cutoffs. This paper adds evidence to the literature by using a school choice reform that varied 
peer characteristics at the school level. Specifically, we examine a reform in Bergen, 
Norway’s second-largest city, which changed its high school intake from a catchment area 
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approach to a performance-based intake system. High schools located in the city center 
(downtown) were more attractive to students than high schools outside the city center 
(suburbs). When the intake system was neighborhood-based, students living downtown 
attended downtown high schools. Once the intake system became performance-based, most 
high-ability students living downtown still attended central schools, while many lower-ability 
downtown students were shut out of downtown schools by high-ability suburban students. In 
sum, the reform decreased variation within high schools, and increased variation across high 
schools in Bergen.  
This paper compares the outcomes of students in Bergen before and after the reform to 
comparable students in other cities to uncover their response to changes in peer 
characteristics. High-ability downtown students attended high schools where the average peer 
student middle school GPA increased by 0.65 over the middle school GPA standard deviation 
(SD) from before the reform to after it, compared to similar groups in other cities. This is 
equivalent to going from a school at the median to a school among the top 10% in both 
Bergen and control cities before reform. The results show positive and significant effects on 
centralized, externally evaluated exams in some subjects for high-ability students as a 
consequence of the reform. For lower-ability students, the reform implied attending high 
school with less variation in peer characteristics. Consistent with recent findings from field 
experiments (Boiji et al. 2017, Carrell et al. 2013, Duflo 2011), our results suggest that high 
school performance for these students increased as a consequence of the reform. The intake 
reform led to a natural experiment that generated a type of tracking similar to that achieved in 
experiments. The reform makes it possible to identify effects on high ability students of 
changing peers from mixed to high ability (high-high). For low ability students it is possible 
to find effects of changing peers from mixed to low (low-low). The effects of this type of 
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tracking are relevant in cases where one decides between dividing a group based on prior 
ability or not. 
Furthermore, the analysis suggests that students obtaining the highest grades before 
and two years after the reform were not necessarily comparable for two separate reasons. 
First, the average middle school GPA increased for cohorts completing middle school after 
the reform, largely because the pre-reform middle school GPA was of relatively low 
importance, since it had very few actual consequences for the students. After intake reform, 
middle school GPA became the main measure that determined which high school students 
would attend, so many students showed increased efforts in middle school to achieve the 
higher grades that would allow them to attend the school of their choice. Second, the 
predetermined background characteristics of the highest-scoring students at middle schools 
were different before and two years after the reform, which can only be interpreted as 
meaning that highest-scoring students are different under low- and high-stakes systems. This 
insight adds another layer of complexity in finding a comparable group of students in Bergen 
before and after reform. This analysis therefore employ a difference-in-difference-in-
difference (DDD) strategy that uses the fact that high-ability middle school students in 
suburban areas in Bergen were exposed to the same reform, but experienced a much smaller 
average change in peer characteristics in high school than high-ability downtown students. 
The findings from this empirical strategy are weaker, but still support the hypothesis of the 
existence of some positive effects of the reform for this group. 
The main contribution of this paper is to introduce a new type of natural experiment to 
identify the effect on educational outcomes of significantly changing the peer environment. 
While changing the characteristics of the peers, we attempt to keep school type and travel 
distances fixed for a particular group. In addition, this new identification strategy permits an 
investigation of the consequences of tracking for different groups, and opens novel 
 86 
perspectives on mechanisms that are explored in detail using high-quality register data. 
Section 2 reviews the literature and places this paper’s contributions in the context of existing 
scholarship, while Section 3 describes the institutional realities of high school intake in 
Norway. Section 4 explains how the empirical design was implemented to exploit the 
exogenous variation in peer characteristics created by the reform. The baseline sample was 
constructed from administrative records. Section 5 details the data that are important for 
interpreting the results. Section 6 contains the results, including a discussion of mechanisms 
and robustness checks, while Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.  
 
2 Literature review 
Manski (1993) formulated three concepts that are fundamental for the understanding of peer 
effects. The first is the endogenous effects—students tend to change behavior according to the 
behavior of the group. The second is exogenous effects, which expresses that students current 
behavior depends on the groups background characteristics. Finally, the correlated effects 
addresses the fact that student tend to select into groups based on unobserved characteristics. 
The reflection issue arises because of the existence of a possible multiplier in that peer 
behavior can affect one’s own behavior, which in turn can affect the peers. Most modern 
papers address the identification problem stemming from endogenous peer group formation 
and reflection, but only a few are able to separate exogenous from endogenous effects.  
Hoxby (2000) authored one of the first studies that explicitly addressed the selection 
issue across schools by using exogenous variation in peer characteristics within schools and 
across years. The results indicated positive peer effects of high-ability peers, which were 
stronger in a same-race context for primary schools in Texas. Hanushek et al. (2003), Betts 
and Zau (2004), and Lavy et al. (2012) reported similar findings. Using Norwegian data, 
Black et al. (2013) studied long-run outcomes such as IQ scores, teenage childbearing, 
 87 
educational choices, and adult labor market status and earnings. The study found positive 
effects among girls of having more females in the cohort. No effect was found due to 
variation in average education of the mother, but average income of the father appeared to 
play a role in students’ long-term outcomes. Other results from Norway using the same 
method are found in Bonesronning (2008) and Boenesronning and Haraldsvik (2014). These 
studies showed that school achievement was negatively affected by the presence of classmates 
from dissolved families and students with less-educated parents respectively.  
Carrel et al. (2013) used variations in squadrons’ standardized test scores as the peer 
variable to identify peer effects at the Unites States Air Force Academy. This analysis 
suggested a positive effect of peer Scholastic Aptitude Test scores on freshman GPAs among 
low-ability students. Building on these results, a follow-up study was conducted in which 
low-ability students were randomly assigned to squadrons with high-ability peers. The 
resulting significant negative effects for low-ability students and lack of effects on high-
ability students were taken as at least partial evidence of the importance of endogenous, 
within-squadron peer group formation. Angrist (2014) cited this study as evidence that the 
standard approach of regressing outcomes on peer means, with variation mainly coming from 
naturally occurring variation, is not reliable.  
The alternative to using naturally occurring variation is to conduct randomized 
experiments that manipulate the peer characteristics of individual students. As in Carrell et al. 
(2013), Duflo et al. (2011) manipulated peer groups in an experimental setting by streaming 
students into ability groups. Low-ability students were put in groups with other low-ability 
students, while high-ability students were put into groups with other high-ability students. The 
results indicated that all students benefited from tracking, including the low-ability students 
assigned to low-ability groups. The researchers concluded that these results show that 
students benefit when teachers are able to adjust their teaching approaches to a homogenous 
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class. Booij et al. (2017) randomized students into tracked groups using an expanded set of 
track combinations, so they were able to look at the effects of different combinations of group 




2.1 Natural experiments 
Many articles on peer effects in schools employs some kind of natural experiment to identify 
those effects. A frequent choice is policy interventions that are intended to desegregate 
neighborhoods or schools. Examples of this from the United States are Moving to 
Opportunity housing vouchers (MTO) and Metropolitan Council for Educational Opportunity 
(Metco). Kling et al. (2007) based their study on the fact that a lottery assignment mechanism 
was used to assign MTO vouchers to families; these vouchers gave families the opportunity to 
move to lower-poverty areas. Comparing families that were offered vouchers to those that 
were not, the researchers did not find any effect on adult economic self-sufficiency. They did 
however find beneficial mental health effects for female youth that were offset by negative 
health effects for male youth. Kling et al. (2005) used the same policy intervention to study 
criminal behavior and found similar results; female criminality went down when moving to 
lower-poverty areas, while the effects for males were more mixed. Ludwig et al. (2013) 
studied long-term outcomes and found results consistent with previous research. Chetty et al. 
(2016) employed newly available data on children younger than 13 at the time of random 
assignment. Restricting their sample to this cohort, they found significant positive effects on 
earnings for all groups in their mid-twenties.  
Angrist and Lang (2004) analyzed the effect on test scores for students in suburban 
schools that received a fraction of new “Metco students” from low-income areas. Metco is a 
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desegregation program that sends low-income students out of poor Boston districts into 
schools in the surrounding suburban areas. The study did not find substantial effects on 
students already attending those schools. Sacerdote (2011) notes that the literature generally 
shows modestly positive effect on academic achievement gains, but that the effects on non-
academic outcomes appear to be much larger. Sacerdote (2001), Duncan et al. (2005), 
DeSimone (2007), Wilson (2007), Kling et al. (2005), Kling et al. (2007), and Carrel et al. 
(2008) looked at outcomes such as drinking, smoking, cheating, sexual activity, criminal 
involvement, health, and racial attitudes. Recently, Rao (2015) studied variations in the 
proportion of poor children in Indian middle class schools and found that overall attitudes 
towards the poor became more altruistic.  
Another type of natural experiment uses the regression discontinuity framework, 
studying students that apply to selective high schools; some are accepted and some rejected 
based on admission scores. Employing this strategy, Clarke (2010) found only small effects 
on test scores of attending selective UK schools. Jackson (2013) used this design with single-
sex schools in Trinidad and Tobago, while Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) studied the public 
school systems in Boston and New York. Both show that students just above the admission 
cutoffs attend high schools with students that score about on average 0.5 standard deviation 
higher on a predetermined test than students right below the cutoff. Jackson (2013) only 
found effects for a group of students that had expressed strong preferences for attending 
selective single-sex schools and some negative effect on selecting science courses, while 
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) found no effect of attending elite schools on students near the 
cutoff for admission to these schools.  
One recent study used an empirical design to avoid the issues of endogenous peer 
groups, correlated effects, and reflection. Dahl et al. (2013) examined social interactions in 
program participation. Their results showed, among other things, the importance of naturally 
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occurring preexisting peer groups, as they were able to identify effects on siblings and 
coworkers on program adoption by varying the “price” of the social program. Translating this 
to a school setting means that even though a study is able to control for endogenous sorting 
across schools or classes, the endogenous sorting within schools or classes may be an 
important point of focus for studies analyzing school-situated peer effects. Other analyses 
using the partial population approach are found in studies of the PROGRESA program in 
Mexico. The PROGRESA program provided cash incentives for parents to send their children 
to school. Peer effects can then be identified on ineligible children that are in the naturally 
occurring peer groups of eligible children. Angelucci et al (2009), Bobonis and Finnan 
(2009), and Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) all found substantial positive peer effects on school 
attendance. To the best of our knowledge, however, no studies have used this method to 
identify peer effects on academic achievement. 
Empirical designs using natural experiments are often unable to separate neighborhood 
or school effects from peer effects. There may be other differences between high- and low-
poverty neighborhoods than resident incomes, and there are other differences between elite 
schools and other schools than their students. Designs of the type found in Angrist and Lang 
(2004) explicitly address this by focusing on the effects on students who were already 
attending schools that experienced a change in student composition. Besides employing a new 
type of natural experiment, a key contribution of the present study is that it keeps variables 
such as school type and travel distance fixed, while varying average peer characteristics 
substantially. The combination of these two features is not often found in the scholarly 
literature. In addition, the reform that changed the high school intake from a geographical 
catchment area based system to a GPA based intake system is similar to switching from 
ability mixing to tracking. Therefore, we contribute with a natural experiment that allows us 
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to explore the effects of ability tracking at high school for both low and high achieving 
students.  
 
3 Institutional setting 
Children in Norway start school in August of the year in which they reach six years of age. 
Children normally attend primary school until age 14 and middle school from age 14 to age 
16. Most primary and middle schools are public, with intake based on geographical catchment 
areas. When students finish middle school, most students choose between applying for 
academic or vocational tracks at high school. Around half of students choose to start on the 
academic track, with about 75% of that group graduating within three years.  
 
3.1 High school intake  
In 2005, 95% of high school students in Norway attended public high schools. High school 
intake systems are regulated at the county level; private high schools have separate 
mechanisms to accept students. The approaches adopted can be divided into middle school 
GPA-based intake systems, geographical catchment area-based intake systems, and 
combinations of the two models (Brugård 2013). Bergen, where the reform examined in the 
present study occurred, is located in Hordaland County. Before the school year starting in 
2005, Bergen had a system by which most students completing middle school were assigned a 
high school by the county school administrative office, which was guided by rules that 
obliged them to divide all middle school students into GPA groups, and then divide these 
students among high schools so that each high school had a roughly equal proportion of 
students from each GPA group.1 One reason for this approach was to try to avoid the 
development of “good” and “bad” schools. In practice, students were generally assigned to 
                                                
1 Source: Nils Skarvhellen, Head of Intake office at Hordaland Fylkeskommune. (20.10.2015), 
Knudsen, Sortevik and Woldset, Government proposal analysis (2003) 
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schools was close to their homes to reduce travel time; there was some flexibility on the 
administrative office’s part to deal with students with strong desires to attend a certain high 
school. The Hordaland school administrative office noted that this system required significant 
effort on their part. The demands of the intake system, combined with increasing pressure 
from different interest groups, were the reasons that Hordaland County changed its intake 
system in the school year beginning in August 2005 to a middle school GPA-based intake 
system. The county government passed the rule change in October 2004. In the next high 
school intake students could list schools based on preference, and were accepted to their first 
choice if their middle school GPA was above that school’s admission level. Each school had a 
limited number of seats, so the admissions level varied depending on the number and middle 
school GPA of the applicants. Only the central school authority at the county level is involved 
in the acceptance procedure and not the schools. 
The control municipalities used for empirical comparison purposes are Trondheim, 
Stavanger, Drammen, and Kristiansand, four of the five other largest cities in Norway. Oslo, 
the capital and largest city, is not included among the control cities because a separate school 
choice reform took place at the same time as in Bergen.2 Drammen had a catchment area-
based intake system, while Trondheim, Stavanger, and Kristiansand all based intake on 
middle school GPA.  
 
3.2 Curriculum and grading 
Learning structure and course compositions at schools are regulated at the national level in 
Norway. This means that all students who attend a public school have access to 
approximately the same range of courses and attend schools with similar learning principles 
                                                
2 We chose to focus on the reform that happened in Bergen since the reform there was a total 
transition, while the reform in Oslo was only a partial change in intake systems. 
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and goals. For the school year 2006–2007 a reform in learning principles took place, called 
“Kunnskapsløftet”. The most important changes at the high school level were changes in 
course composition; students were not differentially exposed to the reform within cohorts, 
only across cohorts. 
 
4 Empirical design 
A school intake reform may significantly change the composition of students at high schools. 
With a catchment area intake system, students generally attend the geographically closest 
high school. With a performance-based intake system, however, high schools consist of 
students who apply and are accepted to each high school based on middle school 
performance. The degree of change in the composition of students after an intake reform will 
depend on the attractiveness of the high school. A change from a catchment area to a 
performance-based system will lead to a negative selection of students at less attractive 
schools, since high-ability students will have the option to leave, which most low-ability 
students will not. The same change will also lead to a positive selection into attractive 
schools, since high-ability students from outside the catchment area will be chosen over low-
ability students from within the catchment area.  
Comparable students before and after an intake reform may end up attending a high 
school with very different peers. In this paper we use these changes to analyze peer effects. 
The first step is to find comparable students before and after the reform for which the 
reform’s main effect was changing the characteristics of their high school peers. Besides peer 
characteristics, a school intake reform can change both daily travel distance and the type of 
high school for comparable students. The group for which reform is most likely to mainly 
change peer characteristics are high-ability students living in the catchment areas of attractive 
schools; they would have attended those schools before reform, and because they still qualify 
 94 
and there is no obvious reason for them to apply to less attractive schools, they are likely to 
continue attending those same schools. We first chose to focus on high-ability students living 
in attractive schools’ catchment areas, since we expect that this group should experience a 
significant change in peer characteristics without any changes in distance traveled and type of 
school. 
High-ability students belonging in downtown middle school districts in Bergen before 
the reform attended high schools located in downtown Bergen; most students average high 
school peer ability as measured by middle school GPA was close to the average of Bergen as 
a whole. After the transition to a GPA-based system, they still attended those same downtown 
high schools, but now many of their low-ability middle school peers were replaced by high-
ability students from the suburbs. To identify the effect of these changed peer characteristics, 
we compared the change in outcomes of high-ability downtown students in Bergen to the 
change in outcomes of high-ability downtown students in other large cities in Norway in a 
difference-in-difference (DD) setup. Model 1 is defined as:  
 
!!" = !! +  !!!"#$"%!" +  !!!"#$!%!" +  !! !"#$"%!" ∗ !"#$!%!" + β!!!" +  !!" (1) 
 
Where ! denotes individual student, ! denotes cohort, !!" are outcomes that can be affected by 
changed peer characteristics, !"#$"%!" is a dummy variable (1 for high-ability student living 
downtown, 0 if the student has high ability and lives in another city center). High-ability 
students are defined as those having middle school GPAs in the top 25% of their citywide 
cohort, while downtown students are those who attended middle school in the downtown area 
of the city.3 Middle school attendance is almost exclusively determined by a middle school 
level geographical catchment area. !"#$!%!"  is a dummy indicating 1 for the cohorts 
                                                
3 We vary the GPA threshold in the robustness section. 
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applying to high school after Bergen’s reform (born from 1989–1991), and 0 for cohorts 
applying for high school before it (born 1986–1988). !!" is a vector of individual-level control 
variables and middle school dummies. Individual level controls are parents’ earnings, parents’ 




Figure 1 shows the development of average incoming peer GPA at high schools for each 
cohort for high-ability students in downtown Bergen and control cities. Average peer GPA 
remains stable at around 4.4–4.6 for both groups before reform. Peer GPA is slightly higher in 
the control groups, something that could be explained by the fact that three of the four control 
cities had a GPA-based intake system in the period studied. The reform was implemented for 
the cohort born in 1989, and we saw a sharp increase in peer GPA in the treatment group for 
this cohort, which stabilized at a higher level for the subsequent two cohorts. There was no 
change for the control cohorts. Peer students’ middle school GPA increased by 0.65 of one 
SD of middle school GPA from before to after reform, compared to comparable groups in 
other cities. This is equivalent to going from a school at the median to a school among the top 
10% in both Bergen and the control cities before reform. 
 
5 Data and variable definition 
Data were taken from Norwegian administrative records. Middle school grade information is 
available through a centralized middle school database, while information on middle school 
and high school attendance is available through education records detailing the schools and 
tracks that individuals attend and complete. High school grade information is available from 
two sources, the school administrative grade records (a database with grade information 
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collected from the various school administrative systems) and the Norwegian certificate 
database, which contains high school grade information for all certificates granted. Both 
databases are used in this analysis because each has strengths and weaknesses. The certificate 
database contains only grade information on those who complete their certificates at high 
school, so dropouts’ grades are not present. The certificates database however has grade 
information for more cohorts than the administrative database.  
The baseline sample is students who started high school immediately after middle 
school.4 Data on school absence is available from the certificates database for those who 
completed school. This measure comes from teachers’ recording the number of hours and 
days a student was absent from class during the school year.  
The data allow us to link students and parents, so we can use parents’ years of 
education and yearly earnings as control variables; these are both measured when the students 




Table 1 offers descriptive statistics of the sample; the baseline sample consists of high-ability 
downtown students in Bergen and similar students in Kristiansand, Stavanger, Trondheim, 
and Drammen. The table is divided into three panels: panel a) show descriptive statistics of 
covariates, panel b) shows the peer GPA variable, and panel c) shows descriptive statistics of 
high school outcomes. Column (1) shows the pre-reform means of the treated group, Column 
(2) shows the SD of that group. Columns (3) and (4) show the difference in means between 
treatment and control before and after the reform. Column (5) shows the number of 
observations of each variable. The top 25% downtown students in Bergen, Kristiansand, 
                                                
4 We have verified that the reform did not affect applications and intake to academic tracks. 
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Stavanger, Trondheim, and Drammen give a total baseline sample of 1869 students. Missing 
observations on covariates are dealt with by replacing them with the value 0 and including a 
dummy for the missing observation of the covariate.  
From the descriptive statistics of covariates we note that students belonging to the 
treatment group have a lower proportion of females and parents with higher earnings and 
more education. These differences are somewhat smaller after reform. Peergpa is constructed 
from the average incoming middle school GPA of the peers of the high school students. We 
note that before the reform, high-ability downtown students in Bergen on average attended 
schools with lower-ability peers than in other cities. This is due to the intake system in Bergen 
pre-reform not being performance-based, while three of the four cities in the control cities did 
have performance-based intake systems. Comparing the difference between columns (3) and 
(4) in panel b) shows that the treatment group increased their average peer GPA at high 
school by 0.41 compared to the control group. 
Firstyear GPA is the average grade for the first year of high school, while “High 
School GPA” is the average of all grades in high school. These two measures largely contain 
grades assigned locally by the teacher. Absence days and Absence hours are the number of 
days and hours of recorded absence during all years at high school. Absence days are the 
number of full days that a student was not recorded as present in any class at school. Absence 
hours are the number of hours of recorded absences from class, not including full-day 
absences. “Select basic math year 1” indicates whether the student selected the less advanced 
math course in the first year of high school. 
Norwegian exam in year 3 is a compulsory national exam at the end of high school 
that is externally administered and graded. Norwegian II exam year 3 is the second formal 
written language for the student. Students decide themselves which written language is their 
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main language. For more than 90 % of the students, the Norwegian exam is “Bokmål”, while 
the Norwegian II exam is “Nynorsk”. 
Exams in years 1, 2, and 3 make use of the fact that students are randomly drawn to 
take exams in different subjects. Scores in different subjects are pooled for each student by 
year since the number of students drawn for each subject is relatively small. Only about 30% 
of students are drawn to take an exam in year 1 in any subject, which explains the smaller 
sample size. The advantage of the exams in year 1 is that the exam-takers are randomly drawn 
among mandatory subjects, which means that that the coefficient are not inadvertently 
capturing mechanisms that involve a change in course composition. A larger proportion of the 




The first results using Model 1 are shown in columns (1)–(3) in Table 2. The table focuses on 
the high-ability downtown students who experienced a large increase in peer ability. Column 
(1) presents the results without any controls, while Column (2) add middle school dummies. 
Column (3) shows the preferred specifications were controls for background characteristics 
and middle school dummies are included. The focus of the discussion will be on the empirical 
specification including middle school dummies and background characteristics. Each row 
gives the estimate of !! from Model 1 with the dependent variable indicated in the row 
header. For now, !! is interpreted as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of the 
intake reform on high-ability downtown students. Section 7 goes into detail about what may 





A positive coefficient is found on both Firstyear GPA and High school GPA, but the effect is 
only significant on average grades in the first year of high school after including middle 
school dummies. After including both middle school dummies and background 
characteristics, the coefficient on Firstyear GPA is 0.10. There is a negative though not 
significant coefficient for total hours absent from high school and a positive insignificant 
coefficient for total days absent. Not finding any effect on absence is in consistent with travel 
time being unaffected by the reform for these students. The next row shows a non-significant 
increase in the likelihood of selecting a basic as opposed to an advanced math course during 
the first year of high school. Thus, the results does not give any conclusive evidence of 
whether high-ability peers encourage more advance course taking, or if it makes it more 
difficult to get a seat at a limited number of spots at these courses. 
The effect on Norwegian exam in year 3 shown in Column (3) are statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level. The size of the effect is 0.20 and stable across 
different specifications. The results show that Nynorsk also increased by 0.30. This effect is  
significant at the 5% level. Even though there are fewer observations of Exam year 1, a 
statistically significant positive effect at the 1% significance level is found on this measure. 
The size of the coefficient is 0.48, and is the largest effect on the achievement measures 
shown in Table 2.  In sum, together with the effect on GPA, the effect on national exams 
suggests the reform’s positive effect for the high-ability downtown students. The effects on 
Exam year 2 and 3 are not significant in any of the specification. A possible explanation is 
that these exams are drawn among elective courses, which may be affected by the reform, 
making this exam measure more sensitive to mechanisms that cause students to change course 






Figure 2 plots average outcomes by cohort, allowing for a graphical inspection of how 
outcomes change over time. Solid circles and triangles indicate averages, while 95% 
confidence intervals of means are indicated with crosses. Confidence intervals are tighter for 
the control group since that group is larger. Norwegian exam scores and GPAs averages move 
relatively coherent before reform, with a trend shift for the treatment group at the time of the 
reform. This supports the assumption that if the reform had not happened, the two groups 
would have had the same development in outcomes.  
 
 
6.1 Reform effects on all groups in Bergen 
Table 3 show subsample estimates of !! in Model 1 on all groups of students in Bergen. All 
estimations are performed with middle school dummies and background control variables. 
Columns (1)–(4) show estimates for the low-, medium-low-, medium-high-, and high-ability 
downtown students, while columns (5)–(8) show these results for suburban students across 
the same achievement groups.5 The first row shows that higher-ability students received 
higher-ability peers after reform, and that this effect was strongest for downtown students. For 
low- and medium low-ability students peergpa increased much weaker or not significantly at 
all. Given the large increase in peergpa for high-ability students, a larger fall in peergpa for 
other groups of students could be expected. The reason for this is that average middle school 
GPA in Bergen increased after the reform. Further discussion of the consequences of this fact 
                                                
5 Students are split into equal sized groups within their cohort and city based on where they ranked on 
the middle school GPA distribution. 
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appears in section 7.1. Another consequence that can be inferred from the first row is that the 




The second and third rows show clear positive and significant effects on average high 
school grades for all groups of students, except for high-ability students. These results show 
that the intake reform benefited these other groups of students. There is a negative coefficient 
on hours absent significant at the 5% level for downtown students with medium-low ability, 
while there is a positive significant coefficient at the 10 % level on days absent for low-ability 
suburban students. Thus, the effects on absence are inconsistent. 
The effect on the centralized exams in the third year is most pronounced for high-
ability downtown students. The positive effects on GPA that appeared for the other groups of 
students are not found to the same degree on exam scores. One explanation for this is that, as 
measures of academic achievement, the exams are subject to more noise. Alternatively, the 
school grading captures improvements in abilities that are not measured in exams. An 
example of this is classroom behavior.  
Regarding the effect on the pooled exam score measures, a larger positive effect on 
first-year exams for high-ability downtown students are found than for most of the other 
groups. No significant effects are found on second-year exams, while on third-year exams a 
significant negative effect for high-ability suburban students and a significant positive effect 
for low-ability suburban students. As noted above, the first-year exam involves fewer 
students, while second- and third year exams are vulnerable to potential mechanisms that 
cause students to change course selection because of the reform. This may explain why the 
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findings for these measures are less coherent. Average outcomes by group over cohort can be 
visually inspected in Figures A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.  
 
6.2 Placebo and Robustness 
!! identifies the ATT effect of the reform on downtown students ranked in the top 25% of 
their cohort in Bergen, with the assumption that without the reform, they would have had the 
same trend in outcomes as downtown students in control cities ranked in the top 25% of their 
cohort and city. To determine if that would have been the case, trends before the reform are 





Figure 2 allows for visual inspection, but for a formal test Model 1 is estimated with 
the adjustment of keeping only the three cohorts before reform and defining two placebo 
reforms starting in school years 2003–2004 and 2004–2005. Results are shown in columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 4. Only two of the 22 tests gave a significant coefficient at the 10% 
significance level. This does not provide strong evidence against the common trend 





Table 5 show how effects change when the estimation sample or model specifications 
change. Column (1) gives the baseline estimates reported in the main results. Column (2) 
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shows estimates in a sample containing downtown students scoring in the top 33% of their 
city cohort. Coefficients on Norwegian and Norwegian II exams remained positive, but they 
were no longer significant. One possible explanation is that it was students with the highest 
ability that gained the most from a change in peers. Column (3) includes high-ability students 
from more cities than those included in the baseline sample. Both the effects on grades and 
test scores became less noticeable, though this could be because this sample definition are 
comparing trends in groups that were less equal than the groups compared earlier. Columns 
(4)–(6) explore how the estimates are sensitive to adjusting the cohorts included in the 
sample. Standard errors on effects increased when reducing the sample size to include only 
cohorts closer to reform, while the effect on exams stay significant.  
To correct for possible intragroup correlation in error terms, standard errors were 
clustered at the high school*year level.  Table A.1 in the Appendix shows that the results are 
somewhat sensitive to the level of clustering. Standard errors on test scores decreased when 
clustering on middle school or city. One possible reason is few clusters; there were 25 middle 




The last robustness check performed is based on the permutation method proposed in 
Buchmueller, DiNardo, and Valleta (2011). We have assumed that the policy change 
happened in each of the 20 largest cities in Norway (excluding Bergen and Oslo), and 
estimated DD coefficients for the top 25% students in each of these cities and for the other 
three ability groups in each city. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these coefficients and the 
95th percentile in the distribution. By comparing the coefficient for Bergen to the empirical 
distribution of DD coefficients for the other groups, we rejected or kept the null hypothesis of 
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no effect in Bergen for each outcome. The results from this robustness check show that none 
of the coefficients are above the 95th percentile in the distribution of coefficients. A way to 
increase precision is to pool the two Norwegian exam scores and inspect inference is for this 
measure. Pooling Norwegian scores results in nearly a doubling of the sample size, and results 
are significant at the 1% significance level with robust standard errors, and above the 95ht 
percentile in the distribution created with the permutation test. Bergen is the second largest 
city in Norway. Choosing fewer and larger cities decrease the variation in the distribution of 
coefficients. In total, results from the permutation test do not suggest intragroup correlation in 




7.1 Testing for selection and “the incentivizing effect” 
The 25% best students from downtown Bergen districts and the 25% best students from 
downtown districts in the control cities are student-group categories that students could switch 
in or out of because of reform. The ATT of a school choice reform on high-ability downtown 
students would be biased if the top 25% downtown students were different under a catchment 
area system and a GPA-based system, as for example if students changed their catchment area 
to one with their preferred school as a response to the introduction of a catchment area 
system. This could prevent the treated group from being comparable before and after reform. 
Machin and Salvanes (2010) showed that house prices in Oslo remained sensitive to school 
intake reform that took place in 1997, even a decade later. This may be less of an issue in 
Bergen since the system before the reform was not strictly based on catchment area. 
A similar situation would arise if students ranked in the top 25% of their cohort were 
not the same before and after reform. Haraldsvik (2014) studied the effect on middle school 
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grades of students in Bergen as a consequence of reform. The study revealed that those grades 
increased in the district as a whole with the transition from the catchment system to the GPA 
system. Haraldsvik proposed that a performance-based system incentivized some or all 
students to work for better grades in order to increase their chances of attending their 
preferred high school.  
The reform was announced in the fall the year before it was implemented. For the first 
cohort applying to high school after the reform, the adjustment time was less than a school 
year. The first cohort after reform should also have been less incentivized to increase their 
grades, since there were fewer observable differences between high schools. The second and 
third cohorts had more time to adjust to intake reform, and the differences between schools 




One way to test whether there was selection of students into the treated group due to reform is 
examining changes in predetermined background variables, and if students were incentivized 
by the reform, it would be revealed by grades determined before high school. To test for 
selection and the incentivizing effect, Model 2, a modified version of Model, 1 is 
implemented: 
 
!!" = !! + !!!"#$"%!" + !!!"ℎ!"#1989!" + !!!"ℎ!"#1990!" + !!!"ℎ!"#1991!" +
!! !"ℎ!"#1989!" ∗ !"#$"%!" + !! !"ℎ!"#1990!" ∗ !"#$"%!" + !! !"ℎ!"#1991!! ∗
!"#$"%!" + α!!!" + !!"      (2) 
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The main change from Model 1 is that the Bergen indicator now is interacted with indicators 
for each post-reform cohort. The dummies !"ℎ!"#1989!" , !"ℎ!"#1990!"  , and 
!"ℎ!"!1991!" are the indicators for the three post-reform cohorts.  
Table 6 show estimates of !!, !!, and !! in Model 2. Panel a) shows results when the 
dependent variables are background characteristics and middle school GPA. Panel b) show 
results when dependent variable are high school peergpa and measures of academic 
performance in high school. There are generally smaller differential changes in predetermined 
background characteristics for the first cohort than for the rest. The second cohort shows 
larger differences, while for the third cohort there were negative significant coefficients on 
fathers’ and mothers’ years of education. Coefficients on parents’ income were negative but 
insignificant, while a positive insignificant coefficient appeared for the female dummy. These 
results confirm a hypothesis of dynamic response to school choice reform. Students scoring in 
the top 25% of their cohort in the city center of Bergen were different before the reform and 
two years after the reform.  
Table 6 shows that middle school GPA increased. This finding could be explained by 
the “incentivizing effect” that the school choice reform had on student middle school grades. 
The top 25% of downtown Bergen students had higher middle school grades after the reform, 
a finding that is in line with Haraldsvik (2014). The second main explanation for the ATT of 
the reform is therefore that high-ability students in Bergen became better because of the 
reform before entering high school.  
Panel b) focuses on high school academic outcomes with the new specification. It 
indicates that selection into the top 25% of downtown students in Bergen affected the high 
school outcomes of this group. The results in Table 2 show that including background 
variables did not change the results significantly. However, if the significant coefficients in 
panel a) indicated changes in unobservable factors, that would suggest that the DD coefficient 
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is a lower bound on the effect of the reform. The incentivizing effect indicated by the positive 
effect on middle school GPA is not an issue if it was a transitory shock to abilities that do not 
affect outcomes in high school. If it was not a transitory shock in abilities, then part of the 
observed effect of the reform could be explained by this phenomenon. The next section 
specifies a model that is designed to take into account both selection into the group of the top 
25% of students in Bergen and the incentivizing effect due to school choice reform.  
 
7.2 Accounting for selection and direct effects 
A school choice reform could affect the high school outcomes of the top 25% of downtown 
Bergen students through channels other than a change in peer characteristics in high school. 
The ATT would then not only reflect a peer effect but also these alternative mechanisms. The 
first of the two main alternative explanations indicated in the last section is that the top 25% 
of students in Bergen were not the same before and after reform. The second is that the top 
25% of downtown Bergen students had higher ability after the reform because they studied 




One way to separate the peer effect from these explanations is employing the fact that all 
students in Bergen underwent the school choice reform, but not all of them experienced the 
same change in high school peer characteristics. As shown in Column (8) in Table 3, the top 
25% of suburban students did not experience the same change in peer characteristics, even 
though they were equally subject to the reform. The procedure would then compare changes 
in test scores between downtown students in Bergen and in control cities to changes in test 
scores between suburban students in Bergen and in control cities. Changes in group 
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composition and the incentivizing effect would no longer pose a concern if these effects were 
equal in the downtown and suburban areas. To implement this strategy, the following 
specification (Model 3) is estimated: 
 
!!" = !! + !!!"#$"%!" + !!!"#$!%!" + !!!"#$%"#$!" + 
!!(!"#$"%!" ∗ !"#$!%!")+ !!(!"#$"%!" ∗ !"#$%"#$!")+ !!(!"#$!%!" ∗
!"#$%"#$!")+ !!(!"#$"%!" ∗ !"#$!%!" ∗ !"#$%"#$!")+ !!X!" + !!"      (3) 
 
Columns (1) in Table 7 show estimates of !! in Model 3. First we note that since both 
downtown and suburban students experienced an increase in average peergpa, the relative 
effect on peergpa goes down. The coefficient of GPA measures are about the same, but 
significance disappear for Firstyear GPA. The coefficient for Norwegian exam year 3 is 0.16 
and insignificant, while the coefficient with controls on Norwegian II is 0.34 and significant 
at the 5 % significance level. Significance disappears for Exam year 1, while the coefficient 
change sign for Exam year 3. The disappearance of significance for some of the outcomes 
could be explained as a direct effect of the incentivizing effect of the reform. Alternatively, 
the disappearance could be explained by the lower relative increase in peergpa using this 
strategy. The coefficient for Norwegian II suggests that high-ability downtown students still 




To test for whether the DDD strategy accounts for the selection and the incentivizing effect, 
Model 3 is estimated with background characteristics and middle school GPA as dependent 
variables. Table A.3 in the Appendix shows that the significant effect from middle school 
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GPA disappears, while there is still a negative effect on maternal years of education. This 
means that we cannot reject a null hypothesis that there was no incentivizing effect, while 
there may still be some unaccounted-for selection in the model using the DDD identification 
strategy. 
 
7.3 School effects 
The reform in Bergen allowed students to choose which school to attend. For at least 10 years 
before reform, a catchment area design in which students’ ability as measured by middle 
school GPA was used to distribute students across schools. This could indicate that at the time 
of reform the schools were relatively similar, since their classes had for a long time consisted 




There is, however, a systematic pattern to the change in which schools different types 
of students attended before and after reform. Table 8 reveals some of the changes in 
composition in downtown high schools. Columns (1)–(5) show the proportion of high-ability 
downtown students at each downtown school in Bergen before and after reform. Column (6) 
reports the proportion at any downtown school, while Column (7) report the proportion of 
high-ability downtown students at private schools. The p-value of a two-proportion z-test for 
differences in proportions is reported in the last row. The table shows that high-ability 
downtown students moved between downtown high schools because of reform; specifically, 
they moved from Tanks and Bjørgvin to Katten and BHG. The table also shows that the 
reform did not influence the decision of high-ability downtown students of whether to attend 
downtown public schools or private schools.  
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All downtown high schools are not equally attractive to students. Since the reform 
induced more high-ability downtown students to attend a particular high school, the ATT 
could reflect a change in school quality, rather than simply peer effects. The school effects 
observed cannot explain all of the effect identified. The proportion of high ability downtown 
students at BHG and Katten increased by 18 percentage points as shown in Table 8. Even if 
the effect of attending BHG or Katten is large, a potential school effect can only explain a 
small proportion the identified effect of the reform. 
 
8 Summary and Conclusion 
There are many studies in the peer effect literature that rely on naturally occurring variation in 
peer characteristics to estimate peer effects. Commonly used natural experiments are school 
vouchers, desegregation schemes, or school assignment lotteries. This study used a school 
choice reform process in Bergen, Norway to investigate the effects of changes in peer 
characteristics at high schools for high-ability students.  
A change from a catchment area-based intake system to a performance-based intake 
system, or the reverse, will have different consequences for different types of students. This 
study focused on a group—the high-ability downtown students in Bergen—for which the 
reform primarily resulted in a considerable shock in peer characteristics at high school. The 
ATT of the reform was identified by comparing the change in high school outcomes of this 
group of students before and after reform to comparable students in other cities. The analysis 
showed that this group of students attended high schools where peer students’ average middle 
school GPA increased by 0.65 of one SD after reform, as against comparable groups in other 
cities. 
The results showed that exam scores of downtown high-ability students in Bergen 
increased significantly due to the reform. Since the reform meant that this group of students 
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attended high school with higher-ability peers, it is tempting to draw the conclusion from this 
finding that high-ability students gain from attending high school with other high-ability 
students. Secondary findings urge caution about the effect of the school choice reform on 
high-ability students, since the results suggested that middle school students adjust rapidly to 
the new high school intake system. Using a DDD identification strategy that aimed to account 
for middle school students’ adjustment to school choice reform, we found some positive 
effects on exams taken at the end of high school.  
Implementing a performance-based intake system is one way of creating a tracked 
system where similar students attend school together based on an achievement measure. 
Detailed policy recommendations regarding intake systems require more in-depth analysis on 
the total effects of the intake reform. The present study’s results suggest that reform had a 
largely positive effect on students at all ability levels, although it may be more challenging to 
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Figure 1
Notes: Figure shows peer gpa by treatment and control
groups across cohorts. Cohorts born in 1989 finish middle
school in the spring of 2005 and are the first that apply to
high school after the school choice reform in Bergen. The
treatment group consists of students that attended middle
school downtown Bergen and are ranked among the top 25
% at middle school of their cohort in Bergen. The control
group consists of students that attended middle school in
Kristiansand, Stavanger, Trondheim or Drammen and are
ranked among the top 25 % of their cohort.
Figure 2: Outcome trends DD
Notes: Figures show outcomes by groups over cohorts. 95 % confidence intervals of means are shown.
Figure 3: Permutation test
Notes: Figures show distribution of coefficents from estimating the effect of placebo reforms. We have
assumed that the policy changed happened for each of the 20 largest cities in Norway, and estimated
DD coefficient for the top 25 % in each of these cities as well as for the 3 other ability groups of
students for each city. This gives a total of 80 coefficents. Dotted line represents the 95 percentile in
the distribution of coefficients, while the full line is the estimate for Bergen.
Figure 4: Outcome trends DDD
Notes: Figures show outcomes by groups over cohorts. Only top 25 % of students included. 95 %
confidence intervals of means are shown.
Table 1: Descriptive
Treated Diff: Treated - control
Pre reform Pre reform Post reform
Mean SD Mean Mean N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel a) - Covariates
Female 0.59 0.49 -0.08 -0.07 1869
Mother years of education 15.09 2.58 0.91 0.50 1736
Father years of education 15.83 2.68 0.93 0.42 1699
Mother earnings 100353 63944 5801 4492 1818
Father earnings 200699 136088 9561 -4503 1778
Middle School GPA 5.21 0.21 0.08 0.15 1869
Panel b) - Peer characteristic
Peergpa 4.48 0.14 -0.10 0.31 1869
Panel c) - Outcomes
Firstear GPA 4.94 0.47 0.05 0.14 1844
High School GPA 4.85 0.46 0.01 0.09 1656
Absence hours 32.23 30.11 -6.53 -7.73 1606
Absence days 14.19 11.60 -3.80 -1.50 1607
Select basic math year 1 0.05 0.21 -0.05 -0.01 1201
Norwegian exam year 3 4.31 0.82 -0.06 0.14 1734
Nynorsk exam year 3 4.09 0.86 -0.03 0.32 1342
Exam score year 1 4.76 0.81 0.13 0.62 420
Exam score year 2 4.49 0.99 0.02 -0.04 1040
Exam score year 3 4.25 1.19 0.02 -0.09 1432
# observations treatment 177 225
# observations control 694 773
Notes: Panel a) show descriptive statistics of covariates. Panel b) show endogenous variable
peergpa. Peergpa are average middle school GPA of students at highs school. Panel c) show
descriptive statistics of high school outcomes. Column (1) show pre reform means of the
treated, Column (2) show the standard deviation of the treated. Columns (3) and (4) show
difference in means between treatment and control before and after the reform. Treatment
consists of students that attended middle school in the downtwon area of Bergen are ranked
in the top 25 % of their cohort in Bergen. Control group consists of students that attended
middle school in Kristiansand, Stavanger, Trondheim or Drammen and are ranked among
the top 25 % of their cohort.
Table 2: Results
Dependent variable: High school outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peergpa 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 1869
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
GPA firstyear 0.09 0.09* 0.10* 1844
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
HS GPA 0.08 0.07 0.08 1656
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Hours absent -1.20 -1.03 -1.07 1606
(4.38) (4.33) (3.97)
Days absent 2.29 2.78 3.04 1607
(2.66) (2.32) (2.24)
Select basic math 0.04 0.05 0.04 1201
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Norwegian exam year 3 0.20 0.20 0.20* 1734
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Nynorsk exam year 3 0.34** 0.31** 0.30** 1342
(0.14) (0.14) (0.12)
Exam year 1 0.45* 0.46** 0.48*** 420
(0.24) (0.21) (0.18)
Exam year 2 -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 1040
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14)
Exam year 3 -0.12 -0.10 -0.08 1432
(0.20) (0.19) (0.18)
Spesification
Middle school dummies x x
Background characteristics x
Notes: Table show coefficient estimates of  3 in model 1 in colums (1)-(3) and sample size in
Column (4). Sample consist of high ability downtown students in Bergen and control cities.
Background characteristics are parents earnings, years of education and gender. Cohorts born
1986-1991. Standard errors in parentheses and are clustered at high school - year level. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 3: DD estimates for all groups in Bergen
Dependent variable: High school outcomes
Downtown students Suburban students
Ability level L M-L M-H H L M-L M-H H
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Peergpa 0.03 0.13* 0.24*** 0.43*** -0.03 0.04 0.11* 0.23***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Firstyear GPA 0.17 0.21*** 0.07 0.10* 0.16* 0.22*** 0.15*** 0.01
(0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
High school GPA 0.22** 0.13** 0.13** 0.08 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.11*** 0.02
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Hours absent -7.41 -17.70** -6.11 -1.07 2.36 -4.60 -2.61 1.71
(11.18) (7.39) (6.43) (3.97) (7.42) (4.82) (3.38) (3.28)
Days absent 2.32 2.94 2.03 3.04 4.27* 1.64 -0.77 -0.56
(3.51) (3.03) (2.00) (2.24) (2.18) (1.58) (1.28) (1.32)
Select basic math 0.02 -0.07 0.10 0.04 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09* 0.02
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Norwegian exam year 3 0.16 0.28** 0.08 0.20* 0.09 0.12* 0.13* 0.03
(0.15) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Nynorsk exam year 3 0.03 -0.17 0.03 0.30** 0.02 0.13* 0.09 -0.03
(0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Exam year 1 0.24 0.64* 0.10 0.48*** 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.17
(0.39) (0.33) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.16) (0.15)
Exam year 2 -0.00 0.20 0.22 -0.02 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.15
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Exam year 3 0.01 0.11 -0.07 -0.08 0.22** 0.05 0.05 -0.20*
(0.22) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Middle school dummies x x x x x x x x
Background characteristics x x x x x x x x
Observations 1957 1911 1859 1869 3525 3475 3332 3219
Notes: Table show coefficient estimates of  3 in equation 1 for all groups. Column (1) compares the change in
outcomes of low-ability downtown students from before to after the reform to low ability downtown students in
control cities. Column (2) compares the change in outcomes of medium low ability downtown students in
Bergen to medium low ability students in control citites. Observations refer to the number of students
registered starting academic track. Cohorts born 1986-1991. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are






Peergpa 0.08 -0.10 871
(0.09) (0.09)
GPA firstyear -0.03 -0.07 847
(0.07) (0.07)
HS GPA -0.05 -0.08 814
(0.06) (0.07)
Hours absent 5.06 1.46 796
(7.25) (5.29)
Days absent 4.25 -1.14 796
(2.86) (2.98)
Select basic math 0.01 0.00 871
(0.05) (0.05)
Norwegian exam year 3 -0.05 -0.08 814
(0.14) (0.15)
Nynorsk exam year 3 -0.36* -0.12 797
(0.20) (0.17)
Exam year 1 -0.21 0.28 271
(0.23) (0.23)
Exam year 2 0.28 0.16 514
(0.18) (0.17)
Exam year 3 -0.14 -0.48* 633
(0.28) (0.24)
Spesification
Background chars x x
Middle school dummies x x
Notes: Table show coefficient estimates of  3 in equation 1. That is, a regression of future
outcomes on reform dummy, treatment status dummy and interaction. In columns (1)-(2)
the sample consists of pre reform cohorts. Column (1) sets the reform for the school year
starting 2003 while Column (2) sets the reform for the school year starting in 2004. Column
(3) show the sample size. Cohorts born 1986-1991. Sample includes high ability downtown
students in Bergen and control cities. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are
clustered at high school - year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 5: Robustness
Dependent variable. High school outcomes
Control group Keeping cohorts
Baseline Top 33% 21 cities 1988-1989 1986-1989 1986-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Peergpa 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.53*** 0.46*** 0.45***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.08)
GPA firstyear 0.10* 0.09 0.06 0.22*** 0.17** 0.11*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
HS GPA 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.17** 0.10 0.07
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06)
Hours absent -1.07 0.71 0.33 -6.76 -5.56 -3.12
(3.97) (3.84) (4.90) (4.45) (4.55) (3.99)
Days absent 3.04 3.59* 3.06 3.04 2.59 1.90
(2.24) (2.00) (2.09) (3.26) (2.69) (2.37)
Select basic math -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05* 0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Norwegian exam year 3 0.20* 0.14 0.15 0.33** 0.24* 0.25**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) (0.13) (0.11)
Norwegian II exam year 3 0.30** 0.18 0.22* 0.45*** 0.29* 0.36***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13)
Exam year 1 0.48*** 0.43** 0.15 0.37* 0.53*** 0.48**
(0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Exam year 2 -0.02 -0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.04 -0.10
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.19) (0.17) (0.15)
Exam year 3 -0.08 -0.24 -0.06 0.28 -0.09 -0.16
(0.18) (0.17) (0.15) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17)
Background char. x x x x x x
Middle school dummies x x x x x x
High school dummies
Observations 1869 2420 12666 651 1201 1544
Notes: Table show coefficient estimates of  3 in equation 1. That is, a regression of future outcomes on reform dummy, treatment status
dummy and interaction. Column (2) keeps students ranked in the top 33 % of students within year and city. Column (3) includes students
scoring in the top 25 % in more cities in Norway in the control. Column (4)-(6) only keeps students belonging to the cohorts indicated in the
table header. Column 8 includes a spesification with high school dummies. Oslo not incuded. Cohorts born 1986-1991. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses and are clustered at high school - year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 6: Selection and dynamic response
Years of education Earnings
Mother Father Mother Father Female MS GPA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel a)
Short (↵5) -0.24 -0.39 12679.12 -528.81 -0.02 0.08*
(0.35) (0.38) (10350.45) (18665.42) (0.06) (0.05)
Middle(↵6) -0.37 -0.19 -13840.84 -22632.64 -0.07 0.03
(0.62) (0.46) (9097.84) (23835.71) (0.06) (0.03)
Long(↵7) -0.67** -0.87** -5590.74 -12197.42 0.09 0.11***
(0.33) (0.40) (11620.11) (18273.99) (0.08) (0.03)
N 1736 1699 1818 1778 1869 1869
Panel b) Norwegian Nynorsk Exam GPA HS GPA
Peergpa exam year 3 exam year 3 year 3 firstyear
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short (↵5) 0.46*** 0.24* 0.27 -0.10 0.17** 0.10
(0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) (0.07) (0.07)
Middle(↵6) 0.43*** 0.25 0.53*** -0.23 0.05 0.03
(0.11) (0.16) (0.12) (0.20) (0.06) (0.06)
Long(↵7) 0.38*** 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.13
(0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.06) (0.09)
N 1869 1734 1342 1432 1844 1656
Notes: Table show coefficient estimates of ↵5, ↵6 and, ↵7 in model 2. Panel a show
estimates when the dependent variable is predetermined background variables and middle
school GPA, while panel b show estimates when dependent are high school outcomes.
Middle school dummies included in all regressions, and covariates included in regressions in
panel b. Sample includes high ability downtown students in Bergen and control cities.
Cohorts born 1986-1991. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at
high school - year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 7: Results II





GPA firstyear 0.09 1844
(0.05)
HS GPA 0.07 1656
(0.06)
Hours absent -2.81 1606
(-5.15)
Days absent 3.38 1607
(2.24)
Select basic math 0.02 1201
(0.07)
Norwegian exam year 3 0.16 1734
(0.12)
Nynorsk exam year 3 0.34** 1342
(0.14)
Exam year 1 0.31 420
(0.25)
Exam year 2 -0.18 1040
(0.16)
Exam year 3 0.11 1432
(0.19)
Spesification
Middle school dummies x
Background characteristics x
Notes: Table show coefficient estimates of  6 in Model 3 in Colum (1). Column (2) show sample
size. Background characteristics are parents earnings, years of education and gender. Cohorts born
1986-1991. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at high school - year level. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 8: Proportion of high ability downtown students attending school
Katten BGH Langhaugen Tanks Bjørgvin Downtown Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pre 0.23 0.12 0.25 0.26 0.04 0.90 0.05
Post 0.32 0.21 0.31 0.08 0.00 0.93 0.04
Diff 0.09 0.09 0.06 -0.18 -0.04 0.03 -0.01
P-value 0.04 0.03 0.20 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.97
Observations 402 402 402 402 402 402 402
Notes: Table show proportion of high ability students attending each
downtown high school in Bergen before and after reform in columns 1-5.
Column 6 report the proportion at all downtown schools, while Column 7
report the proportion of high ability downtown students at private schools.
P-values from a two-tailed test of proportions are reported.
Figure A.1: Attrition rate trends
Notes: Figures show rates for which we observe test score outcomes over time. Difference in difference
estimates are shown in the corner of each figure. Only significant difference in trends are detected for HS
GPA at 10 % significance level. The jump in level of HS GPA firstyear from cohort 1986 is caused by a
lack of administrative grades from the first year for this cohort.
Figure A.2: Descriptive figures - Bergen downtown and Bergen suburban students
Notes: Figures show mean outcomes by cohort and group. Legends indicated in figure a.
Figure A.3: Descriptive figures - Bergen downtown and control downtown students
Notes: Figures show mean outcomes by cohort and group. Legends indicated in figure a.
Figure A.4: Descriptive figures - Oslo downtown and Oslo suburban students
Notes: Figures show mean outcomes by cohort and group. Legends indicated in figure a.
Table A.1: Estimation - Clustering on different levels
Dependent variable. High school outcomes
No Middle school High school City City 21 MS*year HS*year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Peergpa 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.44*** 0.42*** 0.43***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.10) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
GPA firstyear 0.10** 0.10** 0.10 0.10* 0.06*** 0.10** 0.10*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
HS GPA 0.08 0.08** 0.08 0.08* 0.07*** 0.08** 0.08
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
Hours absent -1.07 -1.07 -1.07 -1.07 0.33 -1.07 -1.07
(4.31) (3.04) (3.30) (3.23) (1.23) (2.92) (3.97)
Days absent 3.04 3.04** 3.04 3.04*** 3.06*** 3.04* 3.04
(2.12) (1.36) (1.93) (0.48) (0.49) (1.67) (2.24)
Select basic math 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.08*** 0.04* 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.07)
Nor exam year 3 0.20* 0.20** 0.20*** 0.20** 0.15*** 0.20** 0.20*
(0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.11)
Norwegian II exam year 3 0.30** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.22*** 0.30** 0.30**
(0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.12)
Exam year 1 0.48** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48** 0.15*** 0.48*** 0.48***
(0.20) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.05) (0.15) (0.18)
Exam year 2 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.07* -0.02 -0.02
(0.16) (0.09) (0.17) (0.15) (0.04) (0.15) (0.14)
Exam year 3 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06** -0.08 -0.08
(0.14) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.03) (0.18) (0.18)
Spesification
Middle school dummies x x x x x x x
Background chars x x x x x x x
Notes: Table show coefficient estimates of  3 in model 1. Treatment group are high ability downtown students in Bergen,
while control group are high ability students in control cities Trondheim, Savanger, Kristiansandand Drammen. Standard
errors in parentheses. Cohorts born 1986-1991. Level of clustering indicated in column headers. City means clustering at
city/muncipal level, while city 21 is clustering on city level when expanding to include 21 cities. MS*year is clustering on
middle school - year, and HS*year is clustering on high school - year. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table A.2: School quality
Downtown students Suburban students
Ability level: Low Med-low Med-high High Low Med-low Med-high High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Downtown
Prop. pre 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.13
Prop. post 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.16 0.23
Diff -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.11 -0.05 0.03 0.10
P-value 0.01 0.57 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Private
Prop. pre 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.29 0.33
Prop. post 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.20
Diff 0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.01 -0.10 -0.13
P-value 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.44 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00
Katten
Prop. pre 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.15
Prop. post 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.29 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.44
Diff -0.10 -0.10 -0.03 0.15 -0.09 -0.09 -0.01 0.29
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.00
BHG
Prop. pre 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.14
Prop. post 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.18 0.00 0.03 0.24 0.44
Diff -0.08 -0.03 0.00 0.09 -0.20 -0.15 0.07 0.30
P-value 0.00 0.17 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
Bjorgvin
Prop. pre 0.17 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.21 0.18 0.11 0.10
Prop. post 0.26 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.22 0.10 0.06
Diff 0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.05
P-value 0.02 0.77 0.13 0.00 0.59 0.26 0.86 0.07
Langhaugen
Prop. pre 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.10
Prop. post 0.02 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.18
Diff -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.17 -0.02 0.11 0.07
P-value 0.00 0.83 0.09 0.23 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.01
Tanks
Prop. pre 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.21 0.15 0.14
Prop. post 0.06 0.21 0.22 0.07 0.02 0.20 0.14 0.08
Diff -0.00 0.14 0.13 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06
P-value 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.78 0.03
Notes: Table show proportion students at each downtown school in Bergen before and after
the school choice reform in column 1-5. Also show the proportion at all downtown schools,
and the proportion students at private schools. P-value of a two-proportion z-test for
differences in proportions are reported.
Table A.3: DDD placebo
Years of education Earnings
Mother Father Mother Father Female MS GPA
 ̂7 -0.65** -0.59* -2326.65 635.34 0.01 0.04
-0.33 -0.34 -8593.76 -16737.4 -0.07 -0.03
N 4760 4674 4974 4894 5081 5081
Notes: Table show estimates of  6 in model 3. Dependent variable are predetermined
background variables and middle school GPA. Middle school dummies included in all
regressions. Cohorts born 1986-1991. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are
clustered at high school - year level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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In the first decade of the 2000s, the proportion of children aged one or two attending formal 
childcare in Norway more than doubled, from 38% to 79%. There was an especially large 
increase in public funding to childcare centers starting in 2003, which accelerated this 
attendance growth. The consequences of this expansion on children`s outcomes remain 
largely unknown. This paper study the effects of attending childcare on school performance 
by using the fact that the childcare expansion was greater in municipalities that had low pre-
reform childcare coverage. The results do not indicate any average effect of the childcare 
expansion on test scores at age 10. Dividing the municipalities into groups by childcare 
quality as measured by pre-reform observables, the results show a positive effect on school 
performance in municipalities with high pre-reform quality and a negative effect in 
municipalities with low pre-reform quality. Further analyses suggest that not only quality 
differences between municipalities but also the age of entering formal childcare explain the 
findings. 
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There is an established consensus that high-quality targeted programs can have a positive 
impact on children’s later life outcomes (Almond & Currie, 2010; Ruhm & Waldfogel, 2012; 
Heckman & Mosso, 2014). Meanwhile, there are still discussions in the literature on the 
consequences of public subsidized childcare programs (see examples of negative, no, and 
positive effects in Baker, Gruber, & Milligan, 2008; Gupta & Simonsen, 2010; Havnes & 
Mogstad, 2011, respectively). The main argument put forward for these differing findings is 
that children attending large-scale subsidized childcare programs have materially different 
profiles from the children in targeted programs and that the effect of attending childcare can 
vary for different types of children. For example, the consequence of attending childcare can 
vary for children from low or high socioeconomic backgrounds, by child age, by child 
personality, and based on the quality of the alternative modes of care as compared to the 
quality of the childcare program. Other important discussions in the literature are whether 
childcare has the potential to influence cognitive or non-cognitive outcomes or both, and 
whether the effects of childcare in early life persist through adolescence and into adulthood.1 
This paper contributes to this debate by examining the consequences of a large 
expansion in public subsidized childcare following a 2003 reform in Norway. Outcomes of 
children in municipalities that on average experienced a large increase in childcare capacity is 
compared to the outcomes of children in municipalities that on average experienced a smaller 
increase in childcare capacity. Since the expansion mostly influenced one- and two-year-olds 
in some municipalities and three- to five-year-olds in others, this paper contributes evidence 
on the effects of childcare on children of different age groups. Unlike the studies using 
differential expansion across districts at the time of reform (Havnes & Mogstad, 2011; Felfe, 
                                                
1 Evidence from neurobiological studies shows that the level of stress hormones in children in 
childcare varies by childcare quality, time in care, age, and temperament (Gunnar & Donzella, 2001; 
Geoffroy et al., 2006; Lupien et al., 2009).  
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Nollenberger, & Rodŕıguez-Planas, 2015; Cornelissen et al., 2015; Felfe & Lalive, 2015), we 
contribute by using a slightly different estimation strategy, relying on expansions being 
stronger in municipalities with low pre-reform coverage. The advantage of this method is that 
endogeneity is less of a concern, since pre-determined characteristics of the municipality are 
used to identify high- and low-expansion municipalities. The outcomes available are national 
test scores performed at age 10. In addition,childcare quality is examined, since rich data on 
quality measures are available for childcare institutions. Recent reports on the importance of 
childcare quality for child outcomes have motivated this focus (e.g., Walters, 2015; Araujo et 
al., 2015). This paper contribute to this literature by examining the direct effect of a rapid 
expansion of coverage on child outcomes in municipalities with different pre-reform quality 
at childcare centers.2  
The empirical strategy builds on studies that use differential expansions of public 
programs across districts to evaluate the impact of such programs. An early example of this 
procedure can be found in Duflo (2001, 2004), whose articles explore the consequences of a 
major primary school construction program in Indonesia in the 1970s. A notable feature of the 
expansion program was the intention to construct more schools in areas with relatively low 
school coverage. The results show clear positive impacts on years of completed education and 
adult earnings for those who were more exposed to the school construction program. Since 
the program led to a doubling of the number of schools in six years, Duflo (2001) also 
examines what happened to school quality. Focusing on the pupil-teacher rate, this indicated 
that that quality declined between the pre- and post-reform periods, but that there was no 
differential decrease between high-program and low-program areas.    
                                                
2 It is important to note that observable inputs are not randomly assigned to municipalities. If the effect 
of an expansion varies between municipalities with different observables, that may actually be due to 
differences in unobservable dimensions, different mechanisms in different types of municipalities, or 
groups of children being differently affected in different types of municipalities. Section 6 attempts to 
explore some of these issues.  
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The literature on the consequences of expansions of large-scale public childcare 
programs reports mixed effects on child outcomes. Analysis of such programs is most often 
performed in countries with both an advanced public childcare sector and high-quality 
administrative data. Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Germany are examples of such 
countries.3 Baker, Gruber, & Milligan (2008) published an early paper on the analysis of 
universal childcare. A program to increase childcare availability was implemented in one 
Canadian province, Quebec, but not in the rest of the country. The coverage rate for children 
aged four and under in Quebec increased in the reform period, which lasted nine years, from 
about 43% to about 67%. The article compares the child outcomes in Quebec with other 
Canadian jurisdictions, finding negative effects on short-term behavioral and health outcomes 
for both children, who were assessed soon after leaving the program before age five, and for 
the program, since the effects were estimated not long after it was implemented.4 The paper 
does not find that quality of care decreased by looking at indicators of staff qualifications 
(age, proportion full-time, proportion with some secondary education) in Quebec and the rest 
of Canada.    
Havnes & Mogstad (2011) examined the effect of a large-scale childcare coverage 
increase mainly for children aged three to six in Norway in the 1970s. Studying a reform that 
took place several decades earlier allowed them to look at long-term outcomes, and they find 
positive effects on adult labor market participation and years of education. With regards to 
quality, they conclude that, if anything, childcare quality fell because child-teacher and child-
staff rates increased more in those municipalities that expanded their coverage to a greater 
                                                
3 Evidence on the effect of a relatively large-scale program (compared to Perry Preschool or the 
Abecedarian Project) from the US is found in studies based on Head Start (Currie & Thomas, 1995; 
Ludwig & Miller, 2007; Garces, Thomas, & Currie, 2002; Deming, 2009; Bitler, Hoynes, & Domina, 
2014; Walters, 2015). Gormley et al. (2005), Wong et al. (2008), and Fitzpatrick (2008) report on 
public preschool programs in different states. 
4 Lefebvre, Merrigan, & Verstraete (2008) similarly find negative effects using the same reform on 
preschool children’s Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test scores. Baker, Gruber, & Milligan (2015) show 
that negative effects persist into young adulthood. Other studies pointing to negative effects of 
childcare (not based on expansions) are Bernal & Keane (2010) and Herbst & Tekin (2010). 
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degree. By looking more closely at the distributional effects of the same reform on earnings, 
Havnes & Mogstad (2015) show a positive effect driven by those at the lower end of the 
outcome distribution. Other evidence from Norway mainly that relies on causal identification 
methods different than capacity expansions are found in Drange & Havnes (2015), Drange & 
Telle (2015), and Drange, Havnes, & Sandsør (2016). They find either no effect or a positive 
effect of attending childcare.   
Gupta & Simonsen (2010) examined a policy in Denmark that guaranteed access to 
childcare for certain cohorts in some municipalities. The study does not find any average 
effect of center-based childcare in Denmark on a range of measures of non-cognitive 
outcomes. They do find a negative effect of family daycare for boys with mothers with 
vocational-track education. Felfe, Nollenberger, & Rodŕıguez-Planas (2015) studied an 
expansion in childcare capacity in Spain and find positive effects, driven by girls and 
disadvantaged children, on reading and math scores at age 15. Cornelissen et al. (2017) 
looked at a capacity expansion aimed at 3-6 year olds in Germany, employing a marginal 
treatment effects (MTE) framework to show positive effects on children from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, which also manifests in the MTE analysis as a “reverse selection on gains”: 
those that are less likely to participate are the same people that have the most to gain from 
childcare. Felfe & Lalive (2014) studied the effect of universal childcare before age three in 
Germany and find a positive effect for children from low socioeconomic backgrounds. 
Smaller increases in capacity appear to be more beneficial than larger increases.  
The political motivation behind large-scale public childcare expansions and targeted 
childcare interventions differ to some degree, since the former is driven more by increasing 
the parental labor supply and the latter more directly at child development. Thus, ex ante, 
what to expect about the effects on children of large-scale expansions should be less clear. In 
this study, we find no average effect of a childcare expansion in Norway on 5th grade test 
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scores. Furthermore, we do not find any consistent evidence that childcare quality is affected 
by the expansion. Looking at the effect of childcare in municipalities with a high level of 
quality in childcare institutions before reform, as measured by a pre-reform indicator, the 
consequence of the expansion is positive on school performance. Negative effects are found 
in districts with low childcare quality before reform and are mainly driven by children with 
low socioeconomic status (SES). Further analyses were not able to show that childcare quality 
or maternal labor force participation were affected differently in municipalities with different 
levels of pre-reform quality. However, the children influenced by the expansion were of 
different ages in the two types of municipalities. In low-quality municipalities, the expansion 
largely affected one- and two-year-olds, while in the high-quality municipalities, the 
expansion primarily involved three to five-year-olds. This is an indication that childcare 
might be negative for the youngest children, especially in an environment of lower-quality 
childcare and positive for older children, especially in an environment of higher-quality 
childcare.  
The study proceeds as follows. In section 2, background information on the 
institutional details of the reform and the childcare sector is provided. Section 3 describes the 
administrative data used and lays out the empirical strategy of difference-in-differences using 
pre-reform coverage rates as a predictor of childcare supply shocks. Section 4 presents the 
main results, while Section 5 focuses on childcare quality. Section 6 examines alternative 
mechanisms and Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2 Institutional details 
The development of a public childcare sector in Norway is related to the increase in female 
labor market participation. In the mid-1960s, few mothers were active labor market 
participants, so there were relatively few childcare centers. As women’s participation 
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accelerated in the 1970s, there was a corresponding increase in childcare attendance. In the 
early stages of the development of a public childcare sector in Norway, the focus was on 
offering alternatives to older children aged three to six years. This has changed over time, 
with the labor market attachment by mothers of younger children increasing substantially. 
The 1990s were subject to three reforms that had important consequences for the 
public childcare sector. In 1993, maternity leave was extended up until children turned one, 
and the process of including six-year-olds in the school system was finalized in 1997. As a 
result, most children attending public childcare were aged between one and five after 1997. In 
1998, the Cash-for-Care (CFC) benefit was implemented, providing a substantial cash 
incentive to parents that did not send their one- or two-year-olds to childcare. The reform 
showed that a price increase reduces childcare attendance, and mainly increase parental care 
for the youngest children (Andersland & Nilsen, 2016). 
By the beginning of the 2000s, the public childcare sector in Norway was already well 
developed. About 41% of children aged one or two and about 84% of children aged three to 
five attended some form of public childcare in 2002.  
[FIGURE 1] 
Figure 1 shows the development of the proportion of one- and two-year-olds registered in 
childcare in Norway; the rapid increase in the coverage rate in the 2000s is readily apparent. 
This expansion is associated with “The Childcare agreement,” a 2003 decision by the 
Storting, Norway’s legislature, that changed several laws to increase childcare capacity. The 
most important elements were the equal treatment of childcare centers, the implementation of 
guaranteed childcare for those who wished it, and the implementation of a nationwide 
maximum price for childcare. 
Norway’s formal childcare system features both private and public operations. Both 
types of centers receive public subsidies and are subject to similar regulations. Before reform, 
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however, municipalities differed in the amount of subsidy provided to private childcare 
centers. The reform meant that all types of childcare centers were to receive the same subsidy 
amount. Moreover, municipalities were obliged to guarantee a place in public childcare by 
2005 for all children by 1st September of the year following their birth. The government made 
plans to create 40,000 new childcare slots by 2005. 
Before reform, prices could vary substantially between municipalities. Beginning in 
2004, the monthly maximum price was set at 2,750 NOK (≈US$340), with plans for eventual 
decreases. A survey conducted in 2002 reports that municipal childcare prices averaged by 
parental income groups ranged from 2,044 to 2,937 NOK (Eibak, 2002). The introduction of a 
fixed price would thus largely affect high-income households in practice, since they paid the 
highest prices for childcare before reform. 
To implement a maximum price, equal treatment of childcare centers, and guaranteed 
childcare slots, Norway’s total public expenditure for childcare more than doubled from 2002 
to 2005.5 In addition to increasing regular funds, the government established a discretionary 
fund to help municipalities that would face particularly daunting challenges in fulfilling the 
reform requirements (Aamodt, Moennesland, & Juell, 2005). This fund would direct extra 
resources to those municipalities that had higher prices for and lower subsidies to private 
childcare centers before reform and to those considered likely to be unable to guarantee 
childcare slots for all who needed them by 2005. The specific amount of funds directed to 
each municipality was calculated centrally. The net effect was that more funds were directed 
at municipalities with less-developed childcare sectors. The discretionary fund amounted to 
10.5% of Norway’s total public funding for childcare in 2005. 
Formal childcare in Norway is centrally regulated through the Childcare Act 
(“Barenhageloven”), which provides a set of common rules for childcare in municipalities 
                                                
5 Source: National Budgets 2002–2007. 
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throughout the country. The maximum number of children in full-time care per pedagogical 
leader (a childcare position type that requires certified education) is nine for children below 
three and eighteen for children from three to six years old. To become a pedagogical leader, 
one must complete three years of college education in the preschool teacher program. 
Childcare centers can apply to the municipality for temporary exemptions if they are not able 
to meet the educational requirements for staff. There are both caregivers with formal 
education and caregivers without pedagogical education working in childcare. The stated 
norm is one caregiver for three children below three and one caregiver for six children three 
or older. Childcare centers are normally open during daytime working hours, from 7 am to 5 
pm, Monday to Friday. Statistics on the use of different forms of care arrangements can be 
useful for understanding alternative forms of care for one- and two-year-olds. A survey 
conducted by Statistics Norway in 2002 and reported in Pettersen (2003) shows that 44% of 
children in that cohort are cared for primarily by parents, 33% attend formal childcare, 12% 
have informal care arrangements, 4% are cared for by relatives, and 7% have other care 
arrangements. These figures make clear that a large increase in one- and two-year-olds 
attending formal childcare will be draw primarily from parental care and other informal care 
arrangements. 
 
3 Data and empirical strategy 
Data on cohorts born from 1998 to 2004 are used in the analysis. These cohorts were chosen 
because they were affected by the childcare expansion and because they are now old enough 
to provide data on school performance at age 10.6 Information on childcare attendance comes 
from two sources. The measure of individual-level childcare attendance comes from 
Norway’s CFC database. The CFC benefit was implemented in 1998 to provide a cash 
                                                
6 Table A1 shows the structure of the data. 
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transfer to families that did not send one- or two-year-old children to formal childcare. 
Families applied to the welfare agency to receive the benefit, stating whether or not their child 
attended childcare. From 1999–2012, a family would be eligible for the benefit simply by 
having a one- or two-year-old child who did not attend formal childcare fulltime. The welfare 
agency controlled this information by collecting monthly information from municipalities. As 
a result, individual-level childcare measure for all CFC-eligible children from 1998 onward 
are available. Children are classified as attending childcare in a given month if they were 
registered as attending above 10 hours per week that month. From these data, we also 
construct a measure of the total number of hours in childcare before age three. 
Municipality-level childcare attendance rates, or coverage rates, are taken from the 
KOSTRA (“Kommune-Stat-Rapportering”) database. KOSTRA is a national reporting 
scheme used in Norway for the administration, evaluation, and comparison of municipalities. 
Childcare centers report their numbers at the end of each year to their municipality, after 
which municipalities report the number of children in childcare to Statistics Norway. This 
database is used to calculate municipality-level coverage rates and municipality-level 
childcare quality measures.7,8 
The third important source of information is the database on national exams, which 
were introduced in 2004 in order to evaluate how schools succeeded in developing students’ 
skills in math, reading, and English. Students take the tests at the 5th, 8th, and 9th grade levels. 
Since the students in our sample are still very young, we can only examine the effects on 5th 
grade test scores. Since 2008, the tests in math and English have been electronically 
corrected. Depending on the subject and year, scores are given on a scale from 0 to 30 or 50. 
                                                
7 Figure A1 compares municipality coverage rates calculated from CFC data with KOSTRA coverage 
rates by year and across the largest municipalities.  
8 KOSTRA coverage rates and quality numbers are reported for most municipalities from 2001 
onward. Since we use numbers registered in the second year after the cohort birth year, the 1998 
cohort is excluded from the analysis using KOSTRA numbers. To compensate for this, the robustness 
section shows the main results without the 1998 cohort. 
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In this analysis, the distribution of points is standardized with means of 0 and standard 
deviations (SDs) of 1 by subject and year. 
Information is also available on which school students attended when taking the test, 
municipality of residence by age, and parents’ earnings and years of education. Earnings are 
measured in basic amounts used in the national insurance scheme.9 
The empirical strategy follows previous literature on universal childcare by using a 
large expansion in capacity that varies across districts. The first step is to identify a pre-
reform indicator for the intensity of expansion; examples of similar strategies can be found in 
Duflo (2001) and Løken, Lundberg, & Riise (2017). 
[TABLE 1] 
Table 1 shows the results from a regression of municipality-level coverage expansion for one- 
and two-year-olds from 2002–2007 on pre-reform municipality characteristics. It reveals that 
the pre-reform coverage rate (for one- and two-year-olds measured in 2001) is a strong 
predictor of capacity expansion. The 2003 reform led to a larger increase in childcare capacity 
in municipalities with lower initial coverage rates. A municipality with 10 percentage points 
(pp.) higher pre-reform coverage had a 4.75 pp. lesser increase in the coverage rate. This 
result accords with the regulatory changes following the reform that led to more funds being 
directed at municipalities with less-developed childcare sectors. The pre-reform coverage rate 
is therefore used as the indicator of the capacity expansion and the main regression (Equation 
1) is: 
 
!!" = !! + !!!ℎ!"#! + !!!"#$! + !!(!"#$%&!"#$!! ∙ !ℎ!"#!)+ !!(!"#$%&#"'(#! ∙
!"#$!)+ !!!!" + !!"    (1) 
 
                                                
9 One basic amount was 92,576 NOK in 2016 ≈ US$11,443. 
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The cohorts in the sample were born between 1998 and 2004. !ℎ!"#! is an indicator for 
cohorts born in 2001 or 2002 and only partly affected by the reform, while !"#$! is an 
indicator for cohorts born in 2003 and 2004 and more significantly affected by the reform. 
!ℎ!"#! will also be an indicator for children that are affected by the reform when they are 
older, while !"#$! is an indicator for children that are more affected by the reform when they 
are younger. !"#$%&#"'(#!  is the pre-reform municipal level childcare coverage rates, 
measured in 2001, for one- and two-year-olds. !!" is a set of control variables including 
gender, mother’s age, father’s age, immigration status, parents’ labor participation before 
child birth, parental years of education before child birth, and municipality dummies. !!" are 
average scores on national tests in math, English and reading in the 5th grade. To correct for 
intragroup correlation in error terms, standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.  
The specification assumes a linear relationship between the pre-reform coverage rate 
and outcome variables. Following Løken, Lundberg, & Riise (2017), municipalities above the 
90th and below the 10th percentiles in the pre-reform coverage rate distribution are dropped 
from the analysis.10 Municipalities with very high or low pre-reform coverage rates may 
behave differently than other municipalities in response to the reform because of their 
extreme pre-reform coverage rates. We show the sensitivity of the results to this restriction in 
the robustness section. 
The interpretation of the coefficient in front of the interaction terms in Equation 1, 
with test scores as outcomes, is how changes in test scores from before to after the reform 
depend on pre-reform coverage levels. The coefficient is interpreted as an intention-to-treat 
(ITT) effect, since it is the total effect on children in municipalities more heavily exposed to 
                                                
10 Figure A2 shows the coverage rate distribution with lines indicating the 10th and 90th percentiles. 
Figure A3 explores how pre-reform characteristics relate to pre-reform coverage rates in 
municipalities. The figure reveals that municipalities with higher pre-reform coverage rates on average 
had higher female employment, lower male employment, larger cohort sizes, more private childcare 
centers, lower proportions of preschool teachers, and lower adjusted costs per care hour. 
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the childcare expansion. For our estimate to have a causal interpretation, we must assume that 
without the childcare expansion, the time trends in test scores in municipalities with high and 
low pre-reform coverage rates would have been the same.  
[FIGURE 2] 
Figure 2a illustrates the empirical strategy by showing the change in coverage rates 
from 2002 to 2007, compared to pre-reform municipal-level coverage rates of for one- and 
two-year-olds in 2001. There is a clear relationship between pre-reform coverage rates and 
capacity increases. Municipalities with a relatively high pre-reform coverage level of close to 
0.6 showed an average increase in coverage level of about 0.2, while municipalities with a 
relatively low pre-reform coverage level of nearly 0.2 had an average increase in coverage 
level of about 0.4. Figure 2b shows that there is no significant relationship between pre-
reform coverage levels and changes in test scores, which is the first sign that there was no 
average effect of the reform on test scores. 
 
4 Results 
This section begins the exploration of the effects of the expansion on test scores in detail. 
Estimations are carried out on both on the full sample and, in the next section, on subgroups 
of municipalities in an attempt to see if the effect of the expansion varied across different 
types of municipalities. Lastly, we explore the mechanisms behind the estimated results. 
Table 2 shows the effect of the expansion for children using a sample containing all 
municipalities.  
[TABLE 2] 
The first two columns in Table 2 show the results when the dependent variable is average 
national exam test scores with and without individual-level control variables. The short run 
coefficient is insignificant, small, and negative, while the long run coefficient is insignificant, 
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small, and positive. Including control variables changes the estimates only marginally. Thus, 
there are no conclusive signs that higher exposure to childcare expansion affected school 
performance at age 10. Columns 3–5 show the same estimations with individual controls by 
subjects: reading, English, and math, respectively. The only significant coefficient is in the 
short run effect for math. This may seem inconsistent with a positive effect of childcare since 
the expansion is much stronger in the long run. One explanation for finding significant effects 
in the short run but not the long run is that the effect of childcare is heterogeneous by age. The 
cohorts affected by the expansion in the short run estimate (born 2001–2002) were older when 
the reform began to take effect. This issue is discuss this in greater detail in Section 6. 
Table 3 shows the robustness of the baseline results. The different specifications are 
indicated in the column headers. 
[TABLE 3] 
Column 1 repeats the baseline results from Table 2, while Column 2 excludes Norway’s six 
largest cities from the estimation. The long run estimate changes sign, but both coefficients 
remain insignificant. Column 3 excludes the 25% smallest municipalities, with no significant 
effect on the estimates. Column 4 excludes municipalities with pre-reform coverage rates 
below the 15th or above the 85th percentile in the pre-coverage rate distribution. The short run 
coefficient appears to be somewhat sensitive to changing the pre-reform coverage cutoff rates, 
becoming negative and significant at the 5% level. Column 5 excludes the first cohort in the 
pre-reform period, while Column 6 excludes the first cohort in the post-reform period. 
Excluding cohorts has only a marginal impact on the size of the coefficients. Column 7 
interacts predetermined municipal characteristics with cohort dummies to determine whether 
if municipalities with different observable characteristics demonstrate different trends. 
Observable characteristics used are female labor force participation, male labor force 
participation, and cohort size. Coefficients remain small and insignificant. 
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The estimates are generally robust to changes in the specifications. The only 
specification change that appeared to matter was changing the cutoff in the pre-reform 
coverage distribution, and even that change was observed only for the short run coefficient. 
This could be a sign that there are nonlinear effects but could also be an artifact of chance. In 
total, Table 3 show that the results are robust to a variety of specifications checks. 
 
5 Childcare quality 
Until this point, the focus has been on the average effect of the childcare expansion on child 
outcomes. This section has two main objectives. First, it explores how the expansion affects 
childcare quality. Second, it seeks to determine whether the effect of the expansion depends 
on pre-reform municipality-level childcare quality. To achieve these two objectives, good 
measures (or correlates) of municipality childcare quality must be obtained. The KOSTRA 
database provides a set of potential variables for this purpose. The quality measures available 
are “Children/staff rate,” “Adjusted care hours/staff rate,” “Proportion preschool teachers 
among pedagogical leaders,” “Proportion preschool teachers among employees,” “Cost per 
child,” and “Cost per adjusted care hour.” 
The “Children/staff-rate” and “Adjusted care hours/staff-rate” measure how much 
exposure each child has to a caregiver (or group size) while in childcare. Staff is measured in 
person-year full-time equivalents; it’s thus not sensitive to changes in the use of part-time 
staff. Adjusted care hours are the number of hours of childcare provided, adjusted for the age 
composition of the children, which is determined by multiplying the number of children 
below three by two and the number of children aged three by 1.5 and giving a factor of one to 
children aged three or older. In the time period we study, Statistics Norway has only 
calculated this measure for public childcare centers. 
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The general norms imply that the proportion of pedagogical leaders of employees is 
the same for personnel working with children aged one to two and children aged three to five. 
As a result, the proportion preschool teachers among employees should not be determined by 
the change in age composition. As mentioned, all pedagogical leaders are supposed to have 
preschool teacher education. “Proportion of preschool teachers among pedagogical leaders” 
should therefore not be affected by the change in age composition, even if childcare centers 
operate with different employment structures than those suggested by the norms. These 
proportions are calculated for all childcare centers within a municipality. 
“Cost per child” and “Cost per adjusted care hour” are measures of how much 
municipalities spend on childcare. Since it costs more to keep younger children in childcare, 
“Cost per child” does depend on age composition. As with the adjusted group size measure, 
Statistics Norway has only calculated these measures for public childcare centers.  
The selection of group size measures was motivated by the literature, which shows 
that class size matters (Krueger, 1999; Chetty et al., 2011). The municipality database does 
not include information on the experience of childcare employees, which has been shown to 
be an observable teacher characteristics that is a relevant correlate of teacher quality in the 
school literature (Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010), but it does 
include information on the education levels of employees in childcare centers. Since those 
measures are made at the municipality level, we argue that they do not necessarily reflect the 
quality of the individual childcare employees; rather, they reveal something about the overall 
quality of childcare in a given municipality. According to national regulations, pedagogical 
leaders are supposed to have a certificate in preschool education. A municipality that lacks a 
high proportion of preschool teachers among its pedagogical leaders suggests either that it has 
problems recruiting and retaining quality staff or that it is not strict in adhering to standards in 
childcare centers. 
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Three cautionary remarks are necessary. First, as Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain (2005) 
note, there are large differences in teacher quality that are not easily captured by readily 
available observable characteristics. This suggests that our measures of municipality-level 
teacher education will capture only some quality differences across municipalities and 
centers. Second, even though these may be policy relevant variables, they do not measure the 
actual interactions in childcare centers as observed in Araujo et al. (2016). Lastly, observable 
inputs are not randomly assigned to municipalities. If the effect of the expansion varies 
between municipalities with different observables, that may actually be due to their being 
different on unobservable dimensions, that the mechanism is different in different types of 
municipalities, or that the groups of children affected are dissimilar in different types of 
municipalities. Section 6 offers an initial exploration of some of these issues. 
 
5.1 Effect of expansion on observable inputs 
With a large expansion in public subsidies to childcare centers it is not clear ex ante whether 
one should expect an increase or decrease in childcare quality. The expansion led to a 
doubling of the funding for childcare centers in just three years, so one could reasonably 
expect increased funding to enhance quality. However, a rapid increase in the number of 
children in childcare centers could also lead to lower quality by increasing group size and 
lowering the qualification and experience levels among the personnel. The literature reviewed 
in Section 1 suggests that if anything, quality normally falls with large-scale expansions.  
To analyze the effect of childcare expansion on childcare quality, we estimate 
Equation 2, which has municipality-level quality measures as dependent variables: 
 
!"#$%&'!" = !! + !!!ℎ!"#! + !!!"#$! + !! !"#$%&#"'(#! ∙ !ℎ!"#!  
+!!(!"#$%&#"'(#! ∙ !"#$!)+ !!!!" + !!"    (2) 
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[TABLE 4] 
Table 4 shows the results from these estimations. The dependent variable is average 
municipality level childcare quality from the year in which the children in each cohort turn 
two through the year in which they turn five. Information for the 1998 cohort is dropped, 
since we lack quality information for this cohort (data on quality measures only begins in 
2001). Column 1 examines how age composition in childcare changes, Columns 2–3 examine 
the effect on measures of group size, Column 4–5 look at measures of the quality of staff, and 
Columns 6–7 examine how childcare costs are affected by the expansion. 
Column 1 shows that children in municipalities with 10 pp. lower pre-reform coverage 
rates attended childcare centers with a 1.08 pp. higher proportion of children aged one or two 
in childcare in the short run, and a 2.21 pp. higher proportion of children aged one or two in 
childcare in the long run. This confirms the hypothesis that the proportion of children aged 
one or two in childcare centers was affected by the expansion; any analysis of how the 
expansion changes quality across time should take account of this reality. 
Column 2 shows that the number of children per staff decreases in high-expansion 
municipalities. The long run estimates show a decrease of 0.17 (3.6% of the mean or 29% of 
the SD) children per caregiver in childcare in municipalities with a 10 pp. lower pre-reform 
coverage rate. Children are normally divided into groups by age, with a fixed number of 
adults responsible for each group. Even with the significant change brought on by the reform, 
children’s exposure to adults may actually be unchanged, since the age composition in 
childcare changes.11 
                                                
11 The organization of childcare centers can be divided into “Avdelingsbarnehage” and 
“Basebarnehage”. “Basebarnehage” allows for a more open organization that lets children roam 
between groups, although each child should still keep a main attachment to a specific group with a 
fixed number of adults (Vassenden et al., 2011). The more children are allowed to roam across age 
groups, the regular child pr. staff measure of childcare quality becomes important. 
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Column 3 shows no effect on adjusted care hours/staff for municipal childcare centers, 
indicating that there is no evidence that children’s exposure to adults changes as a 
consequence of the expansion. Since private and public childcare centers are subject to the 
same regulations, it is likely that group size also remains unchanged in private childcare 
centers. 
In addition to group size, employee education levels and amount of municipal 
spending on childcare may indicate how an expansion affects quality. Column 4 shows no 
change in the proportion of staff with preschool teacher education, while Column 5 similarly 
shows no significant increase in the total proportion of pedagogical leaders with preschool 
teacher education. Together, these are interpreted as meaning no average change in the 
education level of childcare center staff as a consequence of the reform. Column 6 shows that 
costs per child in childcare did increase as a consequence of the expansion, but Column 7 
indicates that the increase is relatively smaller per age-adjusted care hour. Given that we do 
not find any evidence of a change in group size in public childcare centers or in employee 
education level, we are cautious about how to interpret this coefficient. It could mean that 
expansion leads to increased quality through other channels, but it could also mean that 
efficiency declines during a capacity buildup, since costs increase for the same number of 
age-adjusted care hours provided. 
In sum, the results indicate that group size and education level among employees 
remain unchanged, while childcare costs increase to some extent. Since the increased costs 
are relatively small and may actually signal decreased efficiency instead of increased quality, 
we conclude that we are not able to reject the hypothesis that childcare quality is unchanged. 
Additional analysis of how changes in observable inputs relate to changes in child outcomes 
is provided in Section 6. 
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5.2 Effect on test scores of the child care expansion by municipality type 
To uncover possible heterogeneity in effects across, municipalities are split into groups 
according to the proportion preschool teachers of employees and the proportion of preschool 
teachers among pedagogical leaders before reform. According to the norms and regulations, 
these proportions should stay constant across municipalities with different age compositions 
in childcare. Any observed variation is therefore more likely to be due to quality differences. 
These measures cover both private and public childcare centers. Table 5 shows the results of 
estimation carried out using subsamples. 
[TABLE 5] 
The table shows estimates of the short and long run coefficients from Equation 1, split into 
four panels. The dependent variables are average test score, reading score, English score and 
math score in Panels a), b), c), and d) respectively. In Columns 1–3, Equation 1 is estimated 
separately by dividing municipalities according to three quantiles in the distribution of pre-
reform municipality-level proportion preschool teachers among employees. In Columns 4–6, 
the same approach is carried out using the proportion of preschool teachers among 
pedagogical leaders.  
Since results are very similar across the two measures of quality, we choose to focus 
on the results in Columns 4–6. The long-run ITTs on average test scores show that the 
expansion affected test scores negatively among municipalities with the lowest proportion of 
preschool teachers among pedagogical leaders before reform, while expansion led to an 
increase in test scores in municipalities with the highest such proportion. The same is true 
when dividing municipalities according to proportion preschool teachers among employees. 
The long run effect shows that children in municipalities with 10 pp. lower pre-reform 
coverage rates increased test scores in high-quality municipalities by 0.041 SD, while it 
decreased by 0.028 SD in low-quality municipalities. This pattern is fairly consistent across 
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different test scores, but it is most prominent in the long run estimates, once reform has had 
time to be implemented and exert greater influence. Table A2 shows the robustness of results 
when dividing municipalities according to the proportion of preschool teachers among 
pedagogical leaders, with average test scores as the outcome as shown in Panel A in Table 5. 
The table shows that estimates for high-quality municipalities are robust to different 
specifications, while the estimates for low-quality municipalities are somewhat sensitive to 
the exclusion of large municipalities and flexible trends.12 
One possible reason for why these measures may capture childcare quality is that they 
describe how easy it is for municipalities to hire quality personnel in childcare. Even though 
pedagogical leaders are supposed to have certified preschool education, the proportion that 
actually has this certification varies between municipalities. The regulations acknowledge that 
it may be a challenge to hire qualified personnel: they therefore allow municipalities to apply 
for exemptions. However, observable inputs are not randomly assigned to municipalities. 
There are thus alternative explanations that are discussed in the next section.  
 
6 Alternative mechanisms and heterogeneous effects 
The previous section indicated that the reason for positive effects of childcare on children’s 
test scores in municipalities with a high pre-reform proportions of preschool teachers and 
negative effects on children’s test scores in municipalities with low pre-reform proportions of 
preschool teachers could be quality differences between childcare centers in different types of 
municipalities. Table 6 allows us to explore alternative explanations. 
[Table 6] 
Column 1–3 in Table 6 show estimations of long run coefficients in Equation 1 on subgroups 
of municipalities split according to the proportion of preschool teachers among pedagogical 
                                                
12 See Section 6 for a further discussion of this issue. 
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leaders in a municipality. Each column shows results for estimations on subsamples, with row 
headings indicating dependent variables. Panel A) shows results using municipality-level 
childcare quality measures as outcomes, while Panel B) has parental labor force participation 
as outcomes, and outcomes in Panel C) are childcare attendance measures. 
Panel A) shows that the children/staff rate decreases significantly in low-quality 
municipalities as a consequence of the expansion, while high-quality municipalities 
experience a smaller decrease in that measure. At the same time, there are no significant 
changes in the adjusted care hours/staff rate in any of the municipality groups. These results 
are consistent with a change in age composition in childcare centers that are different in the 
different municipality types, but does not indicate that different developments in group size 
can explain the observed differences in results between municipality types, because we 
observe no differences in adjusted care hours per employee. This pattern repeats itself in the 
results on the effect of the expansion on childcare costs. While the cost per child increases 
significantly with expansion in low-quality municipalities, we are not able to reject the null 
hypothesis of no change in costs per adjusted care hour in either high- or low-quality 
municipalities. The change in education level appears to be unaffected in all municipality 
types, although there does appear to be an increase in the education level among pedagogical 
leaders in low-quality municipalities. However, this cannot explain the negative effect of the 
expansion in these municipalities since, if anything, an increase in the education level of staff 
should translate into a positive effect on test scores. 13  Children/staff-rate decreases 
significantly in low-quality municipalities as a consequence of the expansion. If children are 
free to roam between groups, this would indicate an increase in quality due to increased 
caregiver exposure, but since we observe a negative effect for this group of municipalities, 
this does not appear to be a quantitatively important explanation. In sum, group size, 
                                                
13 The results shown in Table A3 show that the only significant change between high- and low-quality 
municipalities on quality measures is on the children/staff rate.  
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education level, and costs do not evolve very differently in the different municipality types, at 
least not in the direction expected from the differences in test scores.  
Effects on parental labor force participation are displayed in Panel B). Parental labor 
force participation is defined as a parent’s earning above two basic amounts in the national 
insurance scheme in the second year after a child’s birth (Havnes & Mogstad, 2011, 2015). 
Increased labor force participation could explain a positive effect of the childcare expansion 
by increasing household incomes (Løken, 2010; Black et al., 2012; Dahl and Lochner, 2012; 
Løken, Mogstad, & Wiswall, 2012). A positive effect of the expansion is found on maternal 
but not paternal labor force participation. Importantly, the point estimates do not suggest that 
household income changes differentially in different municipality types. This suggests that 
income effects cannot fully explain the differences in results across different types of 
municipalities.14 
Lastly, Columns 1–3 in Panel C) show the effects of the expansion on childcare 
attendance in different types of municipalities. The regressions suggest that expansion leads 
to a strong increase in childcare attendance before age three in low-quality municipalities, 
while the same effect is not observed in high-quality municipalities. This is consistent with 
the results on municipality-level coverage rates, which show a strong increase in experienced 
coverage rate for one- and two-year-olds in low-quality municipalities, while there is a much 
smaller increase in high-quality municipalities. The largest increase in coverage rates for 
three- to five-year-olds are found in high-quality municipalities. These findings are also 
consistent with the patterns on unadjusted group size and costs measures. The expansion leads 
to increased childcare attendance mostly for children aged one or two in low-quality 
municipalities, while it mainly increases attendance for children aged three to five in high-
quality municipalities. The main alternative explanation for the negative effect observed in 
                                                
14 Table A4 shows results for the full sample, and Table A3 shows results from tests of different 
development in parental labor force participation in high- and low-quality municipalities. No 
significant difference is found. 
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low-quality municipalities is therefore that the effect of childcare on young children is 
negative. The positive effects observed in high-quality municipalities are then explained by 
positive effects of childcare for older children. This might be an important explanation for the 
mixed findings in the literature, since papers more often find positive effects for three- to five-
year-olds (e.g., Havnes & Mogstad, 2011) and no or negative effects for one- or two-year-olds 
(e.g., Fort, Ichino, & Zanella, 2016) 
Table A5 show the robustness of results shown in Table 6 by using pre-reform 
coverage rates for children aged one to five to estimate ITT effects. Panel c) reveals that this 
pre-reform indicator is associated with a shift of both more and relatively older children into 
childcare for low-quality municipalities. With the childcare quality explanation being the only 
explanation, we should expect to see stronger effects of the same sign. Column 4 in Panel d) 
shows that the effect in the low-quality municipalities is no longer significantly different from 
zero. This is consistent with the explanation that there are negative effects of attending 
childcare for children aged one or two in low-quality municipalities, while this is not 
necessarily so for older children. This robustness therefore suggests that the effects originally 
found in Table 5 are likely to be partly explained by the heterogeneous effects of childcare by 
starting age. 
Table A6 shows the results from a regression of a municipality’s pre-reform 
characteristics on a dummy indicating whether the municipality has a high or low proportion 
of preschool teachers among pedagogical leaders (excluding the group of municipalities in the 
middle). Before reform, the proportion of children in childcare was lower in municipalities 
that expanded coverage for the oldest children the most. We also note that differences in 
quality measures are statistically insignificant or small in measures other than the education 
level of employees. The average difference is 0.21 pp. in the proportion of preschool teachers 
among pedagogical leaders between the two municipality types. The difference is noticeable, 
 158 
but indicates a very large return on better-educated childcare personnel if this is the only 
explanation behind the different effects. It therefore suggests that the municipalities differ 
according to unobserved measures, or that child age is an important explanation in the finding 
of different effects.  
[TABLE 7] 
It is possible to look at the heterogeneous effects of the expansion according to observables. 
Table 7 suggests that the positive effects found in municipalities that mostly expanded access 
to older children are driven by females and high-SES children, while the negative effects in 
municipalities that mostly expanded access to younger children are driven by females and 
low-SES children. The observed positive effects for females are consistent with other findings 
in the literature (Anderson, 2008; Havnes & Mogstad, 2011; Felfe, Nollenberger, & 
Rodŕıguez-Planas, 2015). The largest point estimate is the negative effect for low-SES 
children in municipalities that mostly expanded access to younger children.15 
Not finding any positive effect for low-SES children is the most surprising item in 
Table 7. Differential effects by SES may indicate that the childcare quality to which each 
group is exposed could be different, if low-SES children are more likely to be exposed to 
lower quality childcare centers within municipalities. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Publicly subsidized childcare and targeted childcare programs differ in many respects. 
Previous research has shown mixed findings on the effect of large-scale public subsidized 
childcare programs on child outcomes. This study adds evidence to the literature by providing 
an analysis of a recent expansion in childcare capacity combined with new high-quality 
administrative data from Norway. Large expansions of universal childcare are costly, and 
                                                
15 Table A7 shows robustness for this finding. It confirms that the negative effect is driven by low-SES 
children, as the estimate is less sensitive to specification changes than when not restricting the sample 
based on child background characteristics. 
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analyzing the effects of these programs is important both for countries in which programs 
already have been implemented and for governments that are evaluating whether to 
implement similar public programs. 
In contrast to earlier studies of the effects of public subsidized childcare expansions, 
we use a pre-reform indicator to identify municipalities with high or low expansions. In line 
with a Norwegian reform passed in 2003, we find that children in municipalities with low pre-
reform coverage received increased access to childcare compared to those with higher pre-
reform coverage. Using this pre-reform coverage measure as an indicator for childcare 
expansion, we do not find that the expansion has an average impact on test scores at age 10. 
The analysis proceeded by looking for heterogeneous effects by dividing municipalities 
according to observable inputs to childcare. Looking at the effect of the expansion among 
municipalities with a high level of childcare quality, as indicated by the proportion of 
preschool teachers among pedagogical leaders, we find positive and significant effects on 
child test scores of attending childcare. At the same time, we find a negative effect on 
children’s test scores of the expansion in municipalities with the lowest proportions of 
preschool teachers among pedagogical leaders. Notably, the negative effects appear to be 
driven mainly by low-SES children. Further analysis was not able to show that childcare 
quality and maternal labor force participation were affected differently by pre-reform quality. 
However, the children influenced by the expansion were of different ages in the two types of 
municipalities. In low-quality municipalities, the expansion largely affected one- and two-
year-olds, while the expansion mostly affected three- to five-year-olds in the high-quality 
municipalities. This is an indication that childcare might be negative for the youngest 
children, especially in an environment of lower-quality child care, and positive for older 
children, especially in an environment of higher-quality child care. 
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Given the significant increase in childcare coverage for the youngest children in recent 
years, it is important to know the relative significance of these two explanations. If the effect 
of attending childcare for young children is negative only in low-quality municipalities, then 
the proper policy implication will be to increase quality in these areas. More research is 
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Notes: Figure show childcare coverage measured 
at the end of year in official municipal statistics. 
A description of the data are found in Section 
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Notes: Figure a show change in coverage rate for 1-2 year old’s from 2002-2007 by pre reform coverage rate 
(measured for 1-2 year old’s in 2001). Figure b show change in test score from pre reform cohorts born 1998-
2000 to post reform cohorts born 2003-2004 by pre reform coverage rates (Long ITT). Size of dots indicate 
































































Figure A1 KOSTRA and CFC coverage rates 
 

























Notes: a) compares KOSTRA numbers to CFC numbers across years. CFC numbers are 
based on counting the number of children in childcare using the CFC database. CFC 
numbers are at the individual level. KOSTRA numbers are based on childcare centers’ 
reporting the number of one- and two-year-olds in care to municipalities, which the 
municipalities then report to Statistics Norway; b) compares KOSTRA numbers with CFC 
numbers across the six largest municipalities in Norway for 2006. Correlations between 
CFC and KOSTRA across municipalities by year from 2000 through 2008 are as follows: 


















Note: The lines indicate where the 
sample has been cut to exclude 
municipalities below the 10th and above 
the 90th percentiles; coverage rate 





Figure A3 Municipality descriptors 
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Notes: Figures show descriptions of municipalities; P-values show the significance of the 
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This study examines the changes in childcare attendance following a Norwegian reform that 
introduced a money transfer to families who did not send their child to formal childcare. This 
cash-for-care reform raised the price of formal childcare relative to its alternatives by about 
108% for 1–2 year olds but not 3–5 year olds. Using household surveys conducted before and 
after the reform, the analysis reveals that childcare attendance fell by 14.4 percentage points 
four years after the reform took place. In contrast to previous studies, the results indicate that 
the most important alternative mode of care to formal childcare is parental care. Furthermore, 
the main alternative for households of low socioeconomic status is parental/relative care, 
whereas for high socioeconomic status families the alternatives include day parks and nannies 
as well as parental care. 
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Nowadays, much childcare takes place outside the family home in many European countries. 
For the youngest children, attendance rates at formal childcare are especially high in the 
Nordic countries (OECD, 2016). Extensive public subsidization of the childcare sector has 
facilitated the expansion in childcare attendance rates, with public funding supported by 
arguments that formal childcare has beneficial effects for both parental employment and the 
children themselves.1 
Parents making decisions on the form of childcare used face a number of 
considerations. Labor market attachment, childcare quality assessments, childcare availability, 
and price are all components that can influence the decision process about the form of 
childcare. Nevertheless, given that formal childcare has beneficial effects for the children and 
their mothers, it is of great importance for both policy makers and researchers to know how 
parents respond to price changes in formal childcare. Childcare subsidies are costly to the 
taxpayers. Furthermore, subgroups in the population might respond differently to price 
changes. Only a few studies have isolated large shocks to childcare prices unaccompanied by 
other (non-price) changes and examined their consequences. Evidence on the subject remains 
scarce because of either a lack of data or suitable natural experiments, and more work on this 
question is needed. In light of recent emphasis of the importance of childcare and other early 
influences on later life outcomes, our main contribution is to add evidence on how price 
sensitive parents are to changes in childcare prices, and show results on the consequences of a 
price change in formal childcare for other care arrangements.  
A possible way to study responses to changes in childcare prices is to analyze changes 
in childcare subsidies. However, this method has some limitations. For example, childcare 
																																								 																				
1 For a discussion on the effects of public childcare on parental employment, see Lundin et al. (2008), 
Mogstad and Havnes (2011), Baker et al. (2008), Lefebre and Merrigan (2008), Bettendorf et al. 
(2015) and Bauernschuster and Schlotter (2015). A recent survey on the literature of the effects of 




subsidies tend to be means tested, which complicates the interpretation of any effects, and 
using subsidy eligibility cut-offs necessarily limits the validity of any effect to some specific 
subpopulation. As an alternative, we propose to use the introduction of a particular type of 
policy, namely, a cash-for care (CFC) reform, to examine how households respond to price 
changes for childcare in a way that does not suffer from the same limitations.2 The CFC is a 
pecuniary transfer to parents that do not send their children to formal childcare. The 
Norwegian data provide promising context to investigate the question of how households 
respond to price changes in formal childcare. The introduction of the CFC reform was not 
followed by tax cuts nor transfers, i.e. no simultaneous changes in income. Neither was the 
reform followed by changes in means testing. Furthermore, the CFC reform did not directly 
include any changes in capacity. Finally, the introduction of the CFC reform was introduced 
at the same time in whole Norway. Thus, our analysis does not suffer from potential biases 
from unobserved factors that may vary if one would do an analysis between different states. 
The CFC benefit was available in Norway for 1-year-old children from 1 August 1998 and for 
2-year-old children from 1 January 1999. The reform would eventually provide 3,000 
Norwegian kroner (NOK) per month to parents choosing not to send their 1–2-year-old 
children to formal childcare providers receiving public funds.3 As the benefit was unavailable 
for 3–5 year olds, we employ a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy by comparing the 
rates of childcare for eligible and ineligible children, before and after the introduction of the 
reform.  
At the time of the reform, parents paid on average 2,775 NOK a month for care in 
formal childcare; thus, the reform represented a nearly 108% price increase for formal 
																																								 																				
2 The notions “cash-for care” and “home care allowance” reforms are used interchangeably in this 
reform. We will use the notion cash-for-care consistently in this paper. 




childcare relative to any other forms of childcare, which is quite significant.4 For this reason, 
the CFC reform may yield valuable information on how price sensitive parents are to the price 
of formal childcare in general, as well as what the alternative modes of care is. It may also 
highlight the price sensitivity of particular subgroups in the population as there may be many 
reasons why some demographic groups are more likely to receive the CFC benefit and less 
likely to send their children to formal childcare. This paper attempts to address this issue by 
separating the effect of the benefit for groups of different socioeconomic status (SES). 
Some literature has already estimated the effect of childcare prices on childcare 
attendance. The most recent contributions use policy reforms or rules that provide exogenous 
shocks to childcare prices and study its impact.5 Baker et al. (2008) examined a reform in the 
childcare sector in Quebec that included a generous childcare subsidy that set the price of 
childcare at just 5 Canadian dollars per day. After comparing childcare attendance in Quebec 
to the rest of Canada, before and after the reform, Baker et al. (2008) found that childcare use 
increased, while there was a shift from care by relatives and non-licensed non-relatives. No 
effect on the care in own home was found. An important factor that separates that study from 
the current analysis is that the childcare subsidy coincided with an expansion in childcare 
capacity. Therefore, Baker et al. (2008) did not isolate the effect of the subsidy on childcare 
attendance. Another separating feature is that prior to the reform identified in Baker et al. 
(2008), other childcare subsidies depended on family income. The effective price change in 
childcare following the new program therefore also depended on family income. In contrast, 
the CFC subsidy in Norway is uniform for all families, which makes it easier to more directly 
interpret and compare any price responses.  
																																								 																				
4 Reppen and Rønning (1999) report the average monthly payment for formal childcare when a 1-2 
year old child is cared for outside the home. 
5 An earlier literature estimates the price elasticities of childcare, including Blau and Hagy (1998), 
Powell (2002) and Connelly and Kimmel (2003). These studies report price elasticities ranging from –





Gathmann and Sass (2017) is closest in spirit to the present analysis because it also 
used a nationwide population survey to analyze the consequences of the introduction of a 
CFC program, but in a single German state. As the benefit applied in only one state, a factor 
that separates our studies is that Gathmann and Sass (2017) mainly compared the childcare 
outcomes in the reform state relative to those in other states, whereas we compared the 
childcare outcomes for eligible and ineligible children across different ages. In addition, our 
survey data contains information of individual childcare prices, which allows us to perform a 
detailed analysis of price responses of different groups. 
As an alternative, Black et al. (2014) considered the consequences of childcare 
subsidies by utilizing the fact that eligibility depends on sharp family income cut-offs. By 
comparing families immediately below and right above the income cut-offs, they found 
among other things, no effect of the subsidy on formal childcare attendance for children aged 
5 years. One explanation for this finding is that there is an excess demand (or rationing) for 
childcare. It is then not the price that is important, but the availability of a spot. Another 
possible explanation is that information about the subsidy is not easily available to parents 
before they actually apply for childcare. Lastly, an important point when comparing the 
analysis in Black et al. (2014) to ours is that the subsidy eligibility cut-offs they considered 
were for 5-year-old children, while the children in our study are much younger (1–2 year-
olds). 
Other studies that have specifically looked at the Norwegian CFC reform have mostly 
focused on the effects of maternal labor force participation.6 For instance, Schøne (2004) 
associated a modest reduction in the female labor supply with the reform, while Naz (2004) 
identified a relatively larger labor participation response among more highly educated 
mothers. Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) build a simulation model of households’ utility-
																																								 																				
6 This is in line with an international literature. Examples are Blau and Robins (1988), Leibowitz et al. 




maximization under budget constraints, and find that mothers reduce their labor supply by 
about 9% as a result of the CFC reform. Hardoy and Schøne (2008) focus on the labor supply 
of non-Western immigrant females and find that the CFC reform reduced immigrant female 
labor supply more than it did for non-immigrant females. This suggests that immigrants are 
more responsive to the reform on the labor supply margin. Drange and Rege (2013) look at 
long-term outcomes and find that the effect on mothers labor market outcomes persist even 
after the children become CFC ineligible, but disappears when the children are aged 6-7. 
Bettinger et al. (2014) explores what happens to older siblings of CFC eligible children, while 
Drange (2015) focus on both parents time allocation.  
 Other Norwegian reforms have also been used to investigate labor supply effects of 
childcare. Hardoy and Schøne (2015) use the so-called ‘‘Childcare Centre Agreement’’ 
(Barnehageforliket) effective from April 2004. This was a broad political consensus 
agreement reached in 2003 that included reduced costs and increased capacity. The results 
indicate a smaller sensitivity to prices than other studies. Kalb and Thoresen (2010) use the 
same reform as a basis for a simulation study. They conclude that the both the female labor 
supply effect and income redistributional performance of fee reductions is weak, and that 
appears to be relatively little gain at a rather high cost. Finseraas et al. (2017) look at a school 
starting age reform of 1997 - later on referred to as Reform 97. Their findings indicate 
strongest effects among mothers with low wage potential. 
Of course, the impact of the relative price increase in formal childcare may affect 
attendance at other childcare alternatives. There are two main motivations for knowing these 
alternative modes. One reason may be that a relative price increase in childcare can have 
direct effects on the labor market attendance of mothers. If an important alternative to formal 
childcare is nanny care, then the employment effects of childcare prices on mothers are not 




interpretation of the effects of formal childcare attendance on children’s future outcomes. 
Given the discussion in the literature on the effect of early intervention, it is important to 
know the main alternative(s) for formal childcare. Since this literature often estimates and 
compares effects by parental socioeconomic status, knowing the alternative for both groups 
are important for the interpretation. 
This study contributes to the literature by assessing how childcare attendance changes 
as a response to price changes in formal childcare. A particular contribution is the exploration 
of the alternative modes of care, as they may be different for children of different age groups, 
or social-economic groups. Alternative modes can also be influenced by the specific 
country/institutional contexts. In contrast to other studies of the Norwegian cash for care 
reform; we focus on the effects on the children.  
Three main findings arise from the analysis. First, the results demonstrate that the 
price change reduced usage among eligible children by 14.4 percentage points by 2002. This 
points to a childcare price elasticity of about –0.25. Second, the price change affected 
attendance most among the youngest CFC eligible children. Lastly, the main alternative mode 
of care to formal childcare is parental care. While alternative mode of care for households of 
low socioeconomic status is parental/relative care, for high socioeconomics status families the 
alternatives include day parks and nannies as well as parental care. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
institutional framework for the CFC policy, while Section 3 describes the data and details the 
econometric model used in the analysis. Section 4 reports and discusses the results, and 






2. Institutional Setting 
The development of a public childcare sector in Norway relates to the increase in female labor 
force participation. In the mid-1960s, few mothers were active labor market participants, and 
correspondingly there were relatively few childcare centers. As female labor participation 
accelerated in the 1970s, there was a corresponding increase in childcare attendance. From 
1975 to 2002 labor force participation of females aged 25-54 increased from 51.2% to 80.7% 
(Statistics Norway, 2017). In 2002 about 43% held part time positions, while 57% had full 
time positions. The proportions have stayed about the same across years. In the same time 
period, the childcare coverage of 1-5 year old children increased from 7% to 66% (NSD 
2017).  
In 1997 the authorities implementated  the so-called Reform 97. Together with 
changes in the school curriculum, the law meant an expansion of compulsory schooling from 
nine to ten years, and a requirement as of August 1997 for all children to start school at the 
age of six (Norwegian Ministry of Education, 1996). A consequence of this law change was 
that almost no 6 year olds were registered in formal childcare by the end of 1997. 
The introduction of the CFC benefit was clearly planned in a new government 
coalition political platform signed in October 1997 (Christian-Green-Liberal coalition 
political party platform; Voksenåserklæringen). The parliament passed the law that would 
implement the CFC benefit in April 1998. There were three main purposes of the CFC 
reform: (i) provide more freedom of choice to parents of the form of childcare, (ii) provide 
parents with more time to be with their children, and (iii) to redistribute funds to families that 
did not receive services from subsidized childcare providers. The CFC benefit was available 
for 1-year-old children from 1 August 1998 and for 2-year-old children from 1 January 1999. 
It is paid to parents - with whom the child lives – and who do not send their eligible child to 




to 3,000 NOK per month from 1 August 1998. From 1 January 1999 it decreased to 2,263 
NOK, before it increased back to 3,000 NOK from 1 January 2000 to 1 August 2003 (Bakken 
and Myklebø, 2010). Families who use childcare part time would be compensated according 
to the fraction of a full daycare seat used. There have been some changes to the law over time 
concerning the pecuniary generosity and age criteria, but the main features of the benefit have 
remained largely the same.  
In Norway, formal public or private childcare is centrally regulated through the 
Kindergarten Act and by different prescripts to the act. This provides a set of common rules 
for childcare across Norway, as childcare centers are administered at the municipal level. The 
maximum number of children in full time care per pedagogical leader (with required certified 
education) is 9 for children below 3 and 18 for children aged 3-6. There is a stated norm of 1 
caregiver per 3 children for children below 3 and 1 caregiver per 6 children above 3. In 2002 
about 42% of children attended privately owned childcare centers. Privately owned childcare 
centers still receive public subsidies. 
Outside the family, ordinary childcare centers, family childcare, relatives, nannies or 
day parks normally care for children in Norway. The professional alternatives can have 
private or public ownership, but all types of childcare receive operating funds from public 
sources, except for nannies and day parks. Family childcares are usually smaller groups where 
the care is run by one of the parents in private homes. Nannies are privately operating 
childminders that are not subject to the same regulations as childcares that receive public 
funding. Since the start of the integration of mothers into the labor market, there has been a 
significant use of nannies. The peak is considered to be around 1989 when 22% of all parents 
reported use of nannies (Blix and Guldbrandsen, 1992). Possible due to the growing public 
childcare sector, nanny use decreased in the beginning of the 1990s (Blix and Guldbransen, 




response in the household surveys, nannies seem to have few and young children in care 
(Bakelien et al. 2001). Day parks are organized as outdoor playgroups. They operate with 
shorter opening hours than regular childcare centers, and do not receive central government 
public subsidies. As a consequence, it is possible to receive full CFC benefit and at the same 
time use day parks 
Formal childcare is financed through central government subsidies, municipal 
subsidies and parental co-payments, hereinafter referred to as price. At the time of the reform, 
the level of the price was not regulated in the Kindergarten act. Therefore the owners of the 
childcare generally could set the level themselves.7 Reppen and Rønning (1999, Table 2.15) 
show that households that use formal childcare as care alternative outside the home paid on 
average 2,775 NOK a month for care of 1-2 year olds. Parents that used nannies paid on 
average 2,707 NOK a month. The report also provides estimates of the hourly expense of care 
of different childcare alternatives. The average hourly payments (in NOK) of daycare 
alternatives were 29, 87, 87 and 67 for relatives, Nanny/Au-pair, formal childcare, and others 
respectively. 
 
3. Data and econometric approach 
The data are from national living standard surveys administered in the spring of 1998, 1999, 
and 2002, i.e. before and after the implementation of the CFC reform in the fall of 1998. 
These surveys collected information about the usage of different forms of childcare, as well as 
background characteristics of the families surveyed. Statistics Norway collected the data with 
the purpose of evaluating the effects of the reform.  
We mainly concentrate on the following question asked in the surveys, “What form of 
care does your child have during daytime/working hours?” The question asked before and 
																																								 																				
7 Eibak (2002) surveys the payment systems of 109 municipalities. 63 did not means test the formal 
childcare prize, 52 had 50% discount for the second sibling enrolled to childcare, and 23 had higher 




after the reform was in the form of a multiple-choice question, where the respondent indicated 
one or more care alternatives. The question in the 2002 survey was slightly different in that it 
comprised a separate question concerning parental care. To obtain a consistent measure of 
parental care across the three survey years, we coded “Parental care” for those respondents 
that did not identify any of the other care alternatives in all years. The choice of how to code 
parental care does not matter for the results. Both ordinary childcare centers and family 
childcare groups are defined as formal childcare. 
For the 1998 survey, 2,500 mothers with at least one child born after 1.1.1992 were 
drawn. In addition, one thousand mothers with at least one child born after 1.1.1996 were 
drawn. Thus, families with very young children were oversampled. The response rate for the 
1998 survey was 84.9%. The 1999 survey was based on a sample of 2,257 families from the 
first survey. Additional mothers were drawn to get a self-weighting sample. In total, 3,848 
women were drawn for the 1999 survey, of which 86.6% responded. For the 2002 survey 
2,700 mothers with at least one child born after 1.1.1996 were drawn. In addition, 1,200 
women who had at least one child born after 1.1.1999 were sampled. 86.8% of the 3,886 
mothers with preschool-aged children for the 2002 survey responded.8 
We start with a sample containing childcare information on the first- and second-born 
children of the respondents in the household survey. We choose to concentrate on the 
married/cohabiting households. To get a valid comparison group, we exclude children aged 3-
5 with CFC eligible siblings. We then excluded information on those children aged under 1 
year and older than 5 years, leaving us with a baseline sample of 6,751 children.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 1. The table provides the 
averages and proportions of the most important variables used in the analysis. Panel A details 
																																								 																				
8 In the 1998 survey 70% answered a self-reported postal questionnaire, while 15% answered through 




descriptive information on the background variables. The parental income and education 
variables are based on self-reported income in the previous year and administrative 
information on highest completed level of education. Income is measured in NOK. We note 
that the parents of 1–2 year olds and those of the 3–5 year olds appear similar in terms of 
background characteristics. For the subgroup analysis, we should also note that the immigrant 
population represents a relatively small proportion of the sample. We therefore expect the 
estimates for this group to be somewhat noisy. Panel B details the proportion of children 
across the different types of care alternatives. The biggest difference between the care of 1–2 
and 3–5 year olds is that many more of the older group is in childcare.9 Panel C of Table 1 
provides the formal childcare attendance rates by subgroups. Children are defined as low SES 
if the mother does not have a university/college degree, and the father earns less than the 25th 
percentile in the distribution of earnings among fathers in the sample. The child is grouped 
into the immigrant category if the mother has an immigrant background. These sample splits 
show that children with high-SES backgrounds and non-immigrant mothers are more likely to 
attend formal childcare.10 
 To analyze the effect of the CFC reform on formal childcare attendance, we could 
compare formal childcare rates before and after the reform for eligible children. However, 
there could be underlying trends in formal childcare attendance rates for 1–2 year olds that 
have little or nothing to do with the CFC reform. To overcome this, we compare the change in 
formal childcare rates for eligible children to the change in formal childcare rates for 
ineligible children. The difference in the change in childcare rates is then attributed to the 
reform. The following difference-in-difference (DID) approach is specified as:  
 
																																								 																				
9 Appendix Figure A.1 show these numbers in a graph. 
10 The two surveys after the reform lacked information on gender, something that prevents us from 




   (1) 
 
where subscript i index the individual family child and t indexes time. The dependent variable 
Yit is a binary variable equal to one if the parents responded that the daytime caregiver for 
their child is a formal childcare center, and zero otherwise. Ditage1-2 is a binary variable 
denoting child aged 1–2 years at the time of the survey (i.e. one for an eligible child and zero 
otherwise), while Dit1999 and Dit2002 are dummies for recordings in 1999 and 2002, 
respectively. When constructing the interaction terms with the survey years, D1999 and D2002, 
we use the dummy Ditage1-2, not single age dummies (which are in the vector of Controls). 
This provides us with the effect for all eligible children. Controlsit consists of a set of control 
variables. The controls include an immigrant dummy, and dummies for the mother’s and 
father’s educational level (lower secondary, upper secondary, college and university). To 
account for the fact that the surveys conditioned on child birthyear when drawing families, 
age dummies are included. The control vector also includes a set of regional dummies (Oslo 
(Oslo, and Akershus), east excluding Oslo/Akershus (Hedmark, Oppland, Østfold, Vestfold, 
Buskerud and Telemark), southwest (Vest-Agder, Aust-Agder and Rogaland), west 
(Hordaland, Sogn og Fjordane, and M.-Romsdal), middle (Sør-Tr., and Nord-Tr.), and north 
(Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark)). Finally, εit is the error term. To correct for intragroup 
correlation in the error terms, standard errors are clustered at region-age level. 
The parameters of main interest are β4 and β5, where β4 captures the effect the year 
after the reform was implemented, while β5, captures the effect four years after the reform was 
fully implemented. There could be different sources behind finding different effects one and 
three years after the CFC reform. The first one is based on the idea that the knowledge about 
the possibility and the generosity of the CFC benefits spread out over time and therefore 
1999 2002 1999 1 2 2002 1 2
1 2 3 4 5 + +   
age age
it it it it it it it it itY D D D D D D Controlsβ β β β β η ε




affected the utilization of the CFC benefits.11 However, we should note that the introduction 
of the CFC benefits was already described in the contract between the parties of the Christian-
Green-Liberal minority collision government, ten months prior to the reform was effective. 
The second source might be the difference in the level of benefit, being 2,263 NOK per month 
in 1999, and 3,000 NOK per month in 2002. A third source for different effects in 1999 and 
2002, is supply side adjustments. The increase in childcare attendance for the control group 
shown in Table 1 provide evidence of this. The presence of excess demand could give a 
smaller response to the CFC reform than in a situation without excess demand, since newly 
freed up slots would be filled with other families not served by the market earlier (Gustafsson 
and Stafford, 1992). With this market situation, it is not obvious to what extent supply side 
adjustments will affect the relative size of estimates of childcare usage in 1999 and 2002. In 
total, delayed information spread and change in benefit size suggest larger effects in 2002 
compared to 1999, while the market situation with excess demand suggest smaller effects for 
both coefficient than in a situation without. 
 
4. Results 
With the numbers already reported in Table 1 – Panel B Care alternatives “Formal childcare” 
– we calculate a first basic difference-in-difference estimate without controls of –0.096 for 
1999 and –0.126 for 2002. These two estimates indicate that the formal childcare utilization 
for the eligible group dropped due to the introduction of the CFC reform.  
The main results of our DID analyses are reported in Table 2. The table provides 
estimates of the parameters β4 and β5 in equation (1), i.e., the effects in 1999 and in 2002. 
Starting with the results in Column (1), which includes all children, we obtain a negative 
significant coefficient of –13.8 percentage points in 1999, and a negative and statistically 
																																								 																				
11 See for instance Dahl et al. (2014) for similar findings for the introduction of paid paternity leave in 




significant coefficient of –14.4 percentage points in 2002. The difference between the two 
coefficients is statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.81).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
In Column (2), we concentrate on the youngest age group and therefore exclude 2-year-old 
children from the treatment group. Similarly, in Column (3), we focus on those 2-year-old 
children and exclude 1-year-old children. Comparing the results in Columns (2) and (3), we 
can see the estimates for younger children are larger in 1999 and in 2002. In 2002, the 
difference is significant at the 10% significance level.  
Columns (4)-(15) of Table 2 provide estimates of the coefficients for the SES and 
immigrant status subgroups. The motivation behind this is to explore whether particular 
subgroups are more or less sensitive to the CFC reform. Columns (4)-(6) detail the estimates 
for the low-SES children. The point estimates are of a larger magnitude for low SES children 
than high SES children, reported in Columns (7)-(10). There is an argument that the CFC 
benefit redistributes to low-SES households since a lower proportion of children in these 
households attend childcare. Childcare is an in-kind public good that affects the distribution 
of (extended) income in the population (Aaberge and Langøren, 2006). The total 
distributional effect of the CFC reform must take into account the direct redistribution, the 
effect on parental labor force participation, and the effect of change in childcare use.12 
 In Columns (10)-(15), the sample is stratified by mother’s immigration status. Since 
most of the sample consists of non-immigrants, the results for this group are almost identical 
to the main results. The results for immigrants are shown in Columns (10)-(12). They show a 
large and significant (at the 10% level) 2002 coefficient for 1-year-old immigrant children, 
while the remaining coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The positive, but 
																																								 																				
12 Another perspective on distributional effects is how the CFC affects well-being across the income 
distribution (Burton and Phipps, 2007). Both income and parental time may affect family well-being, 
and low-SES families may gain more in terms of these factors. Furthermore, the CFC benefit is a 
transfer to family households. The benefit will the increase income inequalities between men with and 




small coefficients for 2-year old immigrant children, Column (12), are the largest deviations 
from the other results reported in the table. Overall, we cannot conclude that the response to 
the price change is different for immigrants compared to non-immigrants.13 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 details estimates of β4 and β5, the 2002 and 1999 effects, when the dependent 
variables are indicators of different forms of care. Column (1) provides estimates of the effect 
on all eligible children; Column (2) shows the effect only for 1-year-old children, while 
Column (3) shows the effect only for 2-year-old children. The 2002 effects, shown in Column 
(1), indicate that “Parental care” use increases by 9.4 percentage points and “Nanny” use 
increases by 3.6 percentage points, while “Other” use increases care attendance by around 4.6 
percentage points. This latter alternative includes day parks, au pairs and uncategorized care 
alternatives. Looking at the 1999 effect, the main difference relative to the 2002 effect, is that 
“Nanny” use does not increase significantly. In total, both the 1999 and 2002 effects reported 
in Column (1) suggest that parental care is the most important alternative mode of care.   
An interesting observation is that even though “Relative care” is an important care 
alternative for children, there is no observed increase in this type of care arrangement 
following the reform. There are several possible explanations. It could be that relative care is 
a complement to formal childcare. An alternative explanation is that relative care is an inferior 
good.  
Columns (4)–(6) provide the results for low-SES children, while Columns (7)–(9) 
show the results for high-SES children. Comparing the results for the subgroups shows that 
the main alternative for formal childcare is parental care for low-SES children, while the 
alternative forms of care are more mixed for high-SES children. Nanny care and alternatives 
included in the “Other” category are both important alternatives for the latter group. We also 
																																								 																				
13 Formal testing shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the set of coefficients in Column 




note that a significant negative 1999 coefficient shows up for “Relatives” for the high-SES 
group, suggesting that it is either a complement of formal childcare or and inferior good for 
this group. In contrast, the 1999 effects show an increase in the use of relative care for 1-year-
olds of low SES parents.  
Table 2, Column 1, also shows the 1999 and 2002 price elasticities of childcare 
(confidence intervals in square brackets). We use the estimated coefficients, average childcare 
expenses from our data in 1999 and 2002, and predicted counterfactual formal childcare 
attendance when calculating these elasticities.14 The estimates are based on households where 
the mother has completed high school as the highest education in Oslo/Akershus. An 
observation is that the point estimates of the elasticities for 1 year olds are much larger than 
the estimates for 2 year olds. In contrast to the pattern observed for the coefficients, the point 
estimates of 1999 elasticities are larger than the 2002 elasticities. The 1999 overall elasticity 
is –0.33 [–0.49,–0.17], while the 2002 elasticity is –0.25 [–0.41,–0.09].15  
It is useful to compare our measurement of the price sensitivity of formal childcare to 
other causal estimates in the literature. Baker et al. (2008) obtains a price elasticity of –0.58 
for 0–4 year olds in Canada. This is of much larger magnitude (in absolute value) than our 
estimate, and we suspect part of the reason is that the Canadian reform included additional 
measures aimed at increasing the use of childcare other than the introduction of a subsidy. 
Gathmann and Sass (2017) estimate an elasticity of –0.60, which is also much larger than our 
estimate. Their estimates of the impacts on informal childcare alternatives also differ 
somewhat from our. They also find that mainly parental care increases with the CFC, but find 
																																								 																				
14 We have estimated common counterfactual childcare attendance rates for 1-2 year olds using 
inverse probability age weights. We use observed childcare expenses for 1-2 year olds in 1999 and 
2002 reported in the household surveys. 
15 The 2002 overall elasticity is calculated using the 2002 coefficient –0.136 (from a weighted 
regression), the predicted counterfactual 2002 formal childcare attendance rate of 0.495, the size of the 
CFC benefit of 3,000 NOK and the post-reform average payment for formal childcare given in the 
survey of 2,747 NOK. (–0.136 / 0.495) / (3,000 / 2,747) = –0.251. Note that the confidence intervals of 




no impact on the use of nannies or “child-minders”, while they do find a strong negative 
effect for care provided by friends/relatives. One possible reason for the larger effect found is 
that they report excess capacity in the relevant state at the time of the reform. The different 
estimates could also be explained by cross-country differences in childcare systems, or non-
linear effects. Lastly, using Norwegian data, Kornstad and Thoresen (2007) estimate an 
elasticity for childcare of –0.12 for preschool-aged children (1–6 years) while Black et al. 
(2014) are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no effect on childcare use for the childcare 
subsidy for 5-year-old children. Such inelastic demand for childcare for groups of older 
children is consistent with our finding that the demand for formal childcare for younger 
children is more elastic than that for older children. 
 
5. Robustness 
Identification relies on a common trend in childcare rates over time for 1–2 year olds and 3–5 
year olds. Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive earlier trends because the first survey 
including these questions was only conducted in 1998. However, there are official statistics 
on children in childcare by age for the total population from 1990 to 2003 (Statistics Norway 
2005), as illustrated in Figure 1. These numbers are based on childcare centers reporting the 
number of children in care to Statistics Norway for general administrative purposes. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The trends in formal childcare attendance for 1–2 and 3–5 year olds move very closely 
together before the reform.16 Childcare rates for 1–2 year olds then increase on average 3.5 
percentage points each year from 1990–1997, while those for 3–5 year olds increase at 3.2 
																																								 																				
16 Rates are given in Appendix Table A.1. Note that the observed common pre-trends reported in 
Figure 1 are for formal childcare rates. Preferably, we would have like to have similar rates for the use 




percentage points each year for the same period.17 There seems to be an increase in coverage 
rate in 1997. Average yearly change in coverage rate from 1990 to 1996 is 2.9 and 3.1 
percentage points for children age 3-5 and 1-2 respectively. The corresponding increase in 
1997 is 4.7 and 6.0 percentage points.18 The possible existence of capacity constraints in the 
pre reform period, followed by the school starting-age reform, Reform 97, that excluded a full 
cohort of children from childcare from August 1997 onwards, is the likely explanation. Since 
there is very little grade retention in Norway, and enrollment follows the birth year, a large 
number of 6 year olds were no longer attending childcare by the end of 1997.19 The increase 
then reflects excess demand being met by capacity made available by the school starting-age 
reform. Finally, the increase in the attendance rate tapers off from 1997 to 2000 for 1–2 year 
olds.20 
 Figure 1 also suggests that the childcare growth rate for 3–5 year olds slows somewhat 
after the CFC reform. The yearly increase before the reform was 3.2 percentage points, while 
after the reform it was 2.1 percentage points.21 There are three potential explanations for this. 
First, children with siblings in childcare age could be affected by the reform.22 Since we 
exclude this group from the treatment group, our main estimate based on the household 
surveys are unaffected by this. Second, there could be long-term effects of the CFC reform on 
the children affected. Children aged 3-5 after the reform could have been affected by the CFC 
																																								 																				
17 A t-test on the difference in mean yearly changes in the pre-reform period between the two groups 
shows that they are not statistically different. Inference based on this test is valid if we assume that the 
yearly rate changes are independent. 
18 Testing for a significant different yearly change in coverage rate in 1997 using a regression in the 
pre-reform period shows that it is statistically larger. 
19 Note that only about 40% of 6 year olds were enrolled in regular formal childcare in 1996 because 
of a voluntary school preparation program (Norwegian Ministry of Children and Equality, 1991). 
20 From 1999, “open childcare” providers were no longer included as attending childcare. In 1998, 
children in these centers represented about 2% of all children in childcare (Statistics Norway 2005). 
21 Testing for the difference in mean yearly changes in the pre- and post-reform periods using a 
regression shows that they are statistically different. 
22 Appendix Table A.2 shows estimates of the effect on children aged 3-5 with siblings aged 1-2. 
Results are consistent with Bettinger et al. (2014) showing that older, ineligible siblings care type are 




reform since they were eligible when they were younger. We assess that any bias arising for 
this source should be small. In any case, this should not affect the short-term coefficients 
since it is measured shortly after the implementation of the reform. The third explanation is 
that the 3-5 year olds could be affected by the newly freed up capacity in childcare following 
the CFC reform. The household surveys indicate this since we observe a large increase in 
attendance rate for 3-5 year olds from 1998 to 1999 in Table 1. Work- and rental contracts 
may still bind the childcare centers in 1999, so that they do not change the number of seats 
supplied. These restrictions may not be the same in 2002, leading to a delayed adjustment to 
the reform. If the demand shortfall for 1-2 year olds following from the CFC reform affects 
the childcare centers’ response for both 1-2 year olds and 3-5 year olds in the same way, this 
does not affect the interpretation of our estimates. 
The observed common pre trends are our main identification-test. Another way to 
explore whether the results reported in Table 2 are driven by factors other than the CFC 
reform is to run some regressions, as shown in equation (2), where Ait denotes a vector of age 
dummies. Differential trends in the observable variables would indicate that something other 
than the reform could explain the change in attendance rates. 
1999 2002 1999 1 2 2002 1 2
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 provides the results. The only significant difference is the likelihood of mother 
attending university, with six percentage points more university-educated mothers found 
among 1–2 year olds than 3–5 year olds in 1999 than in 1998 in our sample. This latter 
finding may point to a possible explanation for finding different effects in 1999 and 2002, and 
suggests that we should be somewhat more cautious when interpreting the 1999 effects. 
As an additional robustness, we split the sample according to regional characteristics 




sample. These characteristics are such as unemployment rate, sickness absence rate, female 
employment level, and urbanization level, in addition to living in the capital area 
Oslo/Akershus. When analyzing subsamples, we find no significant differences between the 
regions split using these measures.23 Since the subsamples are very equal on characteristics 
available at the regional, we cannot rule out that these characteristics can disguise interesting 
heterogeneity in effects based on other observables than those reported in Table (2). 
Our study may be invalidated because not all the randomly drawn mothers responded 
to the survey and this may relate to the extent families were affected by the reform. For 
example, if high-SES mothers were more likely to respond to the survey, and these mothers 
were less affected by the subsidy, it could bias the estimated effect of the CFC benefit 
downwards. Further, if immigrant mothers who were more proficient in Norwegian were 
more likely to respond to the survey and less likely affected by the CFC subsidy, this would 
also weaken the results for this group. Since our results do not suggest that the effects are 
different for various subgroups, and the response rate was high, we do not consider this to be 
an important issue for our main estimates. 
We are fortunate to have childcare attendance measurements from two sources: 
administrative childcare rates and household surveys. Thus, one way to validate our results 
from the surveys is to compare them to estimates based on administrative data. Figure 1 and 
Appendix Table A.1 detail the administrative rates. As the administrative data are reported at 
the end of year, we use the pre-reform rate from 1997, as the reform was implemented in 
August 1998. The surveys were conducted during spring each year. The 1999 and 2002 DID 
coefficients using the administrative data yield estimates of the effects of –6.5 and –9.3 
percentage points, respectively.24 Both of these estimates are admittedly outside the 95% 
																																								 																				
23 These results are not reported, but available from the authors on request. 
24 The calculations are based on administrative numbers reported in Table A.1 recorded closest in time 
to the surveys (at the end of 1997, 1999 and 2001), such that the 1999 effect is (0.781–0.742) – 




confidence interval for the estimates from the survey. This might question the external 
validity of our survey-based results. One explanation for the different estimates using 
administrative data and the survey data is likely that the populations in the two datasets are 
defined differently (see our Section 3 for details about defining our final survey sample). For 
example, 3-5 year olds with CFC eligible siblings are excluded from the comparison group in 
the survey, while they are included in the comparison group in the administrative data. Since 
Table A.2 shows that this group reduces attendance after the reform, this is a highly likely 
explanation for finding smaller effects in the administrative data. In addition, it could also be 
due to slight different definitions of formal childcare attendance in the survey and 
administrative data. Thus, even though the magnitudes of the results in the survey and 
administrative data differ somewhat, the main tendency is similar, and we therefore believe 
our results to be representative for the whole population.  
 Assuming formal childcare is a normal good, the substitution and income effect should 
decrease the demand in formal childcare following a regular price increase in formal 
childcare. The introduction of the CFC-benefit corresponds to a subsidy of non-publicly 
funded childcare. The substitution effect is expected to decrease demand for formal childcare, 
while the income effect works in the opposite direction. Thus, an income effect following the 
introduction of the CFC reform would work in the opposite direction compared to a regular 
price increase. Depending on the magnitude of the income effects, our estimate for formal 
childcare will be smaller than the effect of an ordinary price increase in formal childcare. If 
the other care alternatives are normal goods too, the substitution and income effect should 







This study focuses on the effect of a price change on childcare attendance. Few studies have 
isolated large shocks to childcare prices unaccompanied by other changes and studied the 
consequences in detail. The introduction of the CFC in Norway therefore provides a good 
opportunity to examine the response to price changes in formal childcare. Recent emphasis of 
the importance of childcare for later life outcomes motivates our main contribution of adding 
evidence on what the alternative mode of care to formal childcare is. 
The price change accounted for a decrease in childcare attendance of 14.4 percentage 
points 4 years after the reform and mainly increased parental care. The magnitude of this 
effect implies price elasticity for formal childcare of about –0.25. Given the number of studies 
analyzing the consequences of childcare on children's future outcomes, it is important to have 
detailed information on what the alternative modes of care is. We find that the most important 
alternative to formal childcare in this context is parental care. This is in contrast to previous 
studies that have found informal childcare to be dominant alternative mode of care. Of course 
this could be different in different countries, and depend on the compliant group to the 
reform. That a nanny care and day park also is an alternative to formal childcare suggests that 
it attenuates the effect of providing affordable formal childcare on parental labor market 
participation. Our results suggest that formal childcare crowds out other out-of-home care 
alternatives, but not fully. Furthermore, the results show that out-of-home non-relative care is 
important for high-SES families but not low-SES families. Thus, the study demonstrates that 
the alternative form of care depends on important observable characteristics of the family.  
Further studies should aim to explore the responses of different subgroups, such as 
different groups of immigrants, female/males and employed/unemployed, more so than has 
been possible with the data used in this analysis. Moreover, how the price sensitivity varies 




also seek to explore whether the alternative mode of care are depend on whether the childcare 
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Figure 1: Formal childcare rates 
 




Notes: (a) End of year childcare coverage rates as reported in the official statistics based on yearly status 
reports from childcare providers and sent to Statistics Norway. (b) The percentage point change since 















































































Table 3: Childcare alternatives
All Low-SES High-SES
All Age 1 Age 2 All Age 1 Age 2 All Age 1 Age 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Childcare
1999 effect -0.138*** -0.152*** -0.096** -0.184** -0.188** -0.170 -0.129*** -0.157*** -0.090***
(0.032) (0.043) (0.038) (0.083) (0.090) (0.101) (0.033) (0.044) (0.032)   
2002 effect -0.144*** -0.165*** -0.096** -0.225*** -0.283*** -0.161* -0.133*** -0.158*** -0.095** 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.043) (0.076) (0.078) (0.089) (0.029) (0.028) (0.045)   
Parents
1999 effect 0.094*** 0.063** 0.097*** 0.112 0.010 0.229** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.076** 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.083) (0.075) (0.100) (0.022) (0.025) (0.029)   
2002 effect 0.094*** 0.130*** 0.035 0.179** 0.220*** 0.156 0.080*** 0.126*** 0.019
(0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.065) (0.074) (0.100) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
Relatives
1999 effect -0.018 0.004 -0.043* 0.050 0.135** -0.063 -0.034* -0.027 -0.037*
(0.021) (0.026) (0.022) (0.060) (0.052) (0.069) (0.019) (0.027) (0.018)
2002 effect -0.017 -0.021 -0.013 0.058 0.103 -0.020 -0.028 -0.045** -0.007
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
Nannies
1999 effect 0.019 0.036 0.008 -0.005 0.013 -0.023 0.028 0.042 0.015
(0.023) (0.032) (0.021) (0.045) (0.059) (0.058) (0.025) (0.037) (0.020)
2002 effect 0.036* 0.023 0.051 0.002 -0.020 0.018 0.042* 0.029 0.056
(0.020) (0.016) (0.030) (0.041) (0.053) (0.052) (0.023) (0.020) (0.037)
Other
1999 effect 0.027** 0.032** 0.022 -0.007 0.020 -0.046 0.033** 0.033* 0.035*
(0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.036) (0.034) (0.045) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017)
2002 effect 0.046*** 0.042** 0.045** 0.006 0.013 -0.011 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.056** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.033) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020)   
N 6751 4789 4548 1168 814 766 5583 3975 3782
Notes: Estimates of the effect on care alternatives are shown. Dependent variable indicates attendance at care alternative. 
Column (1) includes all children, while Column (2) includes 1-year-old children, and Column (3) includes 2-year-old 
children. Columns (4)–(6) provides the results for low-SES children, while Columns (7)–(9) provide the results for high-
SES children. Control variables are education level, region dummies, immigrant status and age dummies. Standard errors 


























Appendix Figure A.1: Formal childcare attendance - Surveys 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows formal childcare attendance rates given in the household surveys. Numbers are from 
based on descriptives reported in Table 1. 
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